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# Radicalization:

## Relevant Psychological and Sociological Concepts

# RADICALIZATION:

## RELEVANT PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Radicalization is the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism). Radicalism includes specific forms, such as terrorism, which is violence against the innocent bystander, or insurgency, which is violence against the state. It does not include legal and/or nonviolent political protest, such as protest that is more properly called activism.

This paper is a basic reference guide for the military. It provides a summary of main ideas and trends in the psychological and sociological literature as they pertain to the process of radicalization and to the roots and context of radicalism as they pertain to the participants. It is meant to be a general read, understandable to the nonacademic, with many recommendations for further reading. It is also meant to be fairly broad and complete, but with the recognition that the topic is new and evolving, with new threads constantly emerging. The paper is also relegated to the prevailing or fairly well-studied theories and mechanisms.

There are sixteen theories that have been proposed to explain the underlying cause of radicalization. They range from explanations due to societal and economic pressures, social and group dynamics, development of identity, antisocial disorders, and even specific cognitive processes involved in the decision to commit violence. There is no single explanation as to why certain individuals or groups move to violent political action. Examples are provided to demonstrate that diverse reasons are applicable across the spectrum of radical groups and terrorists, and also to show that there are usually multiple reasons operating for the radicals themselves. A single theory cannot explain all radicals, and rarely can it explain even a single one to satisfaction. However, understanding the multiple theorized causes helps us understand motivations, behaviors, and worldview of this population much more so than a simplistic view that they must be irrational actors with clinical psychological problems. The literature is fairly agreed upon this: The terrorist or radical rarely meets the definition of a psychopath.

The theories are explained both in their general state and in how they are applied to the specific subject of radicalism. Those theories that have clinical definitions or methods of assessment have a short section on those subjects.

- Relative deprivation theory
- Social network theory
- Social movement theory
- Symbolic interactionism
- Group dynamic theory
- Social learning theory
- Social identity theory
- Terror management theory

- Uncertainty reduction theory
- Identity theory
- Narcissism theory
- Paranoia theory
- Absolutist/apocalyptic theory
- Antisocial theory
- Novelty-seeking theory
- Humiliation-revenge theory

Along with the possible underlying causal theories, twelve mechanisms are used to explain the means by which a crowd, group, or individual psychologically undergoes the process of radicalization. These mechanisms elucidate the motivations and processes by which any of these types (crowd, group, or person) move from nonviolence to violence (and beyond to suicide, use of terror, etc.). They include the pivoting off an overreaction by the state power, to the narrative of

martyrdom, to intragroup competition, to the internalization of a political grievance. In each case, an illustrative example is given from the real world, from Timothy McVeigh to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), to show how these means allowed the radical to move from legal behavior to violent acts. Again, single mechanisms are not enough to explain the full complexity of the 30+-year campaign of the PIRA. But they help the reader associate the means with the outcome. The twelve mechanisms are:

- Mass radicalization in conflict with an out-group – jujitsu politics
- Mass radicalization in conflict with an out-group – hate
- Mass radicalization in conflict with an out-group – martyrdom
- Group radicalization by like-minded groups
- Group radicalization under isolation and threat
- Group radicalization in competition for the same base of support
- Group radicalization in competition with state power – condensation
- Group radicalization by within-group competition – fissioning
- Individual radicalization by personal grievance
- Individual radicalization by political grievance
- Individual radicalization by self-persuasion in action – the slippery slope
- Individual radicalization by joining a radical group – the power of love

Within each mechanism, potential observed behaviors or operations can be derived to show how this process would present itself to those charged with circumvention, prevention, or defense against radicalism. Mostly these observables have been proposed and are not yet empirically proven or verified. When possible, the veracity of the claimed observable has been stated.

There are programs established in certain countries that attempt to disengage or "deradicalize" individuals. These programs are few in number and most do not, to our knowledge, undertake a scientific research program to assess their success or failure. Disengagement programs, in which the focus is to get the individual to stop their participation in radical activities rather than to abandon their ideological agreement with the group or movement, are far more common. This assumes that the decision to disengage is rarely attributable to ideological reasons (the same applies to entry into the radical movement, interestingly) and that cessation of violent behavior is easier than re-programming of ideology. Re-establishing a beneficial social network, such as re-establishing familial ties or finding the radical a wife is a familiar tactic in these programs, as well as providing amnesty or assistance in finding employment.

The theories and mechanisms are good background material for the reader interested in counter-radical application, but we have also identified sixteen "risk factors" within the literature. Not all of these factors have been experimentally derived or are empirically based. They do, however, merit the attention of the reader due to their importance in the establishment of any counter-radical program or process.

The sixteen risk factors are:

- Emotional vulnerability
- Dissatisfaction with the status quo of political activism
- Personal connection to a grievance
- Positive (or at least non-negative) view of violence
- Perceived benefit of political violence
- Social networks
- In-group de-legitimization of the out-group

- Views on (and histories of) violence
- Resources
- External support
- Perceived threat
- Conflict
- Humiliation
- Competition
- Youth
- Resonant narrative

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# PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This paper provides a basic reference guide to the current psychological and sociological theories and hypotheses on the topic of radicalization. It is meant to provide a general summary of the state of disciplinary thought from the two fields by distilling refereed scholarship from the last few decades.

This paper is primarily intended for those in the military engaged in operational or analytical functions, but it can also be useful to those in law enforcement, intelligence, or policy analysis. It aims for a balance between preserving the original social-science terminology and allowing for easy reading by those unfamiliar with the literature. The information herein is not meant to be a complete and unabridged explanation of the theories or mechanisms that impact the process of radicalization, but we have endeavored to suggest further readings for every topic to which the reader may turn for additional detail.

The first section provides a short description of the domain of radicalization to familiarize the reader with the concept and places the main subject of the paper into context. The two main sections follow, the first being a summary of the relevant sociological and psychological theories that have been proposed to have some effect on the process of radicalization or on the internal and external conditions that relate to an individual, group, or mass movement being radicalized. Then mechanisms are defined that are thought to impact either the process or surrounding conditions during the radicalization process. For each mechanism, a real-world example is given to allow the reader to understand how a social scientist might explain the motivations and means of the radical. A short section describing known concepts and programs of "deradicalization" follows. The conclusion is meant to summarize the important findings and trends that were gleaned from the citations.

In the interest of the military reader, for each mechanism, we have made every effort to provide those factors, behaviors, or other observable traits that have been collected from the disciplinary literature. We want this paper to be a bridge between the researcher and those that bear the burden of defending, preventing, or circumventing the radical from achieving their aims through violence.

# PRIMER ON RADICALIZATION

Radicalization is the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism). Although the decision to move from one side of legality to another (or from peaceful acts to the use of violence) may seem a simple cognitive choice, the impact of psychological factors, social networks, information availability, and the physical environmental have all been seen to impinge upon that decision. Often, the decision is made incrementally, as part of a process whereby actions, decisions, and behaviors move toward the more illegal or violent. At other times, the decision to cross the line between activism and radicalism is abrupt, decisive, and emotionally jarring.

For the purposes of this study, we have removed the types of political action that are legal and/or nonviolent in nature. These types of action can be described as "activism" in opposition to radicalism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Specifically, we use radicalism to mean the use (or support of the use) of violence toward political ends, because the legality of the action is dependent upon the local legal statutes. These legal strictures may actually be a means by which the government is trying to counter a growing political movement, such as when the Polish government decided to outlaw the Solidarity movement in the 1980s, driving the labor union to become an underground protest organization. Although they conducted illegal activities, the Solidarity union would not fit our definition for a radical movement because they did not routinely or purposefully engage in violent opposition to the government. They engaged in illegal activism in their desire to reform the communist regime.

For the purposes of our study, terrorism is considered to be a subset of radicalism. It is the use of premeditated violence against noncombatant targets with the intent of influencing the population or government to capitulate.

There is, therefore, an entire spectrum of operations and support activities across radicalism and activism from which individuals and groups may choose. The extreme end is the pursuit of violent operations, such as suicide bombings, sniping, armed assaults, and so forth. These obviously fall within the domain of radicalism, but operations that support violence, such as the collection of intelligence for the purpose of targeting and the construction or emplacement of a bomb, also fall on the side of radicalism. Operations that fall within "activism" for our purposes include demonstrations and the transportation of personnel or materiel not related to violent operations. Support through donations, open sympathizing, or even voting for a party associated with a cause fall even further on the activist side.

This decision to use these options as a means of expressing their political opinion is influenced by many factors, some of which are expressly studied in this paper, and by other factors that fall outside the domain of psychology and sociology but are important to understand as part of the process. This study devotes its attention to both the internal and social external factors that impinge upon the decision to act, or the process by which an individual or group moves from the activist side of the spectrum to the more violent side.

The first question that comes to mind when viewing the political action process as such a spectrum is whether or not radicalism starts always at the activist end and moves, gradually or precipitously, to violence. Studies by Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) conclude that it is far more prevalent for an individual to be firmly disposed toward either an activist mindset or a mindset in which the

acceptability of violence toward certain goals can be allowed, rather than it being a full spectrum of choice for the individual. People seem to either be comfortable with violence from the start and, if not, they are rarely likely to ever move toward finding violence an acceptable alternative.[1] Certainly there are numerous cases in which personal tragedy, horrific or monumental events that cause moral outrage, or even social conditioning can lead nonviolent people to commit to acts (or lives) of violence. But this is comparatively rare; the jump from activist to radical mindset is a far one for most people. Therefore it is this small collection of individuals, those that inherently see violence as an acceptable means to certain ends as well as those that come to that conclusion through external or internal processes, to which we turn our interest.

The second question that presents itself is how that process of becoming a radical, or being "radicalized," occurs. A number of stages have been proposed, including a four-step model by the law enforcement community (Silber, 2010) that includes pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization. Others (Horgan, 2008b) add further stages beyond becoming a full radical, incorporating stages for remaining involved, or disengaging, or even de-radicalizing. Importantly, Horgan stresses that both his and other proposed stages of radicalization are not necessarily sequential or even necessary in all cases. One may progress through all of them or a certain number of them, go through some in parallel, or even skip some. Therefore the problem of "tracing" a normative path by which a radical is created is made nearly moot by the path's dependence on internal psychology, social conditions, and information and physical resource availability.

There are four domains in which the decision to commit violence resides. Each are discussed at least in part in this study, but primarily from the internal psychological impact or sociological impact upon the decision. First, the decision is greatly impacted by the psychological disposition and state of the individual (or group). As stated before, some individuals come with a predilection to the use of violence as an acceptable means toward an end. Coupled with that is the sympathy or affinity with the cause being promoted within the radical context. If the sympathy value is high, that person is more likely to see the utilitarian side of the radical path. Last is the conditioned fear of the consequences, which is promoted by external events, and accumulated and interpreted by the individual. If a person sees others (or hears of others) getting away without punishment for violent acts, one's fear of consequences may lessen their general aversion to the use of violence.

The social domain is highly important to the radicalization process, as the influence of friends, family, and associates can highly impact a decision to pursue the radical path or avert oneself from it. Social networks are discussed in depth in this study. One must also consider the impact of alternative paths available in more nonradical social groups, however, for they can either allow people to support a radical cause or movement without the expenditure of as much moral or social capital as joining the movement, or they may provide an alternative to the radical cause. For the former, the ability of a Northern Irish Catholic to support and be involved with the Sinn Fein political party allowed them to support the cause without committing fully to the violent intentions or operations of the Irish Republican Army. For the latter case, however, the presence of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s nonviolent social movement was a large drain on the support and popularity of the violent-leaning Black Panther Party. American blacks opted to support the more peaceful group in their effort to transform the political landscape (Levine, 1973).

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[1] Saucier et al (2010) have developed an "extremist mindset" from factor analysis of thousands of pieces of radical literature. Although the assessment has not been empirically validated against a radicalized population, it may be a valuable component to include in primary research to help determine the relative extremism of radical groups and/or their parent populations.

The information domain and its impact on the radicalization process will be less visible in this paper, but the ready availability of information, including ideological narratives and success stories and even the presence of tactics, techniques, and procedures, can have a vast influence upon the cognitive process by which one determines violence is profitable. Lastly, the physical environment, including one's sense of security, the availability and presence of ready-made targets for violence, and the availability of resources and materiel all factor into the decision as to whether to pursue violence.

Another fact becomes increasingly clear during the study of worldwide radicalization and the history of violent opposition. Geography and economics do not play a decisively predictive role in determining where radicalism arises or thrives. World history has been full of resistance and revolutionary movements in all areas. There are marked organizational, operational, and functional similarities between current-day Islamic fundamentalist groups promoting the idea of jihad and the communist revolutionary groups from the 1960s and many others. There is a current trend away from the socioeconomic narrative of class-struggle as a motivating factor, and a marked rise in movements pulling on traditionalist/fundamentalist narratives, but many radical groups still exist that coalesce around opposition to and the influence of foreign country (whether military presence or cultural influences) or around centuries-old ethnic divisions and hatred. Some socioeconomic reform groups still operate around the world, including those that desire a more reformist-modernist direction (Crossett, 2010). In short, revolution, radicalism, and violence for political means are still worldwide phenomena, and likely always will be.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Crossett, C. (Ed.) (in press). *Casebook on insurgency and revolutionary warfare, Volume II, 1962–2009*.

Horgan, J. (2008). From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618*, 80–94.

Levine, D. U., et al., (Winter 1973). Differences between black youth who support the Black Panthers and the NAACP. *The Journal of Negro Education, 42*, 19–32.

Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2009). Measuring political mobilization: The distinction between activism and radicalism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 21*, 239–260.

Silber, M. (2010). *Radicalization in the West revisited: confirming the threat* [Briefing]. New York Police Department.

# SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS RELEVANT TO THE STUDY OF RADICALIZATION

Social-science studies of the underlying causes of radicalization have focused on three main areas: 1) the political, economic, and social conditions that correlate to increased incidences of politically motivated violence, 2) group dynamic processes that facilitate radicalization and an increased risk of violence, and 3) psychological traits and characteristics of group members that predispose individuals to seeking membership in violent organizations (Post et al, 2002).

This section includes a subset of theories that have been posited within the disciplines of sociology and psychology to explain the internal and external motivation of why an individual chooses to affiliate with a radical group, how that individual becomes a radical, or how a nonradical group transforms into a radical one. Sociology is the study of human social activity ranging from small-group interaction (micro-level) to societal systems and structures (macro-level). Psychology is the study of human mental functions and behavior to include perception, cognition, attention, emotion, motivation, brain functioning, personality, behavior, and interpersonal relationships. Some of the theories included in this study have been specifically discussed as being applicable to the subject of terrorism, but we have included those that are sufficiently relevant and applicable to the more general process of radicalization. None of the theories presented should be considered mutually exclusive or the sole determinant of individual or group radicalization.

Throughout this paper, two concepts are frequently employed and must be defined for clarity. An *in-group* is a social group toward which an individual feels loyalty and respect, usually due to membership in the group based on social or familial ties. Correspondingly, an *out-group* is a social group toward which an individual feels contempt, opposition, or a desire to compete. Commonly, in-groups include one's family, team, professional organization, and those of the same race, culture, gender, or religion. This affinity often manifests itself as an in-group bias, whereby individuals tend to look more favorably upon their in-group than members of an out-group. Research in sociology and psychology has demonstrated that individuals often privilege in-group members over out-group members even when the in-group has no actual social standing.

The sources referenced here are primarily from peer-reviewed scholarly journals or textbooks within the political science, sociology, and psychology disciplines; however, there are some references to government and nongovernment reports from reputable sources as well some minimal references to works by investigative journalists.

## SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES

Sociology is the study of human social activity ranging from small-group interaction to societal systems and structures. Sociological research emphasizes group behavior and thus examines such phenomena as interactions and exchanges at the small-group level, group dynamics and group development, and societies. Sociologists are typically interested in the individual and group, but generally within the context of larger social structures and processes, such as social roles, race, class, gender, ethnicity, and socialization. They use a combination of qualitative research designs and quantitative methods, such as procedures for sampling and surveys.

The study of radicalization includes both the internal and external influences on disposition, worldview, and behavior. Therefore, a basic understanding of some of the sociological theories applicable to radicalization as well as the analytic techniques used by sociologists will facilitate learning more about the process. The application of sociological theories to radicalization is but one method to mitigate the risk of committing the fundamental attribution error of elevating the importance of internal psychological disposition at the expense of the social and environmental influences on behavior. However, it has been suggested that explanations of behavior based on nothing more than culture, group affiliation, identity, motives, personality, attitudes, values, or ideology often rely on specious reasoning, lack empirical support, and rarely provide a decision advantage (Wheeler, 2009) .

### Suggested further reading on this topic:

Blain, M. (2009). *The sociology of terrorism: Studies in power, subjection, and victimage ritual.* New York: Universal Publishers.

Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a terrorist and why.* Library of Congress Federal Research Division.

### Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative deprivation theory states that economic disparities cause violent political behavior.

**Description:** This theory states that the subjective sense of being deprived of certain needs or freedoms by a domestic or international governing body can result in feelings of frustration, and when individuals can no longer bear this misery or indignity a rebellion ensues. When these feelings of frustration go unresolved through productive or legal means and are left to fester they can manifest in acts of violence motivated by, but not always directed toward, the governing body (Gurr, 1970).

Increasing differences between the material welfare of the "haves" and "have-nots" has been postulated as a cause for political violence. The globalization of economic markets and telecommunications infrastructure in the late 20th century have created new pockets of poverty while enabling the impoverished to remain informed of and connected to those better off (Maya et al, 2002). This modernization brings about two successive value changes for the "haves": Traditional values change into secular, rational values; and survival values change to tolerant, liberal self-expression values. The "have-nots" do not experience this shift and thus tend to be more fundamental or traditional in their value system (Savage & Liht, 2008).

Relative deprivation and/or oppression theory (the two are essentially synonymous) cannot account for the behavior at the individual level. Closely related, and arguably necessary to understand the theory, is the frustration-aggression hypothesis.  The frustration-aggression hypothesis is a response to the aggravation and disappointment resulting from the incongruence between various subjective political, economic, and personal needs and objective reality. It proposes that aggression in all forms (personal or political) is the result of frustration. Conceptually, frustration is considered any stimulus that prevents an individual from attaining some goal and its accompanying reinforcing quality. Frustration is a necessary condition for aggression; however, it is typically inhibited by contextual factors such as social norms and/or threat of punishment. When an aggressive response is suppressed, the use of nonaggressive strategies may fail to achieve the desired goal thus reinforcing aggressive behavior, elevating it as the dominant response (Maile et al, 2010).

The bimodal theory of aggression describes aggression as either reactive or instrumental. Reactive aggression (also referred to as impulsive, expressive, hostile, unintentional, or affective aggression) occurs in response to a perceived threat or provocation characterized by a reaction of fear or anger with autonomic arousal (a loss of behavioral control). Reactive aggression can be both defensive and offensive. Instrumental aggression (also called premeditated, intentional, predatory, proactive, or cold-blooded aggression) is goal-oriented, planful, and tends to be characterized by the lack of or minimal emotional and autonomic arousal.[2] Instrumental aggression is typically considered offensive in nature. The cognitive neoassociationist variant of the frustration-aggression hypothesis holds that it is not the frustration stimulus that precipitates aggression, but rather the negative emotion that is experienced when frustrated (Maile, 2010). This theory, which is consistent with the approach of Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy (REBT) and derived from stoicism, considers the aggressive response a decision point that can be consciously controlled.

**Application to radicalization:** The relative deprivation theory is one of the most frequently applied when studying violence (political or otherwise) in the developing world and lower-socioeconomic-status groups. Grievances are a necessary but insufficient explanation of why some motivations become organized into sustained movements and others do not (Beck, 2008). Certain politically motivated individuals reach the point at which their potential energy is converted into violent action. A subset may show a biological predilection to instrumental aggression. But whether aggressive behavior is physical, mental, or verbal; committed by individuals or groups; directed toward others, self, or inanimate objects; associated with mental illness, antisocial personality characteristics, or cultural, political, or religious views, most definitions include an aspect of overt violent behavior with intent to cause damage, pain, or harm (physical or psychological). Political violence can be construed as a form of instrumental aggression; however, the outcome (harm to others) is often secondary to the primary politically motivated goal of social change (Maile et al, 2010).

Relative-deprivation theory requires a set of environmental conditions, a specific interpretation of those conditions, and a violent reaction to that interpretation to be present in causal linkage. Even cursory analysis can show that political violence exists in some areas in which individuals are perceived to be deprived of some resource. However, there is little empirical evidence to prove the causality between conditions and the behavior or that the specific mechanism of internalization preceded the violence. Political violence clearly exits in areas in which very few individuals are perceived to be deprived of some resource. Furthermore, millions of people throughout the world exist in frustrating circumstances but never move toward radicalization. Many of those who do become radicalized do not belong to the desperate classes whose frustration they claim to be expressing (Victoroff, 2005). Nevertheless, the theory merits inclusion, particularly given that much of the justification for U.S. foreign aid policies is rooted in the idea of relative-deprivation.

## Suggested further reading on this topic:

Fanon, F. (1965). *The wretched of the Earth*. New York: Pelican.

Gurr, T. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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[2] Psychophysiologically, reactive aggressors demonstrate increases in heart rate in response to a perceived provocation, whereas instrumental aggressors do not (Maile et al, 2010).

## Social Network Theory

> Social network theory views social relationships as individual actors (nodes) and ties (relationships) between them. A social network is the actual human-to-human linkage, whereas a social network model is a representation of what those nodes and ties are perceived to be.

**Description:** A social network is a structure composed of individuals or organizations (nodes) that are connected by one or more specific types of interdependency. Those interdependencies may be friendship; kinship; common interest; financial exchange; group affiliation; dislike; social relationships; or relationships of beliefs, knowledge, or prestige. Humans are strongly influenced by their network of close associates, and these associations are critical to understanding an individual's behavior, such as a movement toward radicalization. Close associates may be a greater influence on a person's behavior than internal variables of personality or subjective experience.

Social Network analysis (SNA) is the study of person-to-person associations and their effects on both individual and group behavior. A social network model is a diagram of all of the relevant ties between nodes being studied and is often represented as a node-and-link graph structure. The nodes often represent individuals but can also be organizations or other entities. The links are relationships and may be based on data such as phone records or meeting attendance, or may be hypothesized or inferred based on other types of information. Link analysis has been employed to understand radical groups for quite some time. The French used 3x5 index cards and string on a corkboard to depict the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) cells during the Battle of Algiers in 1957. Modern social-network-analysis software can be useful for keeping track of large networks and analyzing group structures. Social network analysis also sheds light on the functioning of organizations and can allow the estimation of how resistant they are to attacks, infiltration, or outside influences.

Identifying an individual's social network can reveal who are their key influencers. Most people have a small number of strong ties, or people who they most depend on for support and social contact. People generally have a larger number of weak ties or more casual contacts. Weak ties tend to be less influential, but can be critical pathways for new information. For example, research has identified that most people find employment through their network of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). Social network theory considers the attributes of individuals less important than their relationships and ties with other actors within the network. Research in a number of academic fields has shown that social networks operate from families up to nations, and play a critical role in determining the way problems are solved, organizations are run, and the degree to which individuals succeed in achieving their goals.

**Application to radicalization:** The structure of a social network helps determine the network's usefulness to its individuals. Smaller, tighter networks can be more useful to a radical group than networks with many loose connections to individuals outside the main network. More open networks (those with multiple weak ties) are more likely to introduce new ideas and opportunities to their members than closed networks with many redundant ties (Wheeler, 2009).

The requirement for cohesion and conformity in many radical groups (along with the desire for operational security) prohibits the large open social networks that can encourage alternative perspectives. Leaders intolerant of dissent or questioning would not only prefer, but often demand, highly compartmentalized groups. It not only makes the movement less vulnerable to destruction if one cell is interdicted, it limits the free flow of ideas that may detract the group for the leader's proscribed direction. Both intolerance of dissent and the requirement for operational security led Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) to maintain small and clandestine cellular structure with highly cohesive

cells, whereas their fellow radical organization the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) favored a much larger network that was open to recruitment and expansion. Whereas EIJ was more resistant to penetration by the Egyptian security apparatus, EIG was able grow their organization more readily while generating greater popular support through overt civic action. Any social network, large or small, closed or open, loose or tight, has strengths and vulnerabilities, the exploitation of which is dependent upon the accuracy of the knowledge about the structure and function.

Isolation or lack of social connections is also an important factor influencing behavior. Radicalization often happens among members of a diaspora, who feel isolation from a foreign surrounding culture and a heightened dependency on other expatriates. Isolation has been shown to be a key precursor to recruitment to religious groups (Sageman, 2004) such as the Unification Church (Lofland, 1981) or the recruitment of young people to violent political groups such as the German Red Army Faction (RAF) (Wasmund, 1986). In fact, experts have stated the affiliative factors of social networks are the principal reason for joining radical Islamist groups (Sageman, 2004; Post, 2007). Conversely, deradicalization programs such as Saudi Arabia's (Stern, 2010) use the recontact with family members and arranged marriages as a means of moving individuals back into the mainstream of society.

SNA can be used to determine how hierarchical is the command structure of a group, how adaptable an organization is to unfolding circumstances, which are the central[3] and/or critical nodes within the organization, and the rate of information flow through the organization. The resilience of a social network subsequent to the incarceration or death of key members can be indicative of the relative strength of the network and the influence value of those members within the radical group.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Aussaresses, P. (2002). *The battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and counter-terrorism in Algeria 1955–1957*. Paris: Enigma Books.

Freeman, L. (2006). *The development of social network analysis*. Vancouver: Empirical Press.

Milgram, S. (1967). The small world problem. *Psychology Today,* 60–67.

Scott, J. (2000). *Social network analysis: A handbook* (2nd ed.). Newberry Park, CA: Sage.

Tilly, C. (2005). *Identities, boundaries, and social ties*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press.

**Social Movement Theory**

> Social movement theory describes a psychological and sociological process whereby external social or political conditions motivate individuals to challenge the status quo.

**Description:** Social movement theory focuses on larger groups by examining the relationship between the individual, the group, and the broader society. The premise is that any social movement is a self-conscious group that coordinates its activities to challenge the prevailing social order. Social movement theory conceives of social movements and their violent subgroups as rational actors, driven by a political agenda and a set of political goals (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008a).

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[3] Centrality (usually, but not exclusively, measured by the number of connections) is often an indicator of criticality within an organizational structure.

Social movement theory states that opinions have associated social value that is consistently recognized across a group. Human nature drives individuals toward agreement within a small group, and thus opinions tend to gravitate toward the center over time. This pressure toward conformity, however, is not uniform; individuals more extreme than average (in the group-favored direction) tend to possess greater influence. These individuals are viewed as more devoted to the group and more capable, and the enhanced status translates into more influence and less change during group discussion. Individuals less extreme than average have comparatively less influence and thus change more (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

Social movement theory analyzes movements as the interaction of three concepts: mobilizing resources, political opportunities, and framing (Beck, 2008). Resource mobilization (or Strain Theory) describes the process whereby intermediate variables translate the subjective experience of relative deprivation into political action. This perspective proposes that the fundamental problem for collective action is the resources available for mobilization and the methods by which they are organized and directed. Analysis of resource mobilization focuses on how movements actively engage in garnering support and enlarging their constituency and how social networks serve to define and disseminate grievances (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008a).

Political movements arise not only because they are able to successfully mobilize resources, but also because overall political or social conditions are ripe for successful and sustained contention. The political process theory argues that political opportunities combine with the organizational capacity for mobilization to allow for the emergence of the social movement (Beck, 2008).

Finally, framing is employed to describe the rationale and marketing strategies movements employ to engender support. Framing analysis focuses on the social production and dissemination of meaning and on how individuals come to conceptualize themselves as a collective entity. Movements require an argument that resonates within wider social narratives to gain popularity. This process, called frame alignment (or the meaning participants ascribe to their actions), is a crucial component to mobilization (Beck, 2008) and is often a subordinate objective within strategic communications or psychological operations objectives. National Cultural Theory holds that certain frame alignments are more applicable to specific societies and/or cultures. For example, in collectivist cultures, a person's identity is primarily derived from the social system, dividing the world strictly according to in-groups and out-groups and linking their personal well-being to the well-being of their group, whereas in individualist cultures, identity is derived from personal goals (Victoroff, 2005).

**Application to radicalization:** Social movement theory offers a way of conceiving radicalization with an explicit focus on the broader dynamics and processes of political mobilization. Social networks are the key vehicle for transmission of grievances, for recruitment, and for mobilization (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008a), and the analysis of social networks is one of the more popular analytical tools in understanding and combating radical groups.

The result of the interaction between state and nonstate group is often a mutual escalation of violence between group and the security apparatus, with further disengagement by individuals whose radicalization is not sufficient to face increasing state pressure. The majority of those who participate in radical action (joining an illegal rally, march, or sit-in) are likely to respond to repression by disengaging. Those who cease typically perceive the participation cost too high. Those who do not perceive the participatory cost as too high will be undeterred, increase their commitment, and escalate their action against the state. The determinants of this choice are not well studied, but it is hypothesized those who bring a moral frame and personal grievance are more likely

to continue. Therefore, analyzing the cultural narratives and the specific arguments made by a radical group (through both external and internal communications) will provide insight into which grievances are salient and why they resonate with the target audience. The conclusion of this cycle of escalation and self-selection is likely to be that a tiny fraction of the original protest group has condensed into a highly radicalized group that goes underground as a terrorist cell (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). As a group radicalizes, analyzing the changes in their arguments will provide additional insight into the increasingly smaller core of the group.

### Suggested further reading on this topic:

Buechler, S. (2010). *Understanding social movements: A sociological history of social movement theories.* Washington, DC: Paradigm Publishers.

Foss, D. A., & Larkin, R. (1986). *Beyond revolution: A new theory of social movements.* New York: Greenwood Publishing Group.

### Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism is a sociological perspective that places emphasis on microscale social interaction as it relates to self-concept.

**Description:** Derived from American Pragmatism, symbolic interactionism holds that individuals act toward things based on the meanings ascribed to those things. For example, generally speaking, those in agrarian societies tend to act positively toward animals that can facilitate the physical act of farming, while Christians act positively toward the symbolic cross because they perceive it to represent the act of Jesus Christ being crucified for the sins of mankind. There are three underlying premises of the theory: First, individuals act toward things based on the ascribed meaning of said things. The second is that the meaning of such things is derived from the social interaction an individual has with others and the society. Finally, these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the individual in dealing with the things he or she encounters (Blumer, 1969).

Prior to an individual ascribing meaning to symbols, he or she must first develop a self-reference. An individual cannot thoroughly appreciate the meaning a symbol has to him or her until he or she understands who he or she is. The formation and maintenance of the self emerges through a complex interaction amongst symbols, meanings, acts, and roles over three different phases. Stage 1 is the preparatory stage during which the individual child imitates observed actions. Stage 2 is the play phase during which the child learns to take on certain roles within a small group and in society. Stage 3 is the game phase during which the child begins to consider his or her own social position, assesses the concomitant responsibilities, and tests these roles (called reality testing) (Arena & Arrigo, 2006).

This process can become confounded in the presence of minor (and certainly major) mental illness. However, psychopathology in either form is not required for the process to be somehow compromised or ineffective. Certain mental disorders impair reality testing; thus the environmental responses that a healthy individual would perceive as feedback are misinterpreted or ignored and therefore the role-play phase persists along a maladaptive path. If the individual's behavior is unchecked or uncorrected, he or she may learn that authoritarian behavior is appropriate and continue (or possibly exaggerate) the behavior as part of the play phase. If the individual perceives the environmental responses to be positive, the behavior will perpetuate into the game phase.

**Figure 1. An application of the cognitive-interpersonal cycle to symbolic interactionism (adapted from Beck & Pretzer, 2005).**

Figure 1 depicts a hypothesized cognitive mechanism of symbolic interactionism that highlights the dichotomy between reality testing and subjective processing. For any given individual in a particular situation, he or she will possess a set of underlying beliefs and assumptions. When those beliefs are met with external stimuli, two separate parallel processes can occur. The subjective processing path automatically relies on a set of biases that lead to a specific mood state. The valence (positive or negative) of the mood will further influence their selective application of memory and reinforce the initial automatic thought. The reality-testing pathway (which can occur in serial or parallel) moves from the initial thought (in response to external events) to a set of behaviors. The reaction of those who observed the behaviors then serves as feedback to the individual. A negative response of others should inform the individual that the selected behavior might not be appropriate, whereas positive feedback from others will reinforce the behavior. Theoretically, the greater the congruence between the respective processing, the better adapted the individual. Conversely, the greater the incongruity between reality testing and subjective interpretation, the greater the likelihood the adult will tend to misperceive their environment. The latter becomes increasingly exacerbated with the degree of underlying psychopathology.

**Application to radicalization:** Symbolic interactionism can be helpful in identifying the salience of particular narratives and/or objects that resonate with an individual, group, or society. A thorough human terrain analysis component of the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) will likely include some of these resonant symbols. Although it is not necessarily practical to assume one can immediately determine a set of behaviors from resonant symbology, the co-option of such may be a component to radicalization.

The criticism of the applicability of developmental theories is often too dismissive. Although these theories are not deterministic (not every child who prefers being chased to chasing his or her peers will mature to a life of criminally deviant behavior), they can be applied post-hoc to analyze individual behavior. The case of Timothy McVeigh and his radicalization can be evaluated through the developmental components of symbolic interactionism. As a child, McVeigh identified the dominant masculine influence as his grandfather, with whom he associated strength, honor, and martial virtue. During psychological tense periods, he employed fantasy as a compensatory mechanism, viewing himself as the ultimate warrior. His mixed success with reality testing of the hypothesis contributed to his operating independently of radical groups despite ideological similarity. The complex set of interactions ultimately led him to view himself as a lone revolutionary whose moral obligation was to commit a violent act in order to further his political cause (Meloy, 2004).

Also important to consider when studying radicalization are the sociocultural and religious aspects of symbolism and how they may be exploited by groups to either recruit new members and/or further their political agenda. Both the Irish Catholics of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Shiite Muslims who participated in the Iranian Revolution held self-sacrifice in great reverence, a theme that was used to further their political agendas within a like-minded base of supporters. It is important to not only understand why symbols resonate with the target audience, but also why they are salient. Developing this level of comprehension will enable a more sound decision when confronted with novel stimuli when one cannot rely upon a predetermined course of action.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Freud, S. (1918). *Totem and taboo.* New York: Random.

Stryker, S. (2002). *Symbolic interactionism.* New York: The Blackburn Press.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

Psychology is the study of human mental functions and behavior to include perception, cognition, attention, emotion, motivation, brain functioning, personality, behavior, and interpersonal relationships. Psychologists are typically interested in the mental functions and behavior of individuals and small groups. As with sociologists, psychologists employ use a combination of qualitative research designs and quantitative methods, such as procedures for sampling and surveys, along with more direct assessments of an individual through interviews or self-report measures. The scientific study of human mental functions and behavior is a logical discipline in which to evaluate radicalism. Although explanations at the level of individual psychology are insufficient (Horgan, 2009b), the incorporation of multiple subdisciplines within psychology does help one comprehend the process of radicalization. Many experts agree that radicalization involves psychologically normal (e.g., not clinically psychotic) individuals. Although there are certainly exceptions, it is a reasonable assumption that the individuals of interest do not necessarily possess any cognitive, affective, or neurological deficits, or at least those deficits are not precipitating causes of their radicalization. Many consider these individuals rational in that their actions (although violent) are derived from a conscious, calculated decision to take this particular type of action as the optimum strategy to accomplish a sociopolitical goal (Victoroff, 2005).

The study of radicalization includes both the internal and external influences on disposition, worldview, and behavior. Therefore, a basic understanding of the psychological theories applicable to radicalization as well as the analytic techniques used by psychologists will facilitate learning more about the process of radicalization. The limited extent of empirical testing of the various theories makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions with regard to the role of psychological factors and mechanisms behind violent radicalization and terrorism. Based on the data gathered on radical individuals to date, there is consensus that political violence cannot be explained because of psychopathology (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Bognar, B., Beutler, L. E., Breckenridge, J. N., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2006). *The psychology of terrorism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Horgan, J. (2005). *The psychology of terrorism.* New York: Routledge.

Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a terrorist and why.* Library of Congress Federal Research Division.

Stout, C. (2002). *The psychology of terrorism.* New York: Praeger.

Victoroff, J., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). *Psychology of terrorism: Classic and contemporary insights.* Washington, DC: Psychology Press.


## SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY THEORIES

A prevailing theme in the recent literature is that the branch of social and behavioral science that provides the most analytic value to the study of radicalization is social psychology (Horgan, 2009b). The field of social psychology represents "an attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others" (Mitchell, 2010 p 246).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Victoroff, J., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). *Psychology of terrorism: Classic and contemporary insights.* Washington, DC: Psychology Press.


### Group Dynamic Theory

> Group dynamics is the study of two or more individuals connected by social relationships and how they interact and influence each other.

**Description:** Relevant to the fields of psychology, sociology, and communication studies, a group is two or more individuals who are connected to each other by social relationships. Groups may be classified as aggregate, primary, secondary, and category groups. Because they interact and influence each other, groups develop a number of dynamic processes that separate them from a random collection of individuals. These processes include norms, roles, relations, development, need to belong, social influence, and effects on behavior. The field of group dynamics is primarily concerned with small-group behavior, though the component concepts can be applied to mass movements (Forsyth, 2006).

Group dynamic theory distinguishes between two sources of attraction to a group: the value of material group goals and the value of the social reality created by the group. Material goals include the obvious rewards of group membership, such as progress toward common goals, congeniality, status, and security. Less obvious is the social-reality value of the group by which the group is the sole source of certainty for many questions of value. The social-reality value of the group depends on internalizing group standards of value, including moral standards (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Charismatic leaders can often co-opt and ultimately redefine the social-reality value for the group; this behavior is more prevalent in cults than radical groups, often to a much greater degree. Small groups, however, are vulnerable to co-option by the charismatic individual who can effectively manipulate the perceptions of the others through emotional appeals, symbolism, or isolation.

There are three psychological assumptions (or emotional states) that can be used to distinguish members of a particular group. Bion's (1961) research has identified the dependency group, the pairing group, and the fight-flight group to consistently emerge and predominate in his study of group dynamics. The dependency group turns to an omnipotent leader for security; the members act as if they do not have independent minds and blindly seek and follow directions. Any human being attempting to fulfill this role will inevitably fail to meet such criteria; thus disappointment and anger amongst the followers are the eventual result. The pairing group members act as if the goal of the group is to bring forth a Messiah, someone who will save them—there is an air of optimism and hope that a new world is around the corner. Finally, the fight-flight group, which acts oppositional in relationship to the outside world—a world that both threatens and justifies its existence—believes that the only way for the group to preserve itself is by fighting against or fleeing from the enemy. These groups will have unique sociocultural and/or organizational presentations based on the particular group; however, these general trends are nonetheless applicable (Post, 1984).

One of the psychological phenomena associated with group dynamics is deindividuation. Deindividuation is a situation in which antinormative behavior is released in groups in which individuals are not seen or paid attention to as individuals; their immersion in a group is sufficiently intense whereby the individual ceases to be seen as such. The issue has both negative and positive aspects; in this study the positive seem more pertinent. Deindividuation through the reinforcement of the social and group/collective identities is typically looked upon as favorable from the group standpoint because it builds cohesion and engenders loyalty. This is done through a variety of tactics: indoctrination (including the exploitation of cultural, religious, and martial symbology and ritual), training, and the use of uniforms. The use of uniforms has obvious practical benefits, but the higher-order effects, supported by numerous laboratory and naturalistic research, include increases in aggressive behavior and diminished aversion to risk. A particularly extreme form of deindividuation is the "Lucifer Effect," the point in time at which an ordinary, normal person first crosses the boundary between good and evil to engage in an evil action (Zimbardo, 2008).

**Application to radicalization:** In small groups, perceived threats leads to increased group cohesion, increased respect for in-group leaders, increased sanctions for in-group deviates, and idealization of in-group norms (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Therefore, actions taken by the government to intimidate a radical group may in fact achieve the opposite effect. However, because cohesion brings pressure for both behavioral compliance and internalized value consensus, groups under threat may be susceptible to paranoia and vulnerable to fractioning due to mistrust.

In larger groups, reference to cohesion is often replaced by some reference to in-group identification, patriotism, or nationalism, but the pattern in response to out-group threat is analogous. The combination of isolation and outside threat makes group dynamics immediately more powerful in the underground (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

In both small and/or large groups, increased cohesion can lead to negative consequences, one of which is groupthink. Groupthink is the thought process within a highly cohesive in-group whose members are trying to minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analyzing, and evaluating ideas (Janus, 1972). This can be induced and/or exploited to combat the radicalization process; however, if done so indelicately or without proper targeting analysis it can quickly motivate a group toward violence in response to a perceived threat.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Bion, W. R. (1961). *Experiences in groups, and other papers*. London: Tavistock.

Forsyth, D. R. (2006). *Group dynamics (4th ed.)*. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.

Freud, S. (1922) *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego*. New York: Liveright Publishing.

Janis, I. L. (1972). *Victims of groupthink*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

## Social Learning Theory

Social learning theory states that individuals learn new behavior through observing and learning the social factors in their environment.

**Description:** Bandura's social learning/cognitive restructuring theory of aggression suggests that violence follows observation and imitation of an aggressive model. If people observe positive, desired outcomes, then they are more likely to model, imitate, and adopt the behavior. Reciprocal determinism states that individual behavior is both shaped by and in turn shapes the environment (Bandura, 1976). The effect the environment has is not necessarily consistent, because the perception of the external input will differ by individual. The differential reinforcement of aggressive behavior as perceived by the individual will shape his or her propensity toward aggression (Maile et al, 2010). As an individual progresses through the preparatory, game, and play phases (or whichever developmental model is applied) and aggressive behavior is positively rewarded through increased social standing or praise by an authority figure, the individual will likely react to stimuli with aggression. Conversely, if aggressive behavior is punished, the individual will be less likely to react aggressively.

Humans internalize personal moral standards that guide their behavior, and violation of these standards causes self-condemnation. Accordingly, individuals are motivated to avoid self-condemnation by adhering to these moral standards. Internalized social norms typically encourage restraint from violence, particularly extreme forms that can lead to the death of others. When socialized in specific ways that permit them to suspend or disengage from these moral standards (such as when a member of a radical group) individuals can rationalize violent behavior even when directed at innocent members (Maile et al, 2010). Cognitive dissonance is an unpleasant mental sensation caused by holding conflicting ideas in memory simultaneously. Humans have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance and do this both by changing their attitudes, beliefs, and/or actions by rationalizing, blaming, and/or denying.

It is important to note that not only does the individual have the opportunity to acquire a new set of moral standards after joining a group, but he or she will likely be compelled to obey the authority figures within the group, thus expediting the process. The obedience to authority was the subject of the renowned Milgram experiments conducted at Yale in the early 1960s. The principal finding was that psychologically healthy adults would go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority.

Ordinary people, simply performing their assigned duties, and without any particular personal or social predisposition, can become agents in a destructive process (Milgram, 1963).

Social learning theory has been applied extensively to the understanding of aggression and psychological disorders, particularly in the context of behavior modification. It is also the theoretical foundation for the technique of behavior modeling widely used in training programs.

**Application to radicalization:** Socialization within radical organizations facilitates the use of violent behavior through learning specific mechanisms of moral disengagement. Once the individual has begun to affiliate with or has joined a radical organization, social learning processes can then exert their effects in further modifying the individual's knowledge structures, beliefs, and attitudes. The demonization of an enemy serves to reinforce the individual's existing associations amongst aggression-related concepts, negative affect, and the enemy-in-memory networks. Over time, what may have begun as a laborious cognitive exercise (i.e., contemplating and ruminating over the evil nature of the enemy) will become simple and effortless as these associations are reinforced and strengthened through socialization within the terrorist group, to the point of automaticity. It is during this socialization process that individuals are psychologically and ideologically trained in the forms of moral disengagement that are necessary to commit terroristic acts. The socialization processes in a radical organization will afford situational cues and modify moral standards that will encourage violence against a selected enemy (Maile et al, 2010).

An individual's personality evolves and is not influenced by one domain, but by multiple factors including parents, peers, and the environment. An individual may join a group based on basic nonviolent religious or political views, or for other reasons. It is in this group that a person's ideology is slowly shaped. However, if this group is, or becomes, involved in a violent conflict, in which the enemy might be viewed as evil, the individual's group belongingness and his or her desire to be loyal may take precedence. Furthermore, this may result in re-shaping the individual's principles and consequently lead to him or her becoming emerged in the violent conflict as a soldier fighting for the group's ideology (LoCiero & Sinclair, 2007).

The social learning/cognitive restructuring model fails to explain why only a small minority amongst the hundreds of thousands of students educated for jihad in madrasas, the millions exposed to extremist publications, and the tens of millions exposed to public glorification of terrorists have become radicalized. Didactic learning also occurs via the dissemination of radical philosophy and methodology in communiqués, audiovisual tapes, compact disks, books, and websites (Victoroff, 2005).

**<u>Suggested further reading on this topic:</u>**

Bandura, A. (1976). *Social learning theory*. New York: Prentice Hall.

Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67* (4), 371–378.

Miller, A. G. (1986). *The obedience experiments: A case study of controversy in social science*. New York: Praeger.

## Social Identity Theory

Social identity is membership in a group that helps to define a person's self-concept and provide self-esteem. An individual has multiple social identities including those of his or her family, sports team, ethnic group, military unit, etc., all of which help define who he or she is relative to the society and provide a particular sense of self-worth through identification with said group.

**Description:** An important aspect of social identity theory is the distinction between the personal, social, and group/collective. Behavior and identity operate on a situational-dependent continuum ranging from the highly individual and unique at one end (purely interpersonal), to the collective and common at the other (purely intergroup). Individuals possess a repertoire of available identities, each of which informs the individual of who they are and what that identity entails. Which of these identities is most salient at any time will vary according to the social context. When personal identity is salient, the individual will relate to others in an interpersonal manner, dependent on their character traits and any personal relationship existing between the individuals. However, under certain conditions a group identity might take precedence (Arena & Arrigo, 2006). Social identity theory is inherently Aristotelian in that it categorizes objects first by what makes them similar, then by what makes them different. Both Arab and Jewish residents of Palestine are Semitic peoples, but their respective social and personal identities are more salient; hence the differences are more pronounced socially than the similarities.

There are three underlying assumptions of social identity theory: Individuals strive to maintain or improve their self-esteem; social groups (and their membership) are associated with specific value connotations; and the evaluation of one's in-group is determined with reference to others through social comparison. From these underlying assumptions, three principles were determined: Individuals strive to achieve or maintain positive social identity; positive social identity is based on favorable comparisons to other groups; and when social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive to either exit the group and join another group or strive to make their existing group more positively distinct (Arena & Arrigo, 2006).

Social identity theory posits that, once groups are formed, there will be a competitive relationship between groups. This competition is motivated by the need to derive self-evaluation from one's group membership (Savage & Liht, 2008). This in turn emphasizes the sociocultural context, which determines the balance between collective identity and individual identity, and it emphasizes the importance of the externalizing hate-mongering leader (Hoffer, 1951).

**Application to radicalization:** Importance of collective identity and the processes of forming and transforming collective identities are critical in understanding the radicalization process (Post, 2005). The personal pathway model suggests that radicalization stems from a population that has suffered from early damage to its self-esteem. The subsequent political activities of those in this population may be inconsistent with the liberal social philosophies of their families, extending beyond their family's beliefs and lack of social action. As a group, they may consider themselves unsuccessful in obtaining a desired place in society, which has contributed to their frustration and the underlying need to belong, and this eventually drives them to affiliate with a radical group (Hudson, 1999).

| Palestine | Sri Lanka |
|---|---|
| Group/Collective | |
| Broader Muslim populace (umma) and the Palestinian people | Tamil People |
| Social | |
| HAMAS | LTTE |
| Personal | |
| Shaheed | Black Tigers |

*Venn diagrams not to scale

**Figure 2 Application of Social Identity Theory to HAMAS and LTTE**

The application of social identity theory can be depicted in two different organizations: Hamas, an Islamic resistance movement in Palestine; and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the nationalist separatist insurgent group in Sri Lanka. Figure 2 depicts the multiple identities of an individual who seek to sacrifice themselves for the Palestinian cause (Hamas) and Tamil independence (LTTE). Those who sacrifice themselves willingly for the cause are held in great esteem in both groups. Martyrdom operators in Hamas are called *shaheed* (Arabic for "witness") and are afforded special privileges prior to their final act. Their families are well compensated afterward. The Black Tigers of the LTTE are composed of specially selected and trained soldiers considered to be one of the most lethal and effective suicide groups in the world. The Hamas *shaheed* has a personal identity as a living martyr, a social identity as a member of Hamas, and collective identities with both the oppressed Palestinian people and the broader Muslim populace (*umma*). The Black Tiger has a personal identity as an elite soldier selected for a distinct honor by the group leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. The Black Tiger has a social identity as a member of the LTTE and a collective identity as a Tamil in conflict for the ethnic right of self-determination.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Arena, M. P., & Arrigo, B. A. (2006). *The terrorist identity: Explaining the terrorist threat.* New York: New York University Press.

Brown, R., & Capozza, D. (Eds.) (2000). *Social identity processes: Trends in theory and research.* Washington, DC: SAGE Publications.

Tafjel, H. (Ed.) (1978). *Differentiation between social groups.* London: Academic.

**Terror Management Theory**

Terror management theory states that existential anxiety (or the fear of death) is assuaged by adopting a worldview that makes death comprehensible and manageable.

**Description:** Terror management theory focuses on the implicit emotional reactions when individuals are confronted their imminent mortality. It attempts to provide a rationale for the motivational catalysts of human behavior when life is threatened and advances the idea that a shared worldview provides an individual with a defense from inevitable existential anxiety (the fear of

death). This cultural worldview minimizes death anxiety, providing an understanding of the universe that has order, meaning, and standards of acceptable behavior, resulting in increased self-esteem. The theory maintains that, if death is made salient, individuals will intensify strivings for self-esteem and will respond positively towards people and ideas that support their worldview and respond negatively toward those people and ideas that undermine that worldview. If self-esteem is lowered or the validity of a cultural worldview is damaged, death anxiety will increase necessitating an active solution (Savage & Liht, 2008).

Individuals evaluate in-group members positively because similarly minded individuals are assumed to support, and therefore validate, their own cultural worldview. In contrast, individuals evaluate out-group members negatively because alternatively minded individuals (relative to the in-group) are assumed to threaten their worldview. Individuals also demonstrate greater intergroup bias when they are made aware of their own mortality (Pettigrew, 1979).

**Application to radicalization:** Terror management theory has been posited as an explanation for suicide terrorism. Its application holds that individuals are willing to become suicide terrorists because 1) the political cause is consistent with their worldview; and 2) by consciously selecting the manner in which they are to die, they lower existential anxiety. The theory has some merit but little empirical evidence to support it as a viable explanation for radicalization.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Greenberg, J., Koole, S. L., & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). *Handbook of experimental existential psychology.* Washington, DC: Guilford Press.

## Uncertainty Reduction Theory

Uncertainty reduction theory, an application of communications research, puts forth the idea that group affiliation is motivated by the desire to alleviate uncertainty.

**Description:** Uncertainty reduction theory holds that most people do not tend to categorize themselves into groups unless there is a motive to alleviate uncertainty (Savage & Liht, 2008). Uncertainty in various forms plagues our interactions with the environment, yet uncertainty is a naturally occurring cognitive phenomenon experienced by individuals across a wide spectrum of environments that cannot be ignored or trivialized. Uncertainty arises from instability and the inability to obtain confirmation for one's beliefs and attitudes from objective criteria (Savage & Liht, 2008). An interpretation of this theory can be of a specific application of terror management in that a way to confront the uncertainty of death is to end one's life.

Intolerance of uncertainty has been categorized as the desire for predictability and a tendency to hesitate when required to perform an action with consequences that are not well understood (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008). Intolerance of uncertainty is also considered the excessive tendency of an individual to consider it unacceptable that a negative event may occur, however small the probability of its occurrence. Intolerance of uncertainty is a cognitive bias that affects how a person perceives, interprets, and responds to uncertain situations on a cognitive, emotional, and behavioral level and is an indicator of susceptibility to anxiety. Intolerance of uncertainty manifests itself as an excessive tendency to perceive uncertain situations as stressful and upsetting, to view unexpected events as negative and to be avoided, and a subjective sense of unfairness about the unpredictability of the future. Intolerance of uncertainty can exacerbate the common attentional bias

toward negative information, resulting in an increased estimate of perceived threat, and can lead to the inability to act when faced with an uncertain situation (Dugas et al, 2005).

**Application to radicalization:** Uncertainty reduction theory has been posited as potential explanation for affiliative behavior. Although it has face validity (particularly for those individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty or have a predisposition to anxiety-related disorders), there is little empirical evidence to support it. Intolerance of uncertainty as a characterological trait does present a cognitive risk factor for anxiety (Dugas et al, 2005); however, there is no empirical data to support it being a risk factor for radicalization.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Schachter, S. (1959). *The psychology of affiliation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Sherif, M. (1936). *The psychology of social norms*. New York: Harper.

# PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES

**Description:** Psychoanalysis is based on the proposition that much of mental life is unconscious, that psychological development proceeds in stages based on infantile sexual fantasies, and that psychological distress derives from unresolved intrapsychic conflict regarding those fantasies. The dynamics of this theory was derived from 19th-century concepts of physics (as interpreted by Sigmund Freud), in which the flow of mental and libidinal energy is deterministically expressed, repressed, or discharged. The theory has variants, but they share the notions that 1) parenting (as opposed to intrinsic temperament) determines psychological temperament and health; 2) active, unconscious forces exclude unpleasant thoughts from the consciousness; and 3) relationships with others, object relations, are controlled by unconscious forces such as projection—the theory that one irrationally attributes one's own attitude to others (Victoroff, 2005).

Strengths of psychoanalytic interpretations of terrorism are their acknowledgment that individual developmental factors beginning in early childhood probably influence adult behavioral proclivities, their recognition of the enormous power of the unconscious to influence conscious thought, and their observation that covert psychodynamic forces of groups may subsume individuality. The weakness of psychoanalytic explanation is their lack of falsifiability (Victoroff, 2005).

Psychoanalytic applications to radicalization may be roughly divided according to their emphasis on identity theory, narcissism theory, paranoia theory, and absolutist/apocalyptic theory (Victoroff, 2005). Each of these theories has diagnostic criteria for the clinical disorder; however, most theories propose only mild psychopathology and not necessarily full presentation of the disorder. A subset of these theories has been used to describe leadership styles that indicate a pattern of behavior but not psychopathology.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Freud, S. (1923). *The ego and the id*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Post, J. M. (1984). Notes on a psychodynamic theory of terrorist behavior. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 7.2.*, 241–256.

Post, J. M. (2007). *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda*. New York: Palgrave McMillan.

### Identity Theory

Identity theory is a psychosocial concept of development that focuses on the individual's concept of the self across the stages of life.

**Description:** Identity theory is a distinction among the psychological sense of continuity from the self (ego-identity) to the one's distinguishing idiosyncrasies (as the personal identity) to the set of social roles an individual may fulfill (social identity). Identity is a broad term used throughout the social sciences to describe a person's self-concept and expression of their individual and group affiliations. In this section, the focus will be primarily the psychosocial development aspects of Erik Erikson's Identity Theory, which, although rooted in psychodynamic theory, is not as psychosexually focused as Freud's theories.

Erikson maintained that, in order to mature into a psychologically healthy adult, a child must resolve a set of crises that are presented in each of the eight stages of development. Those stages are autonomy vs. shame and doubt, initiative vs. guilt, industry vs. inferiority, identity vs. role confusion, intimacy vs. isolation, generativity vs. stagnation, and ego integrity vs. despair (Erikson, 1963). Erickson further argued that the pursuit of identity was particularly important during early to late adolescence (12–19 years old) in stage 5, identity vs. role confusion. It is in this stage that individuals develop a sense of self-concept.[4] The concept of negative identity is considered an antisocial or harmful set of characterological traits away from which one would move in order to better integrate into society (Arena & Arrigo, 2006).

Erickson's theory is consistent with Bandura's reciprocal determinism and Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Considered together, individuals are shaped by their interactions with the environment and possess the innate desire to satiate different needs (Maslow, 1999). Erickson considered positive identity as a need that required satiation and thus would serve as a principal driver of social behavior.

**Application to radicalization:** The societal labeling of negative identities can have the reverse effect on group affiliation if the operational environment is not well understood. If the status-quo authority in a particular environment (the government, for example) is viewed unfavorably by a social group to which an individual has an affiliation and that authority labels an out-group as "negative" (criminal or terrorist, for example) the individual may perceive that label to be one that will contribute to positive identity. For example, if one's personal identity is that of a rebel, conformity would be considered negative; therefore counter-ideologies such as "outlaw," "agitator," and "criminal" may serve to perpetuate the positive identity of rebel, and thus an individual would derive self-esteem from it. This seemingly counterintuitive logic is consistent with Freud's speculation that the principle of self-determination may be inseparable from the impulse for destruction and, with that of Fanon, who posited that violence against colonial oppression, liberates not only the body but also self-identity (Fanon, 1965).

An application of Erickson's theory claims that candidates for radicalization are young people who either lack self-esteem or who have a need to consolidate their identities. If an individual lacks self-esteem, joining a radical group might function as a strong identity stabilizer, providing the individual with the elusive positive identity. Those with identity confusion may be consumed by a sense of isolation and thus view association (even if it is with a negative identity) as a positive social act. Identity-starved individuals are also hypothesized to be motivated by a desire to embrace the

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[4] Self-concept entails the individual learning "who he or she is" but also "who he or she is not".

intimate tutelage of a charismatic leader—a form of choosing a love object who resembles a parent (Victoroff, 2005).

**Diagnostic criteria:** There are no relevant Axis II personality disorders in the DSM-IV-TR that would be considered "identity disorders." The most relevant clinical code associated with identity (as it pertains to radicalization) is 313.82, Identity Problem. This category can be used when the focus of clinical attention is uncertainty about multiple issues relating to identity such as long-term goals, career choice, friendship patterns, sexual orientation and behavior, moral values, and group loyalties (APA, 2000). The classification of identity problem alone, however, does not necessarily constitute a clinical disorder, but possibly a psychosocial delay (depending on the individual and the presence of other underlying or contributory factors).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Arena, M. P. & Arrigo, B. A. (2006). *The terrorist identity: Explaining the terrorist threat.* New York: New York University Press.

Erikson, E. (1963). *Childhood and society.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Post, J. M. (1984). Notes on a psychodynamic theory of terrorist behavior. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 7.2.,* 241–256.

**Narcissism Theory**

> Narcissism theory or the narcissistic rage hypothesis is a psychoanalytic theory that holds that primary narcissism (or self-love) in the form of the grandiose self does not diminish as the individual develops and expands his or her social network.

**Description:** Egocentricity is a normal component to infantile development; however, as a child develops into adolescence, he or she is supposed to become less self-absorbed and more cognizant of others. Affective (or emotional) development is facilitated through interactions with others and the environment. This reality testing facilitates the child's learning that he or she is not the center of the universe. If this fails to occur, regardless of reason, the resultant grandiose self-image can result in individuals who are sociopathic, arrogant, and devoid of compassion for others.

The hypothesized root of this condition is the failure of maternal empathy, or the perception on the part of the child that his or her mother does not care sufficiently enough. This perception leads to a damaged self-image (or narcissistic injury) that arrests development in one of two ways: persistent infantile grandiose fantasies or the failure to internalize the idealized image of the parent. If the psychological form of the persistent infantile grandiose fantasies is not neutralized by reality setting, it can lead to an overexaggeration of one's importance and potentially retard social and possibly intellectual development (Victoroff, 2005). If the psychological form of the idealized parental ego is not neutralized by reality testing, it can produce a condition of helpless defeatism that can lead to reactions of rage and a wish to destroy the source of narcissistic injury (Hudson, 1999).

The humiliation of subordination might produce an adult narcissistic injury that might reawaken the psychological trait of infantile narcissism. The result might be a pathological exaltation of self (the genesis of the leader), the abandonment of independence to merge with the archaic omnipotent figure (the genesis of the follower), or a combination of these impulses, as seen in the egotistical yearning for glory under the mask of selflessness. Both of these forms of infantile retreat are hypothesized to mobilize the expression of the desire to destroy the source of the injury (narcissistic

rage) (Victoroff, 2005). This sense of perceived humiliation could result from any number of direct or vicarious slights by individuals or groups. Affective appeals that seek to exploit this vulnerability are a common influence mechanism and can be employed by radical groups in recruiting and/or psychological warfare meant to present their adversaries as a logical target for an individual's narcissistic rage.

Sexual abuse (particularly in Middle Eastern and Central Asian Muslim culture) as a source of humiliation (Stern, 2010) and misogyny (Kobrin, 2010) has been postulated as a unique type of narcissistic injury. The theory, which has both Freudian (psychosexual) and Ericksonian (psychosocial) aspects, has been posited but not validated based on empirical data or clinical interviews.

**Application to radicalization:** There is little empirical evidence to support the contention that radicals meet the clinical threshold for Narcissistic Personality Disorder; however, individual radicals may exhibit symptoms associated with narcissism (Hare, 1993). Some radicalized individuals demonstrate a desire for admiration and attention, a hallmark of narcissism (Hare, 1993). Their chosen methods of violence are often spectacular and attention grabbing, suggesting a more narcissistic clinical presentation. In such cases, far from being aggressively antisocial, they are rather timid, emotionally damaged adolescents (Victoroff, 2005). Those who have suffered ego injuries, such as parental rejection, that delay or prevent full achievement of adult identity seem to be in search of affiliation and meaning.

There are also those who exhibit a narcissistic leadership style and again likely do not meet the clinical criteria for the Axis II disorder (Post et al, 2002a). In fact, this leadership style is heavily represented in the military, industry, and academia. Characteristics of the narcissistic leadership style include a vulnerability to biased information processing resulting in an overestimation of their own strength and an underestimation of their adversary's, a grandiose and self-serving disposition, a lack of tolerance for competition, difficulty relying on experts, and a desire for sycophantic subordinates. Often displaying superficial arrogance over profound personal insecurity, they actively seek admiration and are vulnerable to insults, slights, and attacks and are prone to rage (Post et al, 2002a). Key observables that indicate this style are the leader's sensitivity to criticism, surrounding themselves with sycophants, and an overvaluation of his chances of success and an underestimation of the strength of an opponent (Post et al, 2002a).

Another manifestation of the theory is the malignant narcissist style of leadership: a combination of narcissism, paranoia, and sociopathy. These individuals exhibit grandiosity and suffer from poor underlying self-esteem with attendant sensitivity to slights, insults, or threats. They suspect and blame others, have no compunction regarding the use of violence, and lack empathy or concern for the impact of their actions on others (Post et al, 2002a). Observable characteristics of the malignant narcissist leader are displays of extreme grandiosity, paranoia and other antisocial traits, the lack of inhibition on the use of violence, dreams of glory, lack of empathy regarding the impact of his or her acts on others, and the target of anger (subsequent to personal or group setbacks) being an external entity (Post et al, 2002b).

**Diagnostic criteria:** The aforementioned conditions are considered risk factors for the Axis II Narcissistic Personality Disorder; however, the presentation of the symptoms may not meet the clinical threshold for psychopathology. For the DSM-IV-TR criteria for Narcissistic Personality Disorder, consult the appendix.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Kobrin, N. H. (2010). *The banality of suicide terrorism: The naked truth about the psychology of Islamic suicide bombers*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.

Post, J. M. (1984). Notes on a psychodynamic theory of terrorist behavior. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 7.2.*, 241–256.

Post, J. M. (2007). *The Mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda*. New York: Palgrave McMillan.

## Paranoia Theory

Paranoia theory states that violent radicalism is the result of a particular personality trait that predisposes one to mistrust of others and display aggressive behavior.

**Description:** Paranoia theory states that the salient feature of terrorist psychology is projection, an infantile defense that assigns intolerable internal feelings to an external object when an individual who has grown up with a damaged self-concept idealizes the good self and splits out the bad self. This projection is proposed to be the root of an adult persistence of the infantile phase called the "paranoid schizoid position" (Victoroff, 2005).

A common personality trait of individuals drawn to radical groups is the reliance placed on the psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting (Post, 2007). Splitting is a mechanism characteristic of individuals whose personality development is shaped by a narcissistic injury during childhood. Those individuals with a damaged self-concept have failed to integrate the good and bad parts of the self, which are instead split into the "me" and the "not me" (Hudson, 1999). Problematic feelings are not accepted as part of the self, but are instead ascribed to something external. Socially acceptable feelings are located within an idealized "good self," whereas bad feelings are split out and projected onto something external. Individuals with such traits are hypothesized to be likely to strongly idealize the group to which they belong (the in-group) while demonizing outsiders (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008).

**Application to radicalization:** The paranoid position inflames the terrorist with suspicions that justify bloody acts of "self-defense" against his victims (Victoroff, 2005). Given the rigid and extreme ideological belief systems, centered on themes of oppression and persecution that terrorists often espouse, paranoid personality disorder would seem a logical fit (Turco, 1987). Paranoia regarding the survival of the in-group creates the psychological foundation permitting terrorists to kill random civilians who, seen from the outside, do not directly threaten the terrorist group (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008).

There are also those who exhibit a paranoid leadership style and again likely do not meet the clinical criteria for the Axis II disorder (Post et al, 2002a). Characteristics of the paranoid leadership style include the view that one is surrounded by enemies, suspicion and distance, preoccupation with unjustified doubts about the loyalty and/or trustworthiness of those around them, hypervigilance and invulnerability to influence, downplaying threat, as well as the deeply rooted need to externalize blame for their own difficulties (Post et al, 2002a). Observable characteristics of the of paranoid leadership style are the blaming and demonization of adversaries, the stockpiling of weapons to defend against imminent attack, and the frequent purging of the inner advisory group (Post et al,

2002b). Experts tend to agree that paranoid personality disorder may be more common among leaders than among nonleaders of terrorist organizations (Maile et al, 2010).

Paranoia theory, like narcissism theory, remains an intriguing psychoanalytic interpretation that might, after controlled research using validated measures of paranoia, be shown to explain some instances of this very heterogeneous adult behavior (Victoroff, 2005). Paranoid Personality Disorder, a clinical malady characterized by marked suspiciousness, irrational mistrust of others, rigidity in beliefs, and unwillingness to compromise, has been associated with terrorists (Silke, 1998).

**Diagnostic criteria:** The aforementioned conditions are considered risk factors for the Axis II Paranoid Personality Disorder; however, the presentation of the symptoms may not meet the clinical threshold for psychopathology. For the DSM-IV-TR criteria for Paranoid Personality Disorder, consult the appendix.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Post, J. M. (1984). *Notes on a psychodynamic theory of terrorist behavior. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism., 7.2.*, 241–256.

Post, J. M. (2007). *The mind of the terrorist: the psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda.* New York: Palgrave McMillan.

## Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory

Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory is a combination of disrupted psychodynamic development and atypical cognitive style that results in extreme polarizing, idealization of a messianic figure, and impaired social learning.

**Description:** Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory is a combination of atypical psychodynamic development and cognitive style that results in extreme polarizing, idealization of a messianic figure, and impaired reality testing (Victoroff, 2005). This particular theory is not often put forth to explain radicalization; rather it is used to categorize a type of group defined by a specific individual who exhibits such traits. Those traits, when shown by a charismatic leader, may be considered attractive to an individual for any number of reasons (some of which have been discussed previously).

**Application to radicalization:** Radicals are frequently uncompromising moralists; such a worldview is explainable in terms of the psychological mechanisms of splitting and projection (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008). Absolutist/totalistic moral thinking helps motivate terrorism via its seductive appeal to young adults with weak identities. Such terrorists defend themselves from normal emotional responses to violence through denial, psychic numbing, or isolation of affect. Although neither absolutism nor isolation of affect by themselves explains the specific impulse to harm innocents, irrational violence against the out-group could be precipitated when pathological defenses lead to simplistic dualist thinking about the out-group combined with paranoia about in-group annihilation (Victoroff, 2005).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Lifton, R. J. (2000). *Destroying the world to save it: Aum Shinrikyo and the new global terrorism.* New York: Holt.

Post, J. M. (2007). *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda.* New York: Palgrave McMillan.

### Antisocial Theory

Antisocial/psychopathic/sociopathic theory states that violent radicals are either mentally ill or somehow biologically, psychologically, and/or sociologically predisposed to violence.

**Description:** This approach is one of the most enduring but least empirically supported explanations for violent radicalism. Psychiatry identifies adult behavioral disorders according to a multiaxial classification scheme in which Axis I refers to the major clinical illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia or major depression) and Axis II refers to developmental or personality disorders (APA, 2000). Most of the literature attributing clinical mental disorders to terrorists speaks of the remorseless personality type, psychopathy or sociopathy (superego lacunae), rather than the psychotic type. The concept of "insanity" is often associated with terroristic behavior. However, it is not a behavioral science term but a legal one, usually implying psychosis, although no official legal definition or objective criteria exist (Cooper, 1978).

Antisocial personality disorder (APD) is considered an Axis II disorder and is the current term used to describe a pattern of remorseless disregard for the rights of others (Victoroff, 2005). Referred to as psychopathy up until the mid-1950s and sociopathy until 1980 (Hare, 1993), APD is characterized by chronic disregard of social norms and laws, lack of remorse, impulsivity, and other traits, and seems a plausible explanation for some terroristic behavior (Martens, 2004).

Concerning Axis I clinical disorders among terrorists, very little research has been done involving comprehensive psychiatric examination, and no properly controlled research is found in the open literature (Victoroff, 2005).

**Application to radicalization:** Many theories posit that certain individuals possess or lack certain personality traits that make them more susceptible to joining terrorist organizations and engaging in terroristic behavior. This personality defect model asserts that this type of personality is largely the result of a dysfunctional childhood that fosters an impoverished sense of self and hostility toward authority. This resentment to authority may be an outgrowth of unconscious hostility toward abusive or controlling parents, and is later reflected in the adult terrorist's rigid mindset (Maile et al, 2010).

A subset of radicals would meet criteria for a diagnosis of APD,[5] although many others would likely exhibit traits associated with APD without meeting full diagnostic criteria. Many individuals with APD share certain characteristics with violent radicals, such as a sense of social alienation, early maladjustment, impulsivity, and hostility (Martens, 2004).

There are also those who exhibit an antisocial or sociopathic leadership style and likely do not meet the clinical criteria for the Axis II disorder (Post et al, 2002a). The characteristics of a sociopathic leadership style include lack of empathy, absence of moral constraints, and the consideration of violence as a tool to accomplish a goal (Post et al, 2002a). Observables of a sociopathic leadership style include a history of criminal activity not motivated by politics and the projection of personal desire for violent action onto the establishment (Post et al, 2002b).

**Diagnostic criteria:** The aforementioned conditions are considered risk factors for the Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder; however, the presentation of the symptoms may not meet the

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[5] Based on open-source reporting (Napoleoni, 2005), in reviewing biographical data on Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi against the psychopathy checklist (PCL) (Hare, 1993) he most likely would score between 30 and 40, thus reaching Hare's criteria for APD.

clinical threshold for psychopathology. For the DSM-IV-TR criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder, consult the appendix.

Another assessment used in conjunction with a clinical interview and case history evaluation is Hare's psychopathy checklist-revised (PCL-R). The PCL-R consists of two factors: Factor 1, a personality marked by "aggressive narcissism"; and Factor 2, a case history of a "socially deviant lifestyle." Factor 1 includes a history or current evidence of glibness/superficial charm, grandiose sense of self-worth, pathological lying, cunning/manipulative, lack of remorse or guilt, shallow affect, callous/lack of empathy, and failure to accept responsibility for own actions. Factor 2 includes a history or current evidence of need for stimulation/proneness to boredom, parasitic lifestyle, poor behavioral control, promiscuous sexual behavior, lack of realistic long-term goals, impulsivity, irresponsibility, juvenile delinquency, early behavior problems, and revocation of conditional release. Two additional traits not included in either of the factors are many short-term marital relationships and criminal versatility. The PCL-R is composed of the twenty aforementioned elements scored along a three-point Lickert scale (0, 1, or 2). A score of 30-40 indicates psychopathy; however, the PCL-R must be administered by a fully trained and credentialed clinician in an appropriate environment for it to be considered valid (Hare, 1993).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Hare, R. (1993). *Without conscience: The disturbing world of the psychopaths among us.* New York: Guilford Publications, Inc.

## COGNITIVE THEORIES

Cognitive theories are derived from the study of cognitive function, capacity, and style. Cognitive functions refer to mental functions such as memory, attention, the ability to anticipate and learn rules, bias, and the ability to handle complexity (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b). Cognitive capacity refers to mental functions such as memory, attention, concentration, language, and the so-called "executive" functions, including the capacity to learn and follow rules, anticipate outcomes, make sensible inferences, and perform accurate risk-benefit calculations (Lezak, 1995). Cognitive style refers to ways of thinking: biases, prejudices, or tendencies to over- or underemphasize factors in decision-making (Victoroff, 2005).

Violent behavior is influenced by both cognitive capacity and cognitive style. Studies have established a connection between cognitive capacity and violence, and it has been hypothesized that there might also be a connection between cognitive style and an individual's disposition to join a terrorist group. To date very few empirical studies have explored the connection between cognitive style and terrorism. The scarcity of data exploring this connection might be due to difficulty with obtaining the cooperation of active or incarcerated terrorists as well as obtaining the cooperation of the authorities to administer validated psychological tests in a structured way. Random sampling is difficult considering the small size of the population, and, thus, even if the application of validated instruments might lead to a high level of validity, the external validity of results would be dubious (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Norton, G. W., Chandler, M., & Zelazo, P. D. (Eds.) (2009). *Developmental social cognitive neuroscience.* Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, Inc.

## Novelty-Seeking Theory

Novelty or sensation seeking is a personality trait related to chemical activity in the brain that results in a preference for high-risk behavior.

**Description:** Propensity for risk-taking is influenced by variation in life-history traits and neurocognitive functions, specifically the dopaminergic cycle. Factors contributing to increased risk-taking propensity include younger age, lack of parental status, lower reproductive goals, being the last born, and lower subjective life expectancy. The tendency for risk-taking is not necessarily a stable personality trait, but varies by life-history traits and specific domains (Wang et al, 2009). The personality trait of novelty seeking, a measurable, nonnormative, and probably genetically influenced characteristic that persists in certain individuals, may distinguish those susceptible to the allure of radicalism (Victoroff, 2005).

Individuals scoring high on Extroversion and Openness on the Big-Five Personality Traits[6] will likely exhibit behaviors associated with novelty/sensation seeking. However, this alone should not be considered a risk factor for radicalization.

**Application to radicalization:** Sensation and novelty seeking, a normative feature of adolescent development tied to expected changes in neural activity, may play a role in the natural history of radical group involvement. Radical behavior is thrilling action outside the realm of ordinary experience, and many theorists have opined that political violence may satisfy innate, perhaps genetically determined, needs for high-level stimulation, risk, and catharsis (Victoroff, 2005). The confluence of extroversion, narcissism (particularly proneness to parasitic exploitation of others), and sensation seeking may predispose one to revolutionary activity (Turco, 1987).

### Suggested further reading on this topic:

Norton, G. W., Chandler, M., & Zelazo, P. D. (Eds.) (2009). *Developmental social cognitive neuroscience*. Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, Inc.

## Humiliation-Revenge Theory

Humiliation and the consequent internal pressure for revenge is a psychological factor that has been suggested to predispose one to violent behavior.

**Description:** Revenge is an emotion that is probably deeply rooted in the adaptive instinct to punish transgressors who violate the contracts of social species; hence, it is a motivator that often serves not only the goals of a vengeful individual, but also the goals of the group (Victoroff, 2005). Revenge is not always considered an antisocial behavior and can be considered normal and potentially useful in certain contexts.

The humiliation and traumatization of political opponents can create an environment that stimulates regression to more violent behavior, thereby aggravating a conflict or escalating the level of violence. Political, ideological, and/or religious narratives may mediate between the collective identity and personal misery from humiliation, but they may also reinforce a victimization identity that contributes to increased potential for violent behavior (Varvin, 2005). The concept that feelings of

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[6] The Five-Factor Model of personality consists of five broad domains or dimensions used to describe human personality. The factors, Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism, are the components of the descriptive, not theoretical or empirically derived, model.

humiliation or exploitation gives rise to a passion for revenge is prevalent in forensic psychiatry and criminology, and it has been suggested that it may contribute nonpolitical murders (Victoroff, 2005).

Humiliation, revenge, and altruism appear to play a key role at the organizational and individual levels in shaping the subculture that promotes suicide bombings. This humiliation, however, is not the result of a single social incident, but a pervasive internalization over time (often spanning generations) that becomes so ingrained that it comes the definitive trait of an individual (Merari, 2010).

**Application to radicalization:** This theory as it pertains to political violence may be the logical reaction to a personal or political grievance (both are mechanisms of individual radicalization that are discussed in another section) or a misapplication of the law of social substitutability. This anthropological concept holds that the killing of any member of the in-group is considered a group offense and can be avenged by the killing of any member of the offender's out-group (Marcus, 2008). This law may be perverted or manipulated by individuals to rationalize terrorist behavior. For example, members of the Abu Nidal Organization justified the skyjacking and execution of hostages on an EL AL airline on the grounds that Israel required compulsory military service. The individuals were therefore members of the military and thus justifiable targets (Post, 2007). This rationalization has been further extrapolated by Al-Qaeda and its affiliated networks to include American citizens, who, as taxpayers, support the U.S. government's oppressive and exploitive policies toward the Muslim world.

## Suggested further reading on this topic:

Fanon, F. (1965). *The wretched of the Earth.* New York: Pelican.

Gurr, T. (1970). *Why men rebel.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Merari, A. (2010). *Driven to death: Psychological and social aspects of suicide terrorism.* Boston: Oxford University Press.

# MECHANISMS OF RADICALIZATION

This chapter will apply many of the aforementioned theories to the process of radicalization. The mechanisms of radicalization are the "how" and "why" an individual or group progresses from nonviolence to participating in political violence. Radicalization can be considered a multi-staged, not necessarily sequential, process that evolves from pre-radicalization, radicalization, pre-involvement searching, and violent radicalization to continuing involvement and engagement, disengagement, or de-radicalization (Horgan, 2009). Generally speaking, individuals are radicalized by personal grievances and by identity-group grievances either as individuals or as members of small groups, whereas larger groups are typically radicalized in conflict with states and with other larger groups (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Each of these mechanisms entails a specific set of psychological and sociological phenomena that, although applicable to many, have unique manifestations.

The format for the subsections within this chapter will include a description of a specific mechanism, a pointer to the particular psychological and/or sociological theories that apply, and a brief example to illuminate its real-world potential. The intent of the example is not to ascribe the radicalization of the group or its individuals to any specific mechanism or to oversimplify the organizational or individual motivations, goals, and behaviors. As mentioned previously, none of the theories or mechanisms subsequently presented should be considered mutually exclusive or the sole determinant of individual or group radicalization.

## MASS MECHANISMS

Mass mechanisms are the phenomenological rarest of three types; however, there is value in studying the effect on such large groups. Although a detailed explanation of mass psychology is beyond the scope of this section, there are a few areas of research that help explain human behavior in large groups. Much of this research falls under the discipline of social psychology, but there have been both clinical (including psychoanalytic) and cognitive contributions to many of the ideas.

The study of crowds within social psychology was originally precipitated by desire to examine the co-option of power by unknown leaders that were able to gain direct power by prompting collective action. Mass movements have the potential to bring about dramatic and sudden social change in a manner that bypasses established legal and political processes. Social scientists have developed several different theories for explaining crowd psychology and the ways in which the psychology of the crowd differs significantly from the psychology of those individuals within it. Sigmund Freud's crowd-behavior theory holds that people in a crowd tend to act as though their psyches have merged into a single entity whose collective thought process is dramatically different from those comprising the crowd. As the collective enthusiasm increases, individuals tend to lose their inhibition and become less risk averse. "Herd behavior" describes how individuals in a group can act together without planned direction. Although the term is derived from the behavior of animals in herds, flocks, and schools, it has been applied to the study of human conduct during activities such as stock market bubbles and crashes, street demonstrations, sporting events, religious gatherings, episodes of mob violence, as well as decision-making, judgment, and opinion forming (Surowiecki, 2004).

Deindividuation theory states that the loss of personal identity is not replaced by a collective mind that guides one's action. Group leaders can be considered a malevolent group therapist that focuses the discontent of the group members on an external cause for their difficulties, righteously justifying aggression against the identified target (Post, 2005).

A riot is typically the result of an unorganized violent mob that is neither controlled by a leader nor organized in units or another hierarchical structure. Riots have, however, been intentionally incited and/or directed by organized political activists and have been at least partly directed. Although a major insurrection has been initiated by riots, such as in the cases of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of February 1917, the spontaneous street violence was not part of an orchestrated plan to overthrow the respective governments (Merari, 1993).

Not all, in fact not many, crowds that form become violent. However, those that gather on behalf of a grievance can involve herding behavior that turns violent, particularly when confronted by an opposing out-group (be it ethnic, racial, or functional). The unaccountability afforded by being within a crowd can reduce inner restraints and behavioral inhibitions toward violence. Other contextual factors can also contribute to the reductions of responsibility, affective arousal, sensory overload, a lack of contextual structure or predictability, and altered consciousness due to drugs or alcohol (Zimbardo, 2007). Social scientists have developed several different theories for explaining crowd psychology and the ways in which the psychology of the crowd differs significantly from the psychology of those individuals within it. The important takeaway is that the anonymity afforded the individual by the crowd, coupled with the influence of charismatic leaders, can mobilize heretofore peaceful individual or groups to violence (Berk, 1974).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Berk, R. A. (1974). *Collective behavior*. Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown.

Hoffer, E. (1951). *The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of mass movements*. New York: Harper and Rowe Perennial Library.

Jones, A. H., & Molnar, A. R. (1966). *Combating subversively manipulated civil disturbances*. Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems.

Surowiecki, J. (2004). *The wisdom of crowds: Why the many are smarter than the few and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies and nations*. New York: Doubleday.

**Mass Radicalization in Conflict with an Out-group – Jujitsu Politics**

Radicalization in Conflict with an Out-group – Jujitsu Politics is when a population is mobilized by the conflict between two groups in which one (usually the government) has aggressively / excessively responded to the other, promoting sympathy and outrage.

**Description:** In this context, jujitsu politics refers to the use of a state's (or political adversary's) momentum against itself by a less resourced entity. This mechanism is a generalization of group dynamic theory and states that a group seeks to influence potential sympathizers by reframing the out-group threat. With larger groups, reference to group cohesion is often replaced by themes invoking in-group identification, patriotism, or nationalism, but the typical response (increased cohesion) mirrors that of smaller groups. By identifying the out-group as a threat to that in-group reference and capitalizing on the outrage to the recent over-reaction, those potential sympathizers can be swayed and/or mobilized without much expended effort on the part of the radical group.

The material goals of in-group identification may include congeniality, status, and security along with less tangible components such as the social-reality value of the group (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). The social-reality value (or how the group is perceived by those outside the group) depends on internalizing group standards of value, including moral standards. Under conditions of uncertainty individual moral standards are highly susceptible to political influence through affective appeals.

> Group dynamics is the study of groups (two or more individuals connected by social relationships) and how they interact and influence each other.

**Observables:** Ways of observing this mechanism exist from geopolitical to individual levels; however, often required is a degree of nuanced analysis or expertise to identify prior to violence. A common tactic amongst radical groups is to elicit a state response that will carry far beyond the group to influence sympathizers who have not yet been mobilized to action (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). On a smaller scale this can be considered Group Radicalization in Competition with State Power – Condensation (a mechanism discussed later in this chapter). In both of these cases, propaganda would serve to frame the in-group in favorable terms (and the out-group in unfavorable terms) to the sympathizers. This often entails affective appeals to sociocultural narratives, religious symbology, or some element of shared social identity that may distinguish the two entities.

**Example:** An example of this phenomenon is the application of Kilcullen's "Accidental Guerilla" theory to the maturation of the insurgency in Al Anbar province in Iraq after the initial surge of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The Iraqi resistance was widely considered stronger in Al Anbar province than in any other province in Iraq and was initially the most hostile toward the American presence. Comprised of dozens of organizations and multiple distinct causes, the complexity of the insurgency was immense. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)[7] exploited U.S. tactics to mobilize the mass of Iraqis who were opposed to both U.S. and AQI presence in Al Anbar. AQI developed an expansive militant network, including some of the remnants of Ansar al-Islam (a Kurdish militant group) and a growing number of foreign fighters, to resist the coalition occupation forces and their Iraqi allies. Many foreign fighters arriving in Iraq were initially not associated with the group, but once in the country they became dependent on AQI. The stated goals of AQI were to force a withdrawal of U.S.-led forces from Iraq, topple the Iraqi interim government, assassinate collaborators with the occupation, marginalize the Shia population and defeat its militias, and establish an Islamic state. Initially, the various insurgent groups primarily targeted coalition forces (with a minimal amount of targeting directed at Iraqi civilians). Unlike the former Baath regime elements or the Shia groups, AQI employed asymmetric tactics (suicide bombings, car bombings, and the employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as counter-mobility weapons), along with more traditional guerrilla tactics such as ambushes and small-scale raids. They also gained a worldwide infamy (eventually resulting in condemnation from the Al-Qaeda core) for beheading hostages and distributing video recordings on the Internet (Napoleoni, 2005).

One of the more effective tactics (whether intention or simply successfully reactive) was exploiting the relatively heavy-handed coalition response to small guerilla operations to elicit support from the civilian populace. This application of jujitsu politics enabled AQI to gain support by presenting themselves as defenders of the Iraqi people by openly resisting the coalition forces. The

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[7] In this case, AQI is used as a composite of multiple foreign-fighter organizations operating in Iraq who were ideologically affiliated with, but not explicitly commanded and controlled by, Al-Qaeda. Among those groups was *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad*, the group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (who became the de-facto "face" of AQI).

predominantly Sunni population of Al Anbar was historically resistant to outside influence, regardless of ethnicity, nationality, or religion. Although there wasn't immediate support for AQI, sympathizers soon turned against the coalition forces that were unable to protect innocent civilians and/or restore the civil and social services required. As the coalition forces operated in an increasingly nonpermissive environment with relatively vague rules of engagement, many Anbari civilians were unintended casualties of the conflict. AQI successfully used coalition force to turn small tactical defeats into operational successes by exploiting the information domain and framing the coalition as oppressive occupiers (Napoleoni, 2005). Social movement theorists analyze movements as the interaction of mobilizing resources, political opportunities, and framing (Beck, 2008). AQI recognized a political opportunity and mobilized their political resources in response to a power vacuum created by the regime. This was accelerated by framing the out-group (the U.S.-led coalition) as foreign occupiers who sought to impose their will on Al Anbar. AQI successfully exploited the cultural resistance to foreigners to their political advantage.

Killcullen described the Iraqi insurgency as consisting of an "upper level" that represents Al-Qaeda's global Salafist jihad and a "local level' with a specific sociocultural nuance that makes it distinct. At the strategic level, it appeared as a conflict between distinct groups over ideological differences, whereas at the tactical level it seemed that individuals were taking up arms over local issues. The second component to Killcullen's theory is the "accidental guerrilla syndrome," the process[8] by which heretofore noninvolved individuals determine it is in their best interest to aid an insurgency, because it provides the best opportunity for them to achieve their desired goals. The process began with AQI infecting the area by establishing a base of operations outside the control of U.S. or Iraqi authorities. From this safe haven, AQI operatives began contaminate the zone by expanding into neighboring areas, often marrying into local tribes. In response to this, the state or occupying authority (in this case the U.S. military) intervened by launching a violent military operations (or series thereof) against AQI. The consequence of such action, rejection of the coalition by the Anbari people, served to reinforce AQI's narrative. The combination of psychological preparation by AQI and the reality of homes and villages destroyed and innocent civilians injured or killed served to strengthen the bond between AQI and their Sunni brethren in Al Anbar, thus growing the capability of the in-group and further perpetuating this cycle (Killcullen, 2009).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Killcullen, D. (2009). *The accidental guerrilla: Fighting small wars in the midst of a big one.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

## Mass Radicalization in Conflict with an Out-group – Hate

Radicalization in Conflict with an Out-group – Hate is when groups in conflict (actual or perceived) become more extreme in their negative perceptions of one another.

**Description:** This mechanism involves clearly defining the in-group and out-group and assigning a value-laden set of characteristics to each. During the process, the in-group's qualities are elevated through praise and honorifics (often appealing to cultural or religious narratives), whereas the members of the out-group are collective dehumanized. Dehumanization is an extension of framing or contextualizing an adversary and can be a combination of prior prejudice toward an out-group

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[8] Killcullen's model entails four phases: "infection," "contagion," "intervention," and "rejection".

that is reinforced through social learning or an acquired bias developed through affiliation with the in-group.

During the course of a protracted conflict, feelings of anger, fear, and distrust shape the way that the parties perceive each other. As adversarial attitudes and perceptions develop, individuals and groups begin to attribute negative traits to their opponent to a degree at which the adversary is considered inherently evil, morally deficient, and a direct personal threat to the in-group (Opotow, 2000).

> Dehumanization is the process by which members of a group of people assert the inferiority of another group through subtle or overt acts or statements.

The fundamental attribution error (also known as correspondence bias or attribution effect) describes the tendency to over-value dispositional or personality-based explanations for the observed behaviors of others while under-valuing situational explanations for those behaviors. The fundamental attribution error can be exacerbated by in-group prejudice, which can both accelerate and intensify the dehumanization process. For acts perceived as negative (either antisocial or somehow undesirable), the in-group is more likely to attribute the behavior of members of the out-group to personal or dispositional causes. The in-group would likely consider these causes to be innate characteristics of individual members of the out-group while overlooking role requirements and other environmental determinants. In contrast, for acts perceived as positive (either pro-social or somehow desirable) the in-group is more likely to attribute the behavior of a particular member of the out-group to the exceptional special-case individual who is contrasted from the remainder of the out-group, or to luck or special advantage seen as unfair, to uncommonly high motivation and effort, or to some environmental determinant. These tendencies will be exacerbated when group identity (both in- and out-group) is highly salient, when the individual is personally involved in or affected by the specific behavior, when the in- and out-groups have a history of conflict, and/or when racial/ethnic differences co-vary with national and/or socioeconomic differences (Pettigrew, 1979).

Many law enforcement organizations have employed a staged approach to assess this mechanism. The Seven-Stage Hate Model (Shafer & Navarro, 2003) is comprised of the following:

- Stage 1: The Haters Gather
- Stage 2: The Hate Group Defines Itself
- Stage 3: The Hate Group Disparages the Target
- Stage 4: The Hate Group Taunts the Target
- Stage 5: The Hate Group Attacks the Target Without Weapons
- Stage 6: The Hate Group Attacks the Target with Weapons
- Stage 7: The Hate Group Destroys the Target

**Observables:** Surveillance tactics, techniques, and procedures will differ depending on resources, terrain, and the importance of the threat; however, there are associated actions that may be observed and/or predicted using the staged hate model  In Stage 1, the personally insecure individual seeks peer validation through like-minded individuals. In Stage 2, the in-group begins to establish its unique identify through symbols, rituals, and narratives. In Stage 3, the in-group identifies and begins to develop the negative identity of the out-group. In Stage 4, the in-group begins provocative actions toward the out-group. In stage 5, the in-group transforms from verbal to physically abusive actions toward members of the out-group. Stage 6 is an escalation of the previous phase that may even include firearms and bombings. Stage 7 represents the objective of the in-group: the

annihilation of the out-group. Although in reality, this is rarely achieved strategically, tactical success may be sufficiently significant to warrant attention.

**Example:** The Hammerskin Nation is among the largest and most well organized white supremacist groups operating in the United States. Like many white supremacist groups, its members perceive the operational environment to be one of conflict between an in-group (predominantly those of white Christian backgrounds) and numerous others in an out-group (Jews, African Americans, foreigners, etc.). The first Hammerskin group, the Confederate Hammerskins, formed in Dallas, TX, in 1979; since then, dozens of local and groups have been united under the umbrella of the Hammerskin Nation.

The group openly acknowledges the intended target audience for its message (either through a unique form of hate-inspired punk rock music or more direct recruitment) is disillusioned young white males. The devalued social status of white men is a recurring theme evident in a variety of media espousing the inherent pride, masculinity, work ethic, power, and abilities of whites while denigrating all those considered non-white. Although the specific priorities of out-group classification seem to shift depending on locality, the collective categorization (or unifying quality) of the out-groups is clearly those who are not considered "white." A common complaint evident in their propaganda is the special privileges afforded minorities at the expense of whites and the exploitation of the white working class by the Zionist Occupation Government, a conspiracy of powerful Jewish men who covertly manipulate the governments of the world to further the Zionist cause. The Hammerskins consider the in-group to be the white working class and the out-group to be all those considered "non-white" (Arena & Arrigo, 2006).

Although the Hammerskins actively solicit new members, they do so selectively. Many white supremacist organizations allow prospective recruits to join by simply filling out an application and paying dues. In contrast, the Hammerskins require prospective members to prove themselves before they are allowed to join; this requirement (or process) facilitates radicalization as it incentivizes conformity to group norms. They resemble other modern extremists in their use of the Internet; however, few groups use e-mail mailing lists and bulletin boards as effectively (Brown, 2009). The Hammerskin Nation has made particular use of e-mail in its promotion of concerts, providing details to its supporters about the locations of shows, places to stay nearby, directions on how to get to concert venues, and other related information (Arena & Arrigo, 2006).

Cursory analysis of Hammerskin websites and music lyrics have indicated patterns resembling the ultimate attribution error described earlier. The specific groups target included minorities in the United States, homosexuals, and Jews (or non-Christians). The rhetoric disparages the Zionist movement, the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), and racial integration among other themes. The pattern appears to target lower-class, poorly educated, white American males with simplistic (or not empirically supported) arguments designed to 1) create a sense of commonality between the targeted individual and the group, 2) differentiate the in-group from the selected out-group, 3) make an affective appeal to the individual by subtly identifying the incongruence between the individual's goals and accomplishments, and 4) assigning blame for that incongruity to the out-group. Although the rhetoric does not necessarily encourage introspection to exploit the frustration aggression hypothesis, the authors/lyricists clearly sympathize and understand the target audience.

Violence is an integral part of the skinhead subculture, among racist and nonracist skinheads alike. Racist skinheads have committed a large number of violent hate crimes across the United States during the past two decades, ranging from brutal beatings to outright murder. As one of the most prominent white-power skinhead groups in the country, the Hammerskins have frequently shocked

the communities in which they are active (or in which they have hosted concerts) with the violence of some of their activities (Balzak, 2001).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Sternberg, J. (2005). *The psychology of hate*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Society.

Zesking, L. (2009). *Blood and politics: The history of the White Nationalist Movement from the margins to the mainstream*. Austin, TX: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

## Mass Radicalization in Conflict with an Out-group – Martyrdom

Radicalization in Conflict with an Out-group – Martyrdom is the exploitation of shared religious and/or cultural narratives, symbols, or memes invoking self-sacrifice in order to mobilize a population toward political violence.

**Description:** The preference for order compels certain individuals to affiliate with groups to reduce the related anxiety. A cultural worldview that minimizes death anxiety can provide an understanding of the universe that has order, meaning, and standards of acceptable behavior. Order can provide meaning and yield self-esteem, further incentivizing a broader worldview. When self-esteem is lowered or the validity of a cultural worldview is challenged, death anxiety will increase, necessitating an active solution. Terror management maintains that, if death is made salient, people will intensify their striving for self-esteem and will respond positively toward individuals and ideas that support their cultural worldview and negatively toward those individuals and ideas that undermine that worldview (Savage & Liht, 2008). The combination of uncertainty reduction and terror management with inherent biases or prejudices can further exacerbate group distinctions that may escalate tension. However, to an individual, the resultant distinction is reinforcing and thus diminishes anxiety and builds self-esteem. The positive feedback loop created through self-selection and preservation can radicalize an individual who never exhibited violent behavior or explicitly sought to join a violent group.

This mechanism can be considered a perverse exploitation of an unimpeachable source of credibility: the dead. Many religious cultures and military organizations among others hold those who sacrifice themselves for the common good in great reverence. In turn, many humans hold an irrational fear of their own death. This is a logical and adaptive premise, as fear of death would lead one to take certain precautions and thus extend their life and increase their opportunities to procreate and pass along their genes. In some individuals, fear of death or existential anxiety can be debilitating.  When other members of the in-group are risking all for the cause, no individual is permitted to betray that sacrifice (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

> Terror management theory advances the idea that a shared worldview provides individual with a defense from inevitable existential anxiety (the fear of death).
>
> Uncertainty reduction theory holds that most people do not tend to categories themselves into groups unless there is a motive to alleviate uncertainty.

The study of suicidality is amongst the more difficult within clinical psychology as it is extraordinarily difficult to comprehend the proximal reason an individual took his or her life. Even if a rationale is put forth in a note or video, the factors contributing to the resultant behavior are nearly impossible to validate. At least four motives for martyrdom can be put forth: the self-punitive or suicidal motive, the aggressive or homicidal motive, the altruistic or political motive, and the erotic or sexual motive (Meloy, 2004). The altruistic or political motive and its subsequent exploitation are most relevant to this mechanism. To be effective, the social construction of

martyrdom must rule out the possibility of psychopathology of the martyr, as it would risk categorization as another of the four motivations. Rather, higher-status martyrs, those amongst the in-group with higher social, academic, or hierarchal standing, have more credibility with the masses and thus their sacrifice carries more weight. Also highly effective martyrs are the lesser amongst the in-group, the innocent victims who were unnecessarily killed by members of the out-group (intentionally or not).

**Observables:** In groups that revere martyrs, there is a heightened sense of heroism associated with fallen members, and the community supports and rallies around families of the fallen or incarcerated. There is enhanced social status (as well as financial and/or material support) for the families of fallen or incarcerated members. Voluntary participation in the cause is considered a victory, be it religious or politically motivated. As with other phenomena, as individuals adopt this view of success, their own self-image becomes more intimately intertwined with the success of the organization. A counterintuitive cult of martyrdom emerges; thus, the anticipation of dying for the cause provides a reason to live (Post, 2005).

**Example:** In 1978, a loose confederation of secular politicians and Islamic fundamentalist clerics helped to stir up anger and protest against the regime of the Shah, but the violent crackdowns by the police backfired as the lower and merchant classes took to the streets. In January of 1978 an article was published (supposedly at the instigation of the Shah) that accused the Ayatollah Khomeini as having purportedly accepted money from the British to fight against the regime. The article instantly produced protests by the students of Khomeini in Qom, to which the police responded brutally. Over two days at least seventy were killed. Some claim this event is where the movement shifted from being dominated by the secular opposition to being led by the religious leaders (or *ulema*), particularly Khomeini. Whereas the government had been able to abate any secular threat, it now faced a less manageable and more popular religious-based opposition (Keddie & Yann, 2006).

The cycle of forty-day commemorations consistent with the tenets of Shia Islam[9] started in February to honor those killed in Qom. One of the major sites was Tabriz, where police moved to block access to the mosque. Mourners turned away angry and soon ravaged the city. The symbols of dependence on the West were attacked and burned but the mobs did not target people (a practice that held true throughout the entire revolution). The army was called in and it killed and arrested many and restored calm quickly. With Tabriz as a template, riots and protests soon spread to other cities around Iran, and the forty-day commemorations saw an increase in participation and potency in each cycle, with new martyrs being generated at each commemoration. The government struggled against preventing the protests, due to their lack of coordination by any centralized control structure and their growing size. Martial law was imposed in some cities, but the growing opposition was gathering momentum, with the disparate antiregime groups now sensing a possibility of success. The protest gatherings were a mixture of calls for the Shah to step down, to reform, praises for Khomeini, and anger at the violence perpetrated by the government's forces. The protesters moved from running away from security forces to direct confrontation and conflict. There were few exchanges of gunfire. The vast majority of arms were in the hands of the government. The contests were ones of crowds versus crowd control (Keddie & Yann, 2006).

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[9] *Arbaeen*, which means "forty" in Arabic, is a Shia religious observation that occurs forty days after the Day of Ashura, the commemoration of the martyrdom and beheading of Imam Husayn Ibn Ali (who along with 72 supporters died in the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE), the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. Forty days is the typical mourning period in many Islamic cultures.

Whether the events depicted here were decisive or contributing factors to the successful revolution in Iran, they serve to exemplify how cultural or religious beliefs and traditions may be exploited for political gain. The Shia practice of the forty-day mourning cycle was exploited to mobilize the Iranian populace toward a specific political objective. Despite the predictability of the mobilization, the Iranian people adhered to religious custom and observed the appropriate deference to those martyred at the expense of both their freedom and personal safety.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Fields, R. M. (2004). *Martyrdom: The psychology, theology, and politics of self-sacrifice.* Westport, CT: Praeger.

Keddie, N. R., & Yann, R. (2006). *Modern Iran: Roots and results of revolution.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.


## GROUP MECHANISMS

An appropriate level of analysis when studying radicalization is the small group; thus, social psychology is a helpful disciple in attempting to comprehend the phenomenon. Social psychology provides a set of useful research criteria and analytical procedures to study radicalization. With many experts stressing the psychological normality of violent radicals, the analytical focus is placed on group and organizational psychology, with a particular emphasis on collective and social, not necessarily individual, identity. Although personality or dispositional characteristics of the individual should not be discounted completely, individual motivation changes too frequently and in response to too many different factors for it to be definable or reliably predictable. Radical groups can exhibit spontaneous changes in activity as a side effect of the individual changes in member behavior (Wheeler, 2009).

A common solution to the problem of mobilizing individuals for social action is coercion or participation under threat of punishment. Coercion may emanate from legislation, individual morality, or informal small-group sanctions. Personal morality and group norms, particularly in small groups, can be difficult to separate, because individual morality is typically anchored by group consensus. Moreover, in groups in which each member and their behavior is known to others, social rewards for participation and social punishments for nonparticipation can make behavioral commitment rational. When groups can be linked through social networks into a larger multi-group network, social action becomes possible on a larger scale. Thus, radicalization is facilitated initially by bringing individuals into small groups. Sometimes these groups are linked into a larger organization, but not always. The small group is necessary for action, but the organization is not.

Affiliating with an activist movement is (to a degree) illogical as the benefits of advancing the group are available to all group members, whereas the costs are born by the activists. Thus, the rational choice for an individual who cares about a group cause is to do nothing, let other individuals pay the costs, and benefit from the effort. Economists and political scientists (whose disciplines tend to prefer the rational-choice theory when studying market and political behavior) identify that individuals should be reluctant to commit resources of time to advance the cause of a large group, as cost-benefit analysis would result in the enjoinment of the result regardless of their participation. The unfavorable cost-benefit analysis coupled with the fact that the ostensible goal of radical groups is unlikely to be achieved through political violence thus counters any consideration of the radical as a rational actor (Victoroff, 2005). Nevertheless, violence can be a practical, low-cost strategy through which groups leverage their limited capability to achieve a political objective (Post, 2005).

Radical groups are self-organizing social systems that emerge when pre-existing elements (grievances, individuals, weapons, and infrastructure) present themselves in new patterns of interaction resulting in rebellion, terrorism, and/or other insurgent activity. Radical groups are selectively open to certain environmental inputs (recruits, sympathizers, weapons, grievances, and doctrine) that are transformed through processes such as indoctrination, intelligence collection, operations, and logistics and emerge as outputs: casualties, social dislocation, destruction, further grievances, and media coverage. Radical groups consciously seek to insulate members from environmental inputs that would potentially diminish the influence of the group (external security force penetration, counter-ideological propaganda, competing nonviolent activist groups). Output from one system (political discontent, the presence of a foreign force) becomes an input for another (political/social movements that arise in response). The causal relationships tend to perpetuate a political movement provided the radical group or the counter-radical element is sufficiently adaptable to changing conditions (Killcullen, 2004).

In this section, the assumption is that an individual has already joined a group; the potential motivations for joining the group will be addressed in the next section. Once an individual has joined a group, the subsequent identification with the organization can lead to feelings of guilt about wrongdoing perpetrated by others. The human capacity to care about large and impersonal collectives as if they were an extended family is the foundation of identity politics, and a pre-requisite for national, ethnic, and religious group conflict (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Crossett, C. (Ed.) (in press). *Casebook on insurgency and revolutionary warfare, Volume II, 1962–2009*.

Jureidini, P. A., La Charite, N. A., Cooper, B. H., & Lybrand, W. A. (Eds.) (1964). *Casebook on insurgency and revolutionary warfare: 23 summary accounts*. Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office.

Molnar, A. R., Lybrand, W. A., Hahn, L., Kirkman, J. L., & Riddleberger, P. B. (1964). *Undergrounds in insurgent, revolutionary, and resistance warfare*. Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office.

Molnar, A. R., Tinker, J. M., & LeNoir, J. D. (1966). *Human factors considerations of undergrounds in insurgencies*. Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office.

Post, J. M., Ruby, K. G., & Shaw, E. D. (2002). The radical group in context 1: An integrated framework for the analysis of group risk for terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25*, 73–100.

Post, J. M., Ruby, K. G., & Shaw, E. D. (2002). The radical group in context 2: Identification of critical elements in the analysis of risk for terrorism by radical group type. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25*, 101–126.

**Group Radicalization in Like-Minded Groups**

Radicalization in Like-minded Groups occurs when strangers, brought together to discuss issues of risk-taking or political opinion, show two kinds of change: increased agreement about the opinion at issue, and a shift in the average opinion of group members.

**Description:** Relevant-arguments theory holds that a culturally determined pool of arguments favors one side of the issue more than the other side. These favored arguments are not necessarily homogenous and individuals are bound to have divergent opinions on how best to advance their side of the argument. If certain conditions are prevalent such that the cause advanced by a particular argument becomes stagnant (regardless of reason), there are bound to be alternative ideas about how to continue the associated political agenda. As debate ensues, there is typically a shift toward increased extremity on whichever side of the opinion is favored by most individuals before discussion (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Charismatic individuals who have the capacity to manipulate sentiment toward their opinion can precipitate this phenomenon, also referred to as risky shift, group extremity shift, or group polarization. Movements with ill-defined leadership hierarchies (by design or unintentionally) are particularly susceptible to co-option by a charismatic leader whose ideas, personality, or accomplishments can cause individuals hungry for belonging or change to gravitate toward a new position.

> The frustration-aggression hypothesis (or relative-deprivation) is a response to the frustration experienced due to the incongruence between various political, economic, and personal needs or objectives and reality.
>
> Relevant arguments theory holds that a culturally determined pool of arguments favors one side of the issue more than the other side.

Laboratory experiments have demonstrated how readily groups of strangers show favoritism toward arbitrary in-groups and thus neglect out-groups, even when the group memberships were based on meaningless and arbitrary categorizations. "The mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups—that is, social categorization per se—is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group… the mere awareness of the presence of an out-group is sufficient to provoke intergroup competitive or discriminatory responses on the part of the in-group" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979 p. 38). These categorizations may be relatively benign at first, but differentiation can provoke conflict or exacerbate in-group out-group tensions.

If heretofore nonviolent individuals are brought together under any number of auspices, they could organize and become violent rather quickly using their political objectives and frustrations to rationalize their violent behavior. In joining a radical group, a member tends to significantly reduce previous affiliations. This is particularly the case for the anarchy ideologues because their choice is more profound, requiring a total commitment (Post, 1987); it represents a complete break with society, requiring an underground existence.

Groups of like-minded individuals often develop more extreme views as a group than they were as individuals. This "risky shift" phenomenon has several possible causes. The first is due to a high level of in-group versus out-of-group communication. Before joining a group, individuals presumably were aware of how their opinions compared with those of society, and were exposed to contrary ideas from a variety of perspectives. But when a group of people who are on the same side of an issue communicate more with each other than with the more diverse outside world, each individual's more extreme views are confirmed and reinforced, and the group mean may move toward a point that is more extreme than the original mean. A second cause of "risky shift" may be because each individual intentionally seeks to move closer to what they perceive as center of the group for identity reasons, and individuals' perception of where the group center is may be more extreme than the actual center.

**Observables:** There are certain indications that a politically active group is tending toward radicalization; among them are that the group requires prospective members to commit illegal acts in order to further separate from society. Within the group, internal debate becomes increasingly one-

sided in favor of a dominant position favoring more radical goals and behavior, especially those involving violence. The group demonstrates a willingness to punish or expel members or factions disagreeing with the leadership's policy decisions. The group cites a broad range of different reasons supportive of more radical positions, argues for a more radical position, and will not consider contrary arguments. Group members may perceive themselves in competition for a violent leader's approval. If there is no convincing spokesperson or a more moderate position, those who disagree are silenced and/or expelled (Post et al, 2002b).

**Example:** The interaction of an increasingly politically active group of young (in 1960 approximately 50% of the U.S. population was under 18 years of age) people amidst domestic and international strife coupled with the civil rights movement and nascent sexual revolution all served to foment revolutionary ideology. The Weather Underground (or Weathermen) was an American radical leftist organization that emerged out of the 1960s antiwar group Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). SDS held its first convention in Port Huron, MI, in 1962 where it called for progressive alliances among activist groups. Both SDS and the Weathermen drew from a population self-organized along antiestablishment political rather than ethnic, racial, or socio-economic lines. Both groups had male and female, rich and poor, and well-educated and uneducated members; what united them was their collective discontent with the socio-political conditions in the United States and abroad that they felt were the fault of an aging generation. Their commonality was the desire to free the oppressed of the world through revolution.  In 1965, SDS held its first anti-Vietnam War march in Washington that attracted approximately 15,000 people.

The Weathermen described themselves as a revolutionary organization of communist men and women.[10] Their goal was to create a clandestine revolutionary party for the violent overthrow of the U.S. government and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The organization was formed in the wake of the killing Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in a December 1969 Chicago police/FBI raid. A small cadre of SDS members perceived this event to be a signal that nonviolent resistance to the U.S. government was a futile endeavor and that, in order to achieve their objectives, they must resort to violence.[11]

The "Days of Rage," which commenced on October 9, 1969, was their first public demonstration; a riot in Chicago was timed to coincide with the trial of the seven individuals charged with conspiracy, inciting to riot, and other charges related to protests at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. The intent was to break from the typical social activist behavior prevalent at the time by performing extraordinary acts. The belief was that only through violence would the group draw sufficient attention of the U.S. government to the group's political goals. The group's intent was to foment public chaos and mobilize the American public in opposition to the U.S. government's policies toward Southeast Asia. The Weathermen desired the "Days of Rage" to be the largest protest of the decade; however, only a few hundred people attended.[12]

In 1970, the group issued a Declaration of a State of War against the U.S. government. Their positions were framed by Black separatist rhetoric. The group conducted a campaign of bombings through the mid-1970s, including aiding the jailbreak and escape of Timothy Leary. The bombing attacks mostly targeted government buildings along with several banks. The subsequent bombing campaign was a unique manifestation of armed propaganda. Each target was carefully selected for its

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[10] http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/weather.htm

[11] Ibid.

[12] http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/weather.htm

symbolism and tied to a specific political objective. For the bombing of the United States Capitol on March 1, 1971, they issued a communiqué saying it was in protest of the U.S. invasion of Laos, whereas the bombing of the Pentagon on May 19, 1972, was in retaliation for the U.S. bombing raid in Hanoi.[13]

The Weathermen largely disintegrated after the United States withdrew from Vietnam, which saw the general decline of the New Left. This unique application of frustration-aggression can become possible when a relatively large group of people who share similar ideals, concerns, and frustrations/disappointments come into contact with one another.

### Suggested further reading on this topic:

Jacobs, R. (1997). *Way the wind blew: A history of the Weather Underground.* New York: Verso.

Varon, J. (2004). *Bringing the war home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army faction, and revolutionary violence in the Sixties and Seventies.* Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press.

Weather Underground Organization (Weatherman) FBI Summary, http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/weather.htm.

### Group Radicalization under Isolation and Threat

Radicalization under Isolation and Threat is the powerful cohesion that develops in small groups and fosters an increased propensity toward violent behavior.

**Description:** The external requirements for this mechanism do not require deprivation or an oppressive out-group, but merely the perception of an external threat. In small face-to-face groups, out-group threat leads to increased group cohesion, an increased respect for in-group leaders, increased sanctions for in-group deviates, and idealization of in-group norms (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). This results in increased cohesion and a solidification of tighter social networks. The presence of a threat reinforces the need for cooperation and agreement exacerbating the "us against them" mentality and the "we're all in this together" motivation to cooperate and deindividuate. The group can also perceive a serious threat to individual members or their leaders after physical attacks (including arrests, torture, and assassination) or catastrophe.

The combination of isolation and outside threat makes group dynamics more powerful in the underground (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). The group experiences fear that the regime or other opponent is attempting to destroy the group as a whole (Post et al, 2002b). The underground group, isolated from society, develops tighter cohesion in response to shared danger, providing an exaggerated variant of the fight-flight group (Post, 1987).

Prisons are a psychologically unsettling environment in which the sense of isolation and threat is palpable. The internment environment (in its various manifestations) has played an important role in the narratives of many radical and militant movements. No matter how

> Relative-deprivation theory holds that economic disparities cause violent political behavior. A group that views the world as existentially threatening responds by either fighting or fleeing. The second level of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is security; the psychological requirement for safety and security is second only to the most fundamental physiological requirements for life. If these needs are threatened or somehow not obtained, an individual cannot effectively progress to satiating his or her social needs, which lie on a higher level of the hierarchy.

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[13] Ibid.

different their causes or backgrounds, many groups have regarded imprisonment as traumatic turning points in the history of their movement. The prisoners and the ways they were treated came to be focal points for their groups' campaigns, and it significantly influenced their supporters' attitude towards violence and the state. Confronted with existential questions and deprived of their existing social networks, prisoners with no previous involvement in politically motivated violence are vulnerable to being radicalized and recruited into terrorism (Neumann, 2010).

Social/collective identity (or the way groups define themselves against other groups) may influence the shift toward radicalization. In order to solidify the in-group's identity and differentiate themselves from others, particularly from an established competitor or out-group, the in-group may change their views to create a greater ideological distinction. The resultant metacontrast ratio[14] reinforces the in-group/out-group distinction (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

If the ratio of intragroup differences to intergroup differences increases, the distinctions become less precise and individual may begin to perceive the groups as interchangeable. Self-categorization depends heavily on both the comparisons between the self and one's in-group members as well as between in-group and out-group members on the relevant dimensions (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). Recent experimentation using an agent-based computer model demonstrated how polarization of group opinions could frequently occur in a society when agents with a random continuum of opinions formed into groups and then tried to maximize their groups' metacontrast ratio (Salzarulo 2006).

**Observables:** There are a number of indications and warnings of this mechanism that have been derived empirically. Among the observables is the active recruitment from a pool of disenfranchised, victimized, radicalized, or violent individuals. This is particularly so when those individuals have expressed the desire for revenge, have a history of legal (or illegal) conflicts with the government, have a history of violent behavior or experience with weapons (including participation in military training, paramilitary, or other violent organizations or campaigns), or possess specialized skills that can contribute to or facilitate violent action.

In a group context, the prolonged isolation or segregation can foster a sense of humiliation or collective loss of self-esteem. There are certain observables that may indicate a growing tendency to act on a sense of humiliation. If the group experiences a growing sense of stigmatization or isolation (from society or government) as evidenced through overt messaging or signal intercepts, that may indicate a possibility of future violent behavior. If a group experiences humiliation from psychological operations (through adversary strategic communications and/or psychological operations) or physical operations (military operations, mass detentions, etc.) directed against the group, individual members, or their constituents, their propensity for a violent response may increase. Organizations can experience a sense of helplessness and rage in response to collective attacks against the group or other actions designed to demonstrate the group's inferiority. The group can express a desire for revenge and retaliation (Post et al, 2002b).

Another observable signifying a movement toward radicalization is a change in recruitment strategy such as adapting methods to attract personnel with skills and motivations necessary for violence, using more elitist entry requirements, and perpetrating media-coverage-generating events such as demonstrations and open confrontations with police to draw recruits. Additionally, if the group

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[14] Metacontrast ratio is the average of intragroup differences over the average of intergroup differences.

adopts an increasingly paranoid defensive posture, including the intimidation, expulsion, even killing, of suspected traitors, there is an increased risk of further violence (Post et al, 2002b).

**Example:** The Palestinian resistance to the initial formation of Israel in 1948 and their subsequent occupation of Muslim lands is one of the most geopolitically divisive issues in the Middle East and one whose lasting effects are felt globally. Palestinian refugee camps were established after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War to accommodate the Palestine refugees who were forced to leave or chose to do so after the creation of Israel. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 grants Palestinians the right to return to their homeland, but Israel has refused to allow the vast majority of refugees to return. There are approximately 60 official Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza strip with an estimated population of nearly five million.[15]

The collective humiliation at the hands of and subsequent anger toward the Israelis has served as a unifying theme amongst the Palestinian people (and has been co-opted by external entities such as Al-Qaeda to usurp charitable funding raised ostensibly for the Palestinian cause but ultimately going to fund illicit activities). The clear distinction between in-group and out-group is reinforced through the physical security measures of the refugee camps and the strictly controlled lifestyle required of the inhabitants. Isolation creates a unique application of the combination relative-deprivation and frustration-aggression called cramping. Groups feel cramped when their desire for security and social needs are unavoidably interfered with (Gurr, 1970). This negative sensation grows increasingly intolerable and results in violence against those who are perceived to interfere with the aforementioned needs.

Interviews with both secular and nonsecular Palestinian terrorists have identified the common trend of being under constant threat by Israel. This shared fear and contempt appears to be a defining characteristic of those engaged in political violence against Israelis. In a series of interviews with 35 incarcerated Palestinian operatives, most Fatah members reported their families had good social standing, but their status and experience as refugees was paramount in their development of self-identity. For the secular terrorists, enlistment was a natural step and it led to enhanced social status. Armed attacks are viewed as essential to the operation of the organization. There was no question about the necessity of these types of attacks to the success of the cause; it provided a sense of control or power for Palestinians in a society that had stripped them of it. The hatred socialized towards the Israeli was remarkable, especially given that few reported any contact with Israelis. There was a common theme of having been unjustly evicted from their land, of being relegated to refugee status or living in refugee camps in a land that was once considered theirs (Post, 2005). They expressed an almost fatalistic view of the Palestinian/Israeli relationship and a sense of despair or bleakness about the future under Israeli rule. Few of the interviewees were able to identify personal goals that were separate from those of the organization to which they belonged (Post, 2005).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Livingston, N. C., & Halevy, D. (1990). *Inside the PLO: Covert units, secret funds, and the war against Israel and the United States*. New York: William Morrow and Company.

Post, J. M. (2005). When hatred is bred in the bone: Psycho-cultural foundations of contemporary terrorism. *Political Psychology, 26* (4), 615–636.

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[15] http://www.unrwa.org/

## Group Radicalization in Competition for the Same Base of Support

Radicalization in Competition for the Same Base of Support is multiple groups competing for the same base of sympathizers, resulting in increased violence.

**Description:** Intergroup competition is an indication and warning of impending violence because the competition for support often propels groups toward increasing violence (Post et al, 2002b) as groups attempt gain status by more radical action. Threat from in-group competitors is analogous to the threat from an out-group enemy in that both phenomena tend to produce increased cohesion resulting from increased pressure to conform and higher penalties for deviation from normative behaviors. The competition for in-group support can be considered a competition for survival in which violence against an out-group may be combined with violence against in-group enemies (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

Competition over scarce resources, which can be tangible resources such as money or intangible resources of rank and prestige, can exacerbate in-group/out-group conflicts. In allocating scarce resources, members tend to distribute resources in ways that favor the subgroup and neglect the out-group (Tajfel et al, 1971).

The theory of social learning holds that individuals within a group will be differentially reinforced by the response to aggressive behavior (Maile et al, 2010). If the perception of positive reward (in this case increased support from or influence over a target audience) increases with violence, the group will drift toward increasing radicalization. Specific cultural nuances notwithstanding, social norms typically encourage restraint from violence. When the opportunity to commit violence is socialized in specific ways, however (e.g., either under threat, or to maintain cohesion), individuals are permitted to disengage from these moral standards and their reluctance to act violently is lessened (Maile et al, 2010). As one individual within a group (particularly the leader or influential personality) advocates more aggressive behavior in response to the perceived threat, the cohesiveness of the group will motivate the others to comply. The group will tend to elevate the perceived threat to not only rationalize their increased aggression, but also to increase group cohesion. The increase in perceived threat and group cohesion, in turn, increases the likelihood of violent behavior. As two or more groups are simultaneously undergoing similar processes of threat elevation and radicalization, the increased completion further predisposes each group toward increasingly violent action.

**Observables:** Competition can be observed through direct observation (propaganda or direct conflict) or indirect assessment in changes in recruitment strategies. If a group or set of groups' financial operations are known and interdicted, it is likely that competition for resources (material, human, and financial) will foster competition amongst groups, likely driving one or more groups toward violence.

**Example:** The competition for support of the Egyptian *umma* (Muslim populace) by the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIG), and the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) in Egypt during the late 1970s and early 1980s demonstrates the effect competition amongst highly similar groups can have on a society.

Formed in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has served as an Islamic counterweight initially to the colonial government and also to the following secular Egyptian government under Presidents

Bandura's social-learning theory of aggression suggests that violence follows observation and imitation of an aggressive model, and a variant of this theory has been invoked to explain terrorist behaviors not as the consequence of innate aggressiveness, but of cognitive restructuring of moral imperatives.

The theory of social learning holds that individuals within a group will be differentially reinforced by the response to aggressive behavior.

Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood is the world's oldest and largest Islamic political organization. It officially opposes violence as a means of conveying its objectives, which are to affirm the Koran and *Sunnah* as the sole reference point for ordering the lives of the Muslim individual, family, community, and state (Mitchell, 1993). The goals of the Muslim Brotherhood have evolved somewhat in response to changing local and global policies and geopolitical landscapes; however, they have consistently promoted the reinstatement of the Islamic caliphate, the strengthening and administrative discipline of its internal organization, and mobilization of the greater community of believers through social, religious, and political outreach and civic action (Mitchell, 1993). The renunciation of violence by the Muslim Brotherhood precipitated the development of groups that espoused a more aggressive means of obtaining similar goals; notable amongst those were EIG and EIJ.

Considered the first element of the modern global Salafist jihad (Sageman, 2004), EIJ drew its legitimacy from a Salafist interpretation of Islam viewed through Sayyid Qutb's unique *takfiri* ideology. EIJ operationalized Qutbism by exemplifying piety in its members as well as the organization's oppositional stance against the Egyptian government. Nowhere was this more apparent than in EIJ's commitment to conducting attacks against Egyptian and Western interests, despite the increasing difficulty and relative lack of success of these operations until the early 1990s. EIJ was a more secretive and elitist organization that considered itself the ideological vanguard of the global Salafist jihad movement of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

Alternatively, EIG emerged as an umbrella organization for the proliferation of Islamic student groups in the 1970s. Unlike the more elitist and clandestine approach taken by EIJ, EIG attempted to appeal to a broader demographic of Muslims through social outreach and engagement along with their antiregime actions. Their civic action paralleled that of the Muslim Brotherhood, although their criticisms of the Egyptian regime were more vociferous and at times critical of the Muslim Brotherhood's appeasement and cooperation with the regime.

Both EIG and EIJ were comprised of Egyptian Muslims who were previous members of the Muslim Brotherhood. EIG and EIJ broke from the MB because they did not believe the goal of an Islamic state was achievable without violence. While EIG advocated a more populist model of protracted insurgency, EIJ preferred a swifter military coup to facilitate the transition to a theocratic state that would implement *Sharia*. Despite seemingly individual objectives and ideology, EIJ and EIG remained adversaries within the Islamist community in Egypt. The mass imprisonment of all groups in the wake of the Anwar Sadat assassination in October 1981 saw an irreparable rupture within the Said and Cairo factions of the Islamist movement. The Cairo group (which later emerged as EIJ) was seconded by future leader and current Al-Qaeda deputy Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Said group (which later emerged as EIG) was led by a *Shura* but deferred to their ideological guide, Sheik Umar Abd-al Rahman (who came to be known as the Blink Sheik). The dispute was ostensibly over the propriety of a blind man leading a militant organization, though it was more likely a result of the perceived threat of the religious credentials Rahman had by the abrasively negativistic Zawahiri. Each faction sought to gain support from the mass of Islamists imprisoned under the oppressive Egyptian prison system with both groups successfully building sympathizers and drawing many away from the Muslim Brotherhood. Although EIG clearly acquired more members, this is not necessarily indicative of their success, as EIJ under Zawahiri's leadership was far more selective (and secretive) about recruitment and indoctrination (al-Zayat, 2004).

Many members from both EIG and EIJ participated in the "defensive jihad" against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s, when their radicalization was refined. From the end of the war until 1997, the Egyptian government waged a low-intensity war of attrition with EIG (which

accounted for 90% of the attacks) and EIJ resulting in about 1,300 casualties, billions of dollars in damage to the tourist industry, and significant costs to relations between state and society (Gerges, 2005). The June 2001 merger between EIJ and Al-Qaeda to form "*Qaeda al-Jihad*" effectively ended the operational role of EIJ. However, many Egyptian members of Al-Qaeda are still considered to belong to both organizations and are often identified as such. While numerous factors have prevented the remnants of EIG/EIJ and the Muslim Brotherhood from seeing their social polices come to fruition, the current state of political discourse among these three groups is much closer to the activist zone along the political mobilization continuum than the radical terrorist (Hamzway & Grebowski, 2010).

### Suggested further reading on this topic:

Gerges, F. A. (2005). *The far enemy why jihad went global*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terrorist networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Spring, D. R., Regens, J. L., & Edger, D. N. (2009). *Islamic radicalism and global jihad*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

### Group Radicalization in Competition with State Power – Condensation

Radicalization in Competition with State Power is when a group with relatively weak and diffuse popular support attains sufficient organization to make a public demonstration and the state overreacts to the gesture.

**Description:** Condensation is similar to the jujitsu politics mechanism in that both require an external entity (typically the state) to act as a catalyst. Unlike jujitsu politics, however, condensation does not involve a mass movement and can include intentional provocation of the state. A component of terrorist and/or insurgent strategy dating back to the 19th century is the idea of provocation, compelling the state power to act violently. This overreaction may be intentional or unintentional (but still exploited by the radical narrative) and may include indiscriminate violence or, at the extreme, human rights violations. The result is an increase in sympathy for the victims of state repression and some mobilization of the group's sympathizers toward action (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Carlos Marighella, in his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla*, advocated this tactic as a highly effective means of cultivating popular support. Instead of compelling the populace to join an insurgent cause, the insurgents would provoke the state to react violently and indiscriminately, thus driving the populace into the arms of the insurgents (Merari, 1993). This tactic has also been employed against U.S. forces by Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Radicalization by condensation depends upon the strength of the affiliative ties between individuals within a group (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). The stronger the affiliative ties, the more likely a

> Social-movement theory is a psychological process whereby social conditions affect individuals and motivate them to challenge the status quo. It offers a way of conceiving violent radicalization with an explicit focus on the broader dynamics and processes of political mobilization.

negative effect on one member of the in-group perpetrated by the out-group will be internalized and retained. Social networks are the key vehicles for transmission of grievances and ultimately for political mobilization (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008a). Grievances are often a component to joining behaviors (Beck, 2008), but rarely will grievance alone convince an individual to remain engaged in a radical group. The social component of group membership and the positive affect experienced through affiliation with the larger group identity are more likely

explanation for sustained involvement (Beck, 2008). The salience of those affective reactions will vary directly with the strength of the relationship. Strong ties prohibit the group from abandoning those imprisoned or forgetting those who were martyred (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). The strength of cohesion can be so affectively powerful that the only justifiable response to out-group provocation is violence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

Social-movement theory analyses violent radicalization with an explicit focus on the broader dynamics and processes of political mobilization by considering the individual, his or her relationship with the group, and the group's relationship within a larger society. This area of study considers social movements and their violent subgroups as rational actors, driven by a political agenda and a set of political goals (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008a).

**Observables:** Indications and warnings of this mechanism require the identification of the at-risk group or those with a public dispute with a state power. Once identified, certain state behaviors increase the risk of radicalization; they include the promulgation of unpopular policies, public criticism or verbal attacks on the group, attack on core symbols associated with group identity (religious and/or historical sites, symbolic locations etc.), blocking access to political decision-making apparatus or legislative alienation, discriminative policies against the group and its constituents' rejection of publicly articulated group demands, and the active violent engagement of the radical group (Post et al, 2002b).

**Example:** The Tamil New Tigers (TNT), the forerunner of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), were the vanguard of a group that at its height was among the most innovative, ruthless, and well-organized insurgent movements in recent history. The Sri Lankan civil war of ethnic secession, which ended in 2009, pitted a secessionist Tamil group, the LTTE, against a state dominated by two Sinhalese parties (Wood, 2008).

Though LTTE was not officially founded until 1976, political activism along ethno-national lines in Sri Lanka began in 1970 with the formation of a militant student groups to protest government plans to limit access of Tamil students to Sri Lankan universities (SATP, 2001). These discriminative policies, which primarily affected Tamil middle-class students, were the primary catalyst for the emergence of a militant nationalist movement (Sabaratnam, 2005). Though the policy was relaxed the following year in favor of a quota system, this countermeasure was largely ignored by the more strident who began to consider the movement in more nationalistic terms.

The more militant components of the movement went underground but began organizing activities in Jaffna in 1972 in response to the publication of a new Sri Lankan constitution perceived as anti-Tamil (SATP, 2001). In 1972, two Tamil groups—the TNT led by Velupillai Prabhakaran (the future leader of the LTTE) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)—splintered from the original students' movement (SATP, 2001). The first recorded attack occurred September 17, 1972, when Prabhakaran led a bomb attack at carnival in Jaffna (Sabaratnam, 2005). The attack resulted in a police crackdown of the original movement (members of which were largely unaware of the still-underground TNT), but did not garner much support for the TNT (Sabaratnam, 2005).

In January 1974, Sri Lankan police attacked the Fourth International Tamil Conference in Jaffna, killing 11 Tamils, causing the loss of civilian property, and resulting in more than 50 civilians sustaining severe injuries; this event was commemorated annually by the LTTE (Sabaratnam, 2005). The incident took place while Naina Mohamed, a distinguished Tamil scholar from India, was speaking to a crowd of thousands. The Assistant Superintendent of Police led more than 40 anti-riot police to the scene. The police (armed with rifles, tear-gas bombs, batons, and wicker shields) had been advancing slowly through the crowd in vehicles attempting to disperse the crowd. The police

eventually dismounted and began attacking with batons and shields those who failed to disperse. The result was a stampede to escape the violence as police officers fanned out in all directions. The overhead electric wires were brought down by gunshots, though it is unclear whether the shots were warning shots that unintentionally struck the wires or purposeful attempts. Seven civilians died of electrocution, four others were trampled to death, and approximately 50 were injured (Sabaratnam, 2005).

The event served as a catalyst for the TNT's assassination of the Jaffna mayor in July 1975 (Sabaratnam, 2005). Thereafter popular support began to grow amongst the Tamil people for this still relatively small yet increasingly violent group. Though the TNT was already on a path toward violent radicalization, the 1974 deaths and the deadly assassination served to empower the TNT as a group and increase the number of Tamils who identified with this empowering ideal of violent opposition to oppression. The series of events also served to enhance the growing cult of personality surrounding Prabhakaran and reinforce his national-separatist ideal through violent action (Arena & Arrigo, 2006). Under Prabhakaran, the LTTE was formed on May 5, 1976, and evolved into one of the most lethal, well-organized, and creative insurgencies in the past 50 years (SATP, 2001).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Arena, M. P. & Arrigo, B. A. (2006). *The terrorist identity: Explaining the terrorist threat.* New York: New York University Press.

Post, J. M. (2007). *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda.* New York: Palgrave McMillan.

Sabaratnam, T. (2005). *Pirapaharan.* http://www.sangam.org/Sabaratnam/index.htm.

## Group Radicalization in Within-Group Competition – Fissioning

Radicalization from Within-Group Competition is when competition within the group for social status produces intense intragroup conflict and a rise of violent operations.

**Description:** Cohesion leads to pressures for agreement within the group. When, as in an already radical group, perception of external threat produces very high cohesion, the pressure for agreement is even stronger. An individual is unlikely to resist the pressure of a large majority; however, a minority group may be able to resist. If the pressure for agreement is very strong, the minority group is likely to be expelled from the group or destroyed (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

Debate over direction of an organization can become divisive and the result is often that the confluence of individual and group identity become imbalanced as the lack of cohesion leads to intrapersonal and interpersonal tension (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). This tension can result in the fractioning or eventually the self-destruction of the group. This is unlikely in groups led by charismatic narcissist (particularly if he or she is a malignant narcissist) because the public debate or

In small groups, a perceived threat leads to increased group cohesion, respect for in-group leaders, and idealization of in-group norms.

discussion is rarely encouraged and often prohibited. In these cases, the debate is likely clandestine and relegated to members of a particular cell (or set of cells) who actively attempt to keep the leader ignorant of their plans. In democratic or more egalitarian groups, open debate may be encouraged. Groups without an authoritarian leader are more likely to see open discourse dissolve into factionalism.

There can be an interaction between polarization and the "risky-shift" phenomenon, as groups would shift away from the perceived views of an out-group. Groups shift toward a more risky choice when they perceive an out-group to have made a safer choice in the same circumstance. The converse can also be operationalized if the in-group believes an out-group chose the riskier path (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

**Observables:** When the group experiences internal debate and factionalization over the use of violence and factions arise, the group cohesion will degrade, tension will increase, and the likelihood that elements split from the parent group increase. If this is recognized by the group leader, he or she may elevate the perceived threat from an out-group in order maintain cohesion. In other cases, the group may remain intact and become more violent, remain intact yet self-destruct, or lose control over certain elements that are more likely to act violently. When a faction disagrees with the group over the appropriateness of violence, the more violent faction becomes increasingly likely to break with the organization. If the parent group fails to keep the more extreme factions from leaving the organization, the departing faction is no longer subject to the moderating influence of the organization and thus is more likely to become violent (Post et al, 2002b).

**Example:** The history of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) dates back to the early 20th century, whereas the history of Irish Catholic resistance to British Protestant presence dates back centuries. The conflict again turned violent in Northern Ireland in 1969 as the minority Catholic population marched in civil rights parades, calling for more equitable rights from the largely Protestant-dominated government. The factionalization of the Irish republican movement became stark as the protests in Derry, Dublin, and Burntollet turned violent. The energy and conflict unleashed in the civil-rights movement uncovered two important facts about the IRA in 1969. First, at least some of the Army members had grown dissatisfied with the leftist turn of the organization and felt that the vigor and traditional ways of the IRA were being ignored.

The second realization during the violence of late 1969 was that the IRA could not protect Catholic citizens. Dissatisfied IRA members were irritated that the leadership refused to arm its members, or, even worse, could not arm its members. Belfast units had only a few dozen small arms, and Dublin had nothing to send north (Bell, 2000). As the violence continued to grow, a new offshoot of the IRA stood up to protect the Catholics from Protestant mobs and drive the British back to England. The new Provisional IRA (PIRA), just like the IRA from which it separated, intended to fight until Northern Ireland was allowed to merge with the independent Republic of Ireland.

The split within the party got under way in Belfast in August at a meeting to discuss replacing the local IRA leadership. Many of the key figures of the as-yet-unformed Provisional movement were present, and the meeting led to an armed confrontation with the Belfast unit commanders, which resulted in a compromise. The new faction gained some leadership responsibility, but not full command. The split became official during an Army Council meeting in October of 1969. The Council passed two motions desired by the Dublin leadership; the IRA was to drop its customary practice of parliamentary abstentionism and align itself with the more radical leftist political parties. Because these motions were expected to win, the dissidents had arranged to meet quickly to form a new organization. Army Council member Sean MacStiofáin was made its first Chief of Staff and thirteen other IRA Convention members joined thirteen supporters to become the Provisional IRA. The political arm, the Sinn Féin, had its own split in January 1970. The remaining elements of the original organization soon became known as the "Official" IRA, to distinguish it from the new "Provisional IRA."

The new Provisional IRA separated, intending to fight until Northern Ireland was allowed to merge with the independent Republic of Ireland. The Provisionals undertook a three-decade campaign of sniping, assassinations, and bombings across Northern Ireland and England, with waves of indiscriminate attacks, near collapses, rebuilding, and shifting tactics.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Alexander, Y. & O'Day, A. (Eds.) (1984). *Terrorism in Ireland.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

English, R. (2004). *Armed struggle: The history of the IRA.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heskin, K. (1980). *Northern Ireland: A psychological analysis.* New York: Columbia University Press.

# INDIVIDUAL MECHANISMS

It is radical behavior, not simply beliefs and/or feelings, that is of greatest practical concern when studying radicalization. However, the underlying susceptibility, vulnerability, and concomitant feelings of an individual throughout the process do help develop a potential set of observable behavior and/or conditions. It is important to note that the adoption of radical beliefs alone does not necessarily mean an individual will become violent; the transition from activist to violent radical is not inevitable. In addition, an individual need not personally suffer a transgression to seek out radicalization opportunities. Any individual with a degree of empathy, sufficient emotional vulnerability, and the opportunity to access informative materials (of which there is no short supply on the Internet) could potentially succumb to this mechanism. However, there may be underlying factors that predispose one to vulnerability, but those factors have been studied with sufficient rigor to have generated a set of empirically determined criteria for susceptibility to radicalization.

To date, no terrorist profile, whether cognitive or personality based, has been discovered (Post, 2007) and there is no scientific evidence of any genetic role in determining why certain people become involved in terrorism. Radical organizations likely have a sufficient range of personality and cognitive profiles within their ranks to be indistinguishable from the surrounding population on either of these axes. Most primary research conducted on individual terrorists or radical groups considers them psychologically normal. Strentz (1981) delimited three prototypical terrorist personality profiles. The "Leader" is the intellectual force of the terrorist operation and experiences an underlying sense of inadequacy that he or she projects onto society that, in turn, is viewed as inadequate and a logical target for social change. The "Opportunist" is characterized as the muscle of the group and often exhibits antisocial traits and has a history of criminal conduct predating his or her affiliation with the terrorist organization. Finally, the "Idealist" is described as a young and naïve individual who is drawn to a terrorist organization in the hope of effecting political and/or social change (Strentz, 1981). Leaders are likely to differ from followers, and the supporters/perpetrators of nationalist terrorism are likely to differ from the supporters/perpetrators of ethnically or religiously inspired terrorism (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b).

The mechanisms that follow discuss the reasons how and why an individual chooses to participate in violent radical behavior. Some become radicalized due to a personal or political grievance whereas others do so because of social or environment pressure.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Pearlstein, R. M. (1991). *The mind of the political terrorist.* Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.

Post, J. M. (2007). *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda.* New York: Palgrave McMillan.

## Individual Radicalization by Personal Grievance

Radicalization by Personal Grievance is when the individual internalizes a perceived transgression and seeks to act violently upon that slight.

**Description:** This mechanism is a manifestation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis in the absence of relative depravation. Here, a transgression against an individual is sufficient to overcome the contextual factors that typically inhibit aggression (Maile et al, 2010). The mechanism implies that the nonaggressive response to frustrations, heretofore dominant, would be subordinated to the aggressive response. The exact response is difficult to predict in the absence of specific information on the individual (to include personality data, family history, professional experience, etc.), and therefore the resultant behavior could be the act of joining a radical group, founding a group (more likely, but not necessarily, if the individual exhibits narcissistic tendencies), or acting alone. If the individual is already a member of a group or seeks to start one, it is unlikely to result in in-group sacrifice unless the member of the group can identify with the transgression (either personally or vicariously) (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

**Observables:** The personal grievance need not be direct, but can be experienced by proxy. This concept of vicarious victimization, or the exposure to stimuli that may elicit a political grievance, can be experienced through the self-study, media exposure, or accounts learned from members of the same social network. In fact, the intent of some Al-Qaeda psychological-warfare efforts appears to target vulnerable populations in order to elicit this very response. These individuals (sometimes referred to as self-radicalized or super-empowered) become adherents to the narratives of violent extremists and radicalized to the point of contemplating terrorist acts. Members of this category have a variety of motivations for radicalization, including grievances against governments, a hatred for the perceived erosion of fundamental values, disaffection from society, anger over unequal economic opportunities, the desire to belong to something larger than self, and a desire to make a name and prove oneself. Self-radicalized individuals present a unique challenge because of the inherent problems associated with potential numbers of people who could become susceptible to self-radicalization.

**Example:** The phenomenon of vicarious victimization is becoming increasingly prevalent in Muslims residing in the United Kingdom. The Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7 July 2005 cited that international conflict involving Muslims was widely interpreted as widespread war against Islam, that leaders of the Muslim world were perceived as corrupt and non-

> The frustration-aggression hypothesis (or relative-deprivation) is a response to the frustration experienced due to the incongruence between various political, economic, and personal needs or objectives and reality.
>
> The humiliation-revenge theory suggests that humiliation and the consequent internal pressure for revenge is a psychological factor that has been suggested to motivate one to participate in terroristic acts.

Islamic, and that some U.K. policies were viewed as evidence of a persecuted Islam.[16] Despite the variation in socioeconomic status amongst the relatively small sample, the report identified that the U.K. Muslim population had internalized the issues affecting Muslims globally and often used the first person plural to refer to Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, and/or Afghanistan (Change, 2008).

Mohammad Sidique Khan was the supposed ringleader of the perpetrators of the 2005 London Underground bombings. His story seems to be relatively consistent with much of the work done on Islamic extremists in that it is unremarkable. Thirty years old at the time of the bombings, he was born in Leeds and grew up in Beeston, a largely residential, close-knit, and densely inhabited area with an ethnically mixed population with a high transitory element. Khan is remembered as quiet, studious, and never ill behaved, and was apparently a vulnerable boy who was sometimes bullied at school.

After secondary school, he worked locally for the Benefits Agency and then for the Department of Trade and Industry as an administrative assistant. He later studied at Leeds Metropolitan University, majoring in business studies. It was here that he met his future wife, a British Muslim of Indian origin; they were married in October 2001 and had a daughter in May 2004. In 2001, Khan joined the staff of a local primary school, where he was employed as a learning mentor for special-needs children and those with language or behavioral difficulties. By the time he began his job as a learning mentor in 2001, he prayed regularly at work and attended the mosque on Fridays. He is said to have become less talkative and more introverted approximately a year after taking the position as a mentor. He was highly regarded by teachers and parents and demonstrated empathy with difficult children; however, he had a poor attendance record and was dismissed in 2004.[17]

Khan was an influential personality amongst the small group of clubs and gyms in Beeston, but there is little evidence he openly advocated violence. Kahn traveled to Pakistan in 2004, ostensibly to study with a friend (who also participated in the Underground bombing); however, Khan's intent may have been to fight in Afghanistan. Unfortunately there are few corroborated details of his trip, but Kahn may have linked up with Al-Qaeda figures while in Pakistan and those figures may have helped him film his martyrdom video. Khan's video statement focused on perceived injustices suffered by Muslims at the hands of the West, justifying the legitimacy of violence while his will focuses on the importance of martyrdom as supreme evidence of religious commitment to Islam.[18]

The London Bombings Report identified that the individuals used the aforementioned narratives combined with a simplistic argument to rationalize violence.[19] This justification included the idea that violence was a demonstration of commitment to Islam and that suicide terrorism (including the praise and admiration for martyrs) was a noble undertaking. The Change Institute study claimed the ideology appropriated Salafist concepts found in Islamic thought; however, they consider the manifestation that is most resonant with EU Muslims to be an overtly political ideology that has been developed outside of Islamic jurisprudence (Change, 2008). This framework is characterized by a reliance on selective and literal interpretations of Islamic texts and employed in support of political causes and strategic necessities (Change, 2008). The core component of violent Islamic radical thought in the European Union, the Change Institute states, is that jihad is interpreted as a way of life or a permanent and individual obligation on all Muslims (Change, 2008).

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[16] Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7 July 2005

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

## Suggested further reading on this topic:

Cole, J. (2009). *Martyrdom: Radicalisation and terrorist violence among British Muslims.* London: Pennant Books Ltd.

Coolsaet, R. (Ed.) (2008). *Jihadi terrorism and the radicalisation challenge in Europe.* London: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Ranstorp, M. (Ed.) (2010). *Understanding violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe.* London: Routledge.

## Individual Radicalization by Political Grievance

Radicalization by Political Grievance is when an individual is moved to individual radical action and violence in response to political trends or events.

**Description:** Perceived grievances are supported by ideological frameworks with a view of perceived problems, a vision of the future, and a prescription for action. Cases of individual radicalization to political violence (when the individual acts alone rather than as part of a group) are relatively rare. In such cases, the individual is likely to have some association with a larger intellectual movement (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Ideology and narratives play multiple roles in self-radicalization; however, the specific mechanism of internalization and processing is sufficiently idiosyncratic to prevent discernable trends from emerging across cases.

From the individual perspective, self-efficacy (the belief that one is capable of goal-directed behavior to affect the operational environment) and self-agency (the sense that one is the primary creator and principal driver of a particular thought or movement) are typically high in individuals who act alone in opposition to a political grievance. Self-efficacy and self-agency are often correlated with narcissistic tendencies; however, their presence does not necessarily indicate the presence of the personality disorder or the associated leadership style.

There is a greater probability of some degree of psychopathology in this category than in any other (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008), although the psychopathology is rarely the proximal factor in the process. Rather it is a combination of some underlying psychopathology (major or minor) along with specific environmental conditions that propel the individual toward radical behavior. In certain cases, such as paranoid schizophrenia with underlying thought disorder, the violence is a result of disordered cognition and a break from reality, and not necessarily truly politically motivated.

**Observables:** Most of the literature attributing clinical mental disorder to radicalism speaks of the remorseless personality type, psychopathy or sociopathy (Victoroff, 2005). Common theories hold that certain individuals possess or lack certain personality traits that make them more susceptible to radicalization and engaging in terroristic behavior than those individuals who do not. This personality-defect model asserts that this type of personality is largely the result of a dysfunctional childhood that fosters an impoverished sense of self and hostility toward authority. This resentment to authority may be an outgrowth of unconscious hostility toward abusive or controlling parents and is later reflected in the adult terrorist's rigid mindset (Maile et al, 2010).

> Narcissism theory or the narcissistic-rage hypothesis is another psychoanalytic theory by which primary narcissism (or self-love) in the form of the grandiose self is not neutralized by reality testing.

In certain behavioral presentations of paranoid schizophrenia[20] with the presence of thought disorder, individuals may associate a political entity with the "not-me" and project their negative attributes to said entity. The personal identification with the adversary (e.g., the government is out to get "me") is a delusion of grandeur that can be considered an unconscious attempt to seek to elevate self-esteem. Presumably, if a powerful group has a specific grievance with a single individual, that individual must be important. The subsequent elevation in self-esteem and self-importance may perpetuate the disordered thinking.

**Example:** Timothy McVeigh was the perpetrator of the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which was at that time the deadliest terrorist act on American soil. McVeigh was the middle child between two sisters born into a middle-class Irish, Roman Catholic family in rural western New York. He possessed above-average intelligence, was by temperament an introvert, although not antisocial, and was considered personable. Despite his social skills, he was reluctant to trust others and did not form close relationships easily (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). His parents separated when he was 11 years old, causing him to repeatedly withdraw into fantasies about himself as a hero as a means of coping with the familial tension during his latency years. The dissolution of his parents' relationship increased his interest in survivalism and firearms (his primary masculine identification was with his paternal grandfather who introduced him to firearms as a boy). It also lowered his motivation for academic achievement and it severely dampened his interest in women. His disinterest in romantic relationships was compounded by another developmental trauma when his mother and older sister abandoned him at the age of 16 (Meloy, 2004).

The crystallization of McVeigh's personality in late adolescence focused on his conscious identification as the self-described "ultimate warrior." This fantasy was inferred from numerous behaviors and personal productions including his interest in (and proficiency with) weapons and survivalism, his distrust and devaluation of women, his enlistment and success in the U.S. Army (to include combat actions during Operation Desert Storm), and his political interest in defending Second Amendment rights. This narcissistic fantasy, although grandiose, was for a time supported by reality and compensated for other disappointments. The fantasy progressed undeterred until he returned from Kuwait and attended the Special Forces Assessment Selection Program in April 1991. McVeigh's personal failure, however, and voluntary withdrawal from training was likely a humiliating and dysphoric experience. His subsequent behavior suggested this event was significant enough to contribute to his alienation from the U.S. government. He remained in his own mind the "ultimate warrior" in search of another war, socially adrift and exhibiting symptoms associated with mild depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), although he was never diagnosed with or treated for either disorder (Meloy, 2004).

McVeigh found another war through the politics of the Patriot (or militia) movement, although he never officially joined any of the affiliated organizations (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). Instead, he formed a leaderless cell composed of himself, Terry Nichols, and Michael Fortier. The personality profile of McVeigh at the time was that of a poised, over-controlled individual who would present favorably to others, but demonstrated traits associated with hypervigilant narcissism. He was self-sufficient, self-reliant, and capable of organizing and exhibiting goal-directed behavior. He was mildly shy, sensitive, and serious and gravitated toward esoteric political and philosophical beliefs. These abstract ideas helped him justify his sense of being different from and superior to others, and

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[20] For the DSM-IV-TR criteria for Schizophrenia, consult the appendix.

defended against underlying feelings of inadequacy, dependency, and anger toward authority figures. He was also brooding, analytical, and introspective; he would intellectualize his anger rather than express it directly. He was likely perceived to be a quiet, ruminative person who would shun frivolous pursuits (Meloy, 2004).

Consequent events in the United States, particularly the burning of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, TX, on April 19, 1993, provided a rationale for his anger directed toward the government. He began operationalizing that anger approximately a year after Waco when he began actively planning the Oklahoma City bombing. McVeigh used a variety of methods to maintain his pathologically narcissistic belief that his act of bombing was his destiny with history. First, he held an intense interest in "The Turner Diaries" and an affinity with the protagonist in the fictional account of a race war in which a federal building is bombed. Second, he personally identified with American patriots such as Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Patrick Henry, evidenced by his collection and dissemination of their writings. Finally, he selected April 19, 1995, as the date of the bombing to not only avenge the deaths at Waco in 1993, but also to commit what he saw as a revolutionary act on the birthday of the American Revolution, April 19, 1775, in Lexington and Concord, MA (Meloy, 2004).



**Figure 3. Hypothesized sequence of cognitive events leading up to the Oklahoma City bombing (adapted from Beck & Pretzer, 2005).**

Figure 3 depicts a hypothesized cognitive sequence of how McVeigh may have rationalized his actions. The Waco event can be considered a form of narcissistic injury that (as similar injuries in childhood had) compelled him to withdraw into the fantasized ideal of the "ultimate warrior." This served to exacerbate the discomfort of the latent wounds suffered in childhood and young-adulthood. He transformed from role-playing to role-taking and began actively considering an appropriate response. His own perversion of the law of social substitutability enabled him to rationalize killing innocent people as tools of tyrannical government. Both his fastidiousness and self-agency enabled him to carefully select the target, build and test the explosive triggers, position the explosive materials, and coolly execute his plan.

The meticulously crafted and tested ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel mixture bomb placed in the rear of a rental truck killed 168, injured nearly 700, and damaged more than 300 buildings within a

sixteen-block radius. On August 10, 1995, McVeigh was indicted on 11 federal counts, including conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, use of a weapon of mass destruction, destruction by explosives, and 8 counts of first-degree murder. On June 2, 1997, McVeigh was found guilty on all 11 counts of the federal indictment. He was executed by lethal injection on June 11, 2001, at the U.S. Federal Penitentiary in Terre Haute, IN.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Hoffer, E. (1951). *The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of mass movements*. New York: Harper and Rowe Perennial Library.

Michel, L., & Herbeck, D. (2001). *American terrorist*. New York: HarperCollins.

**Individual Radicalization by Self Persuasion in Action – the Slippery Slope**

Radicalization by Self-Persuasion in Action is when an individual moves from sympathizer to activist to radical by suddenly undertaking some major risk or sacrifice.

**Description:** An individual moving from sympathy to extreme violence in a single giant step (in the absence of a specific personal grievance) is rare. The typical progress from recruitment to operator within radical group is slow and gradual, with the individual being required to complete a series of loyalty and operational tests before being trusted with greater operational responsibilities (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Once individuals join a terrorist group, individual differences disappear in the face of the powerful unifying forces of group and organizational psychology. Group psychodynamics of the terrorist group would be an unusually powerful mechanism for producing conforming behavior (Post, 1987).

Once recruited, individual identity fuses to that of the group, particularly to the more radical elements therein. With that come few opportunities for individual ideas, identity, and decision-making and self-perceived success becomes more tightly coupled to that of the organization. Individual self-worth becomes increasingly tied to the value or prominence of the group. It provides the individual with the intrinsic motivation to ensure not only the success of the organization, but to increase its prominence and exposure. Cognitive dissonance often leads to the rejection of previously held ideals in favor of those of the group.

Prominence of a radical group is often tied to their level of violence, leading to greater prestige projected onto its members. This creates a cycle in which group members have a direct need to increase the power and prestige of the group through increasingly dramatic and violent operations. As the individuals and the group fuse, the cause becomes increasingly internalized by the individual, who may develop an inability to distinguish between personal goals and those of the organization. A symbiotic relationship emerges between the individual social needs, the need to ensure success of the group, and an enhanced desire to be an increasingly more active member of the group. Furthermore, heretofore highly personal emotions such as pride and shame become reflections of group and not the individual (Post, 2005).

The "Lucifer Effect" describes the point in time at which an ordinary, normal person first crosses the boundary between good and evil to engage in an evil action.

Cognitive dissonance is an unpleasant mental sensation caused by holding conflicting ideas in the memory simultaneously.

Deindividuation is a situation in groups in which anti-normative behavior is released because members are not seen or paid attention to individually; their immersion in a group is sufficiently intense whereby the individual ceases to be seen independently.

**Observables:** Fusion with the group seems to provide the necessary justification for their actions and absolution, or loss of responsibility (Post, 2005). This deindividuation process weakens individual's capacity to resist performing harmful or socially disapproved actions. It also heightens individual responsiveness to external cues resulting from increased implicit suggestibility. In pro-social groups this tends to be positive, whereas in radical groups it facilitates the loss of individual accountability. The result is uninhibited behavior that may be harmful or socially disapproved actions. Deindividuation also increases adherence to norms that emerge with the group. The re-established standard heightens susceptibility to conformity through social influence. The emergence of new group norms often leads to groupthink, a phenomenon characterized by faulty decision-making in a group (Postmes & Spears, 1998).

Radical groups, like many organic systems, are greater than the sum of their parts. They often exhibit characteristics and behaviors that emerge at a given level of analysis, which could not be predicted by analyzing the component parts. Groups and crowds afford the individual sufficient anonymity to take risks and/or perform actions they would be unwilling to perform as individuals. The Lucifer Effect represents a significant transformation of human character likely to occur in settings in which social situational forces are sufficiently powerful to overwhelm, or set aside temporally, personal attributes of morality, compassion, or sense of justice and fair play (Zimbardo, 2008).

**Example:** The Stanford prison experiment is a study of the psychological effects of becoming a prisoner or prison guard. The experiment was conducted in 1971 by a team of researchers led by Dr. Philip Zimbardo, Ph.D., at Stanford University. Twenty-four undergraduates were selected out of more than 75 to play the roles of both guards and prisoners and live in a mock prison in the basement of the Stanford psychology building. Subjects were randomly assigned to a role as either a prisoner or a guard. The participants adapted to their roles well beyond what the researchers predicted, leading the guards to display authoritarian measures. Deindividuation was created through a series of input variables that created an inferential subjective change in the individual. After those changes occurred, individual behavior became immersed into that of their role within the group. Normal, psychologically healthy young men playing the role of the guards quickly become strict to the point of brutality, whereas the psychologically healthy young men playing the role of prisoners quickly exhibited behaviors consistent with those actually incarcerated or oppressed. Five of the prisoners were sufficiently distressed by the process that they elected to quit the experiment early. Ultimately the entire experiment was abruptly stopped after only six (of fourteen scheduled) days (Zimbardo, 2008).

The experiment was groundbreaking in many respects and continues to serve as an example in psychology research methods and experimental ethics courses and textbooks. The resultant theoretical and practical applications have been felt in the laboratory, detention/internment centers, and military training environments the world over. It is important to note, however, that in Zimbardo's experiments only a subset of the population succumbed to the demands of authority or conformity and experienced the "Lucifer Effect." The totality of individuals subjected to certain conditions (be they oppressive or coercive) will not become violent or somehow experience a negative transformation of character. Although the focus in this work (and the attention of much of the research on this topic) is on those who did experience the effect, it is equally important to also understand what caused the resistance to the influence.

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Festinger, L., Pepitone, A. & Newcomb, T. (1952) Some consequences of deindividuation in a
      group. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *47*, 382–389.

Zimbardo, P. G. (2008). **The Lucifer effect: Understanding how good people turn evil. New York:**
      Random House Publishing Group.

## Individual Radicalization by Joining a Radical Group – the Power of Love

Radicalization by Joining a Radical Group – the Power of Love is when individuals are recruited to a group via a social network that includes radicalized individuals.

**Description:** This mechanism address the affiliative rationale for joining a radical group. Once the individual is a member, the particular route taken to violent radicalism may follow any of the aforementioned paths. This mechanism, the social network theory of radicalization, is the most currently prevalent and widely accepted of the phenomenon. Maslow identified that humans require belonging and acceptance (whether from large or small social groups); they need to love and be loved (sexually and nonsexually) by others. The absence of these elements may increase an individual's susceptibly and vulnerability to loneliness, social anxiety, and depression (Maslow, 1999).

**Observables:** Once individuals join a radical group, individual differences disappear in the face of the powerful unifying forces of group and organizational psychology. The need to belong, coupled with an incomplete personal identity, cuts across group differences and provides the basis for especially powerful group dynamics. This strong need to belong and to achieve a stable identity is deep-seated and springs from circumstances in the period before entering the terrorist group (Post, 1987).

**Example:** Sageman's work on the Al-Qaeda social movement is widely recognized as one of the definitive studies of jihadist psychology. In the study, he compiled biographies of 400 Al-Qaeda-affiliated radicals from trial transcripts, press accounts, academic publications, and corroborated Internet sources. Of that sample, 162 were from the Maghreb (the predominantly Muslim countries of North Africa), 132 were from Arabian countries, and 55 were from Southeast Asia. He further distinguished those 38 high-value individuals who were components of the Al-Qaeda central staff (Sageman, 2004).

The second level of Maslow's hierarchy is love, belonging, and social needs. Humans require belonging and acceptance (whether from large or small social groups); they need to love and be loved (sexually and nonsexually) by others.

Social identity is membership in a group that helps define a person's self-concept and provide self-esteem. An individual has multiple social identities, including those of his or her family, sports team, ethnic group, military unit, etc., all of which help define who he or she is relative to the society and provide a particular sense of self-worth through identification with said group.

The overall mean age was 25.69 years, with means of 29.35 for the Southeast Asians, 27.9 for the central staff, and 23.75 for the Arabs. The vast majority had secular, not religious educational backgrounds. Seventy-three percent were married and most had children (all of central staff and Southeast-Asian members were married). The modal responses in each group indicate the majority had at least some college education with many earning a bachelor's degree, and five held master's degrees and doctorates. The majority of those from the Maghreb were considered either unskilled or semiskilled laborers, whereas the modal categories of the other geographic groups were professional followed by semiskilled. The vast majority had no criminal records, very few had

incidents of major crimes, and some (mostly the Maghreb logistical) cells had histories of petty crime (Sageman, 2004).

The central staff was comprised mostly Egyptian Islamic militants released from prison, who traveled to Afghanistan for the jihad against the Soviets. The central staff and Maghreb Arabs were upwardly mobile young men from religious, caring, and middle-class families. Many spoke three to four languages and possessed computer skills. Most found themselves abroad, separated from traditional and cultural bonds, and sought social interaction with those of similar backgrounds and psychological states. They adopted the set of radicalized beliefs after they established social networks with radicalized individuals. The organization (or social movement) was a bottom up, self-organizing activity with no centralized recruiting mechanism. Of those interested in joining, only very few were actually accepted (Sageman, 2004).

An interesting finding was the history of mental health of the sample: There were only four cases of possible thought disorder, one case of mild cognitive impairment (what used to be considered mental retardation), and no indications of pathological narcissism. There were very few indications of traumatic histories. Sageman considered many to be over-protected youth who became well-adjusted, psychologically healthy adults. Arguably the most compelling finding was that 68% joined due to pre-existing friendships with members and 20% joined due familial ties with members. In 98% of the cases, social bonds preceded ideological commitment. There was no evidence of coercion or brainwashing; individuals acquired the beliefs of those around them. In each case, the individual joined the jihad through human bridges (acquaintances, relatives, and imams) and not electronic or bureaucratic ones (Sageman, 2004).

**Suggested further reading on this topic:**

Brachman, J. M. (2009). *Global jihadism: Theory and practice*. New York: Routledge.

Post, J. M. (2007) *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda*. New York: Palgrave McMillan.

Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terrorist networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sageman, M. (2008). *Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

# DERADICALIZATION

Deradicalization is the abandonment of terrorist ideology. Disengagement is the cessation of terrorist activities (Horgan, 2009). A comprehensive analysis of deradicalization conceptually and deradicalization programs specifically is beyond the scope of this study. But the prevailing theories to the topic and the studies and programs that have been attempted are useful to relate to the theories and mechanisms previously explained.

Of vital interest is why an individual decides to leave a radical group. Possibilities include the revulsion to the extreme violence of the group's operations or the personal violent acts required to join and maintain membership in the group (Horgan, 2005). Perhaps their reasons for joining were found to be inconsistent with their subjective experience within the group. That incongruity could be operational (their function with the organization does not match their desired role), psychological (stress, exhaustion, trauma), personal (obligations outside the group require attention), or financial (radicalism may prove insufficiently profitable) (Horgan, 2009). Understanding the rationale behind disengagement requires primary interaction with those individuals. Unfortunately, the dataset on that population is limited.

Deradicalization programs attempt to convert the radical's belief in the central ideology of the group or movement to which they belong. The programs in many predominantly Muslim countries consist primarily of moderate discourse between program participants and moderate imams, who attempt to persuade participants, through religious discussion and debate, to abandon terrorist ideologies in favor of a more moderate, nonviolent understanding of Islam.

Programs that focus more on disengagement tend to focus on affliative factors and more generalized social regulation, rather than try to change the ideological mindset of the participants. In essence, the programs attempt to get participants involved in activities and networks that are not violent, rather than seek a conversion. The role of social networks in recruitment and in the process of radicalization is widely acknowledged. The relevant literature in a variety of disciplines indicates the central importance of affiliative factors in individual motivations for entry into and exit from the radical organizations (Morris et al, 2010). One Saudi program seeks the involvement of participants' family members in the process and, reportedly, in some cases provides assistance in finding a wife. Others seek to reduce potential economic barriers to disengagement through the provision of social services such as job training or placement, educational opportunities, or modest cash stipends (Barrett & Bokhari, 2009). In each instance, the program adopts an approach that may be readily accommodated and implemented in the setting in which it is to be carried out (government-run detention facilities in the case of deradicalization, short-term abduction conditions in the case of deprogramming, and longer term municipal and federal project structures in the case of de-ganging) (Morris et al, 2010).

Some preliminary findings of a study (to be published shortly) that evaluated programs in 15 countries lend some insight on approaches to deradicalization. The existence of hierarchical command and control structures in a conducive environment may enable radicals to "lay down their arms" while retaining the inherent dignity of their identity as a solider/fighter/warrior, especially if the leadership is convinced the movement is faltering. When political concessions form part of a negotiated agreement between the state and the radical group, deradicalization should be a component of said agreement. However, the process requires tangible goals, effective management, and patience (Neumann, 2010).

Some additional recommendations from the Neumann report suggest using a combination of counter-ideological education (or religious re-education) with vocational training. It recommends employing credible and empathetic interlocutors, who can relate to prisoners' personal and psychological needs and not simply confront their beliefs with an unsympathetic set of alternative beliefs, and an emphasis on re-establishing a social network in mainstream society through pre-existing (but nonviolent) connections. This process is obviously confounded when the radical is collocated with other violent radicals. Material inducements are often helpful, but as a supporting effort only. The main effort requires a sophisticated holistic approach to simultaneously satiate one's hierarchy of needs by credibly incentivizing positive behaviors (Neumann, 2010).

Measuring the success of deradicalization programs is rather difficult, because the combination of cultural context, differences in eligibility requirements, and the relatively limited time period have produced data that are difficult to assess and nearly impossible to compare. Although several studies are ongoing, reliable data on recidivism rates of terrorist behavior and/or longitudinal studies on the long-term effectiveness of deradicalization programs are scarce.

## Suggested further reading on this topic:

Horgan, J. (2008). Deradicalization or disengagement? A process in need of clarity and a counterterrorism initiative in need of evaluation. *Perspectives on Terrorism, 2. 4.*

Horgan, J. (2009). Individual disengagement: A psychological analysis. In T. Bjorgo & J. Horgan (Eds.), *Leaving terrorism behind: Disengagement from political violence.* New York: Routledge.

Horgan, J. (2009). *Walking away from terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements.* New York: Routledge.

# CONCLUSION

This study has posited that there are four domains in which the decision to commit violence resides. Each are discussed at least in part in this study, but the primary emphasis has been on the internal psychological or sociological factors that impact the decision. Psychological factors or social conditions/phenomena play a heavy role in the likelihood and process by which one decides to commit violence toward a political end. But we have emphasized that there seems to be no link between psychopathology, mental illness, or specific personality or cognitive profiles and the radicalized. The availability and conditions of both the information and physical environment also play key roles, but have been left to other studies for explanation.

We have also emphasized that geography and economics do not play a decisively predictive role in determining where radicalism arises or thrives. World history has been full of resistance and revolutionary movements in all areas. There are marked organizational, operational, and functional similarities between current-day Islamic fundamentalist groups promoting the idea of jihad and the communist revolutionary groups from the 1960s and many others. There is a current trend away from the socio-economic narrative of class-struggle as a motivating factor, and a marked rise in movements pulling on traditionalist/fundamentalist narratives, but many radical groups still exist that coalesce around opposition to and the influence of foreign country (whether military presence or cultural influences) or around centuries-old ethnic divisions and hatred. Some socio-economic reform groups still operate around the world, including those that desire a more reformist-modernist direction (Crossett 2010). In short, revolution, radicalism, and violence for political means are still worldwide phenomena, and likely always will be.

### Risk Factors

Again, there is no experimentally derived or empirically based psychological or demographic profile that would indicate a predisposition toward radicalization. What follows are a proposed set of risk factors that seem to apply to individual and group radicalization. A risk factor is a variable associated with an increased risk of radicalization whose presence is neither deterministic nor implicitly characterological. The behaviors or attributes described below merely point to a possible increased likelihood of a willingness or eventual participation in political violence.

**Risk factor:** Emotional vulnerability

**Description:** The existence of some temporary emotional state that predisposes the individual to greater openness to the use of, or support for the use of, violence (Horgan, 2009b) creates a window of opportunity or vulnerability. This could be brought on by any number of internal or external stimuli from a cognitive and/or personality predisposition, such as death or injury of a loved one. In the individual mechanisms discussed earlier, both Khan and McVeigh perceived a set of events to be sufficiently powerful to allow them to rationalize violence. For Khan it may have been his trip to Pakistan or his emotional reaction (his sense of vicarious victimization and identification with the Palestinian resistance), whereas for McVeigh the incidents at Ruby Ridge and Waco may have increased his emotional vulnerability to the point at which his fantasy of the "ultimate warrior" became increasingly salient. Understanding the emotional state of an individual at various points in the radicalization process is interesting (and often included in psychological autopsies); however, individual motivation changes too frequently and in response to too many different stimuli for it to be easily definable or have sufficient predictive validity (Wheeler, 2009). Absent additional

psychometric and demographic data, it is not only difficult to determine without direct access, but the appropriate mitigation steps or countermeasures may be too idiosyncratic to be practical.

**Risk factor:** Dissatisfaction with the status quo of political activism

**Description:** The confluence of dissatisfaction with current political or social activism, the desire to engage in activity (as opposed to discussion), and the acknowledgement of personal agency help set the external and internal conditions for radicalization (Horgan, 2009b). An individual (or faction with a group) may become increasingly frustrated or disillusioned with the perceived lack of progress and may feel it is incumbent upon him or herself (or their faction) to add sufficient energy to the movement by using violence.

**Risk factor:** Personal connection to a grievance

**Description:** Identification with victims (actual or vicarious) (Horgan, 2009b) will predispose an individual to radicalization. The proximity and/or strength of connection of one individual to another who was victimized or perceived to be victimized by a political out-group will increase the likelihood for radicalization. Any political or military action will have unintended consequences, including individuals who suffer physically, psychologically, financially, or otherwise by a change in policy, a military operation, legislation, etc.

**Risk factor:** Positive (or at least non-negative) view of violence

**Description:** The belief that there is nothing inherently immoral in violence against the state or its symbols (Post et al, 2002a) is another risk factor for radicalization. As described earlier, social learning holds that an individual can recalibrate his or her moral compass in order to increase cohesion with the in-group to which the individual belongs. If the individual's underlying moral reasoning does not include compunction toward violence, this process can occur more rapidly. Understanding the prevailing local sentiment regarding violence through direct or indirect assessment may augment target audience analysis and help better comprehend the social microterrain and inform a risk assessment for radicalization within a defined area of operations.

**Risk factor:** Perceived benefit of political violence

**Description:** An expectation of reward to accompany increased involvement (Post et al, 2002a) is a risk factor for joining a radical group. Rational-choice theorists identify that individuals should be reluctant to commit resources of time to advance the cause of a large group because cost-benefit analysis would result in the enjoinment of the result regardless of their participation. However, if the perceived benefit (ranging from collective political gain to personal self-esteem enhancement) is greater than the perceived risk of inaction, the individual is more likely to participate in political violence. Individual cost-benefit analyses are rarely expressed interpersonally and often change too frequently to be reliably assessed (Wheeler, 2009); however, if, through various collection operations, it can be reliably determined that this individual calculus is presented it may be acted upon and/or exploited.

**Risk factor:** Social networks

**Description:** Kinship or other relevant social ties to people that are experiencing similar issues or who are already involved (Sageman, 2004) will increase the likelihood of an individual joining a terrorist organization. Sageman's study of the Al-Qaeda social movement indicates that 98% of his sample of 400 jihadists joined the movement because of preexisting social, kinship, or mentorship dyads (Sageman, 2004). The application of social-network analysis tactics, techniques, and

procedures[21] can facilitate understanding the at-risk populations and mechanisms of radicalization through affiliative factors.

**Risk factor:** In-group delegitimization of the out-group

**Description:** The intensity of delegitimization is the degree to which the radical group challenges the legitimacy of its opponents, the more intense the delegitimization, the greater the risk for radicalization (Post et al, 2002a). If the group increasingly believes that change is not possible in existing society and that a radical change is necessary, they are more likely to radicalize. Additional signs of delegitimizing an adversary include the group's ideology calls for and legitimizes violent action against enemies, specifies targets with explicit detail or expands the spread of targets from specific to general,[22] emphasizes the historical sins of a designated group, characterizes group members as righteous and uniquely empowered to rectify the perceived ills of society. A radial can delegitimize the out-group by idealizing the goals and means of the in-group's revolutionary nation or leaders associated with violence, terrorism, or revolution (Post et al, 2002b). Reviewing the themes and messages of a group are mission-essential tasks of psychological operations (or military information support) forces; submitting requests for information (RFI) to the element(s) responsible for such tasks will help develop a more robust risk calculus for radicalization of a particular group.

**Risk factor:** Views upon (and histories of) violence

**Description:** Moral inhibition and antiviolence taboos are societal strictures. Groups operating in fragmented political cultures with a history of violence are a greater risk for radicalization. Groups whose members (particularly their leaders) have experience with violence, conflict, and weapons are at an increased risk for radicalization. If the group actively recruits individuals that demonstrate a history of violent behavior, including participation in other violent campaigns or organizations (Post et al, 2002b), it could indicate a conscious attempt by the group to build capacity for political violence. Rational assessment of risk and opportunities is the degree to which the radical group has calculated the necessity and feasibility of confronting its enemies with violence; the greater the degree, the greater the risk for political violence (Post et al, 2002a). Reviewing the biographical data and criminal records of the individual comprising a group may provide insight into their propensity toward violence. Records of violent crime, military and combat experience, and other evidence of violence will help calculate the risk for further violence.

**Risk factor:** Resources

**Description:** Organizational, financial, and political resources available to the group increase the risk of its radicalization (Post et al, 2002a). If an adversary threat calculation equals the group's intent multiplied by its capability,[23] increased resources (assuming the intent increases or at least remains constant) significantly heightens the threat. Capabilities require resources, training, and political will; the greater the product of those, the greater the likelihood of violent action. Understanding the mechanism by which a group funds their operations (e.g., recruitment, strategic communications, terrorist acts) is amongst the most valuable intelligence that can be gathered.

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[21] Appendix B of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations has a useful set of recommendations and applications for SNA in a counterinsurgency environment. Many of those TTPs are applicable to the radicalization process.

[22] The perversion or misapplication of the law of social substitutability (which holds that the killing of any member of a segment is considered a group offense and can be avenged by the killing of any member of the offender's segment (Marcus, 2008)) greatly expands the threat assessment associated with the particular group.

[23] Threat = Intent x Capability.

**Risk factor:** External support

**Description:** External influence and manipulation is the type and level of support provided to radical organizations; radical groups receiving money and training support from foreign governments are at an increased risk for radicalism (Post et al, 2002a). Observable risk factors of sponsorship include support from a source with a known violent agenda, pressure placed by the supporters on the supported group, and direct provocation of violence by the supporters (with the expectation the radical group will participate) (Post et al, 2002b). As with the previous risk factors, understanding the organizational and support networks is vital to countering a radical group. Understanding the number of operational radicals (guerrilla, insurgents, or terrorist) and the active and support networks (or the "tooth-to-tail" ratio) as well as the structure and function of that support network will provide insight.

**Risk factor:** Perceived threat

**Description:** A sense of imminent threat is the degree to which a radical group feels threatened by its enemies; the more imminent and existential the threat is perceived to be, the greater the risk for terrorism (Post et al, 2002a). Out-group threat is the most reliable stimulus to induce in-group cohesion; if a radical group feels increasingly threatened, the likely outcome is an increase in political violence. Evaluation of actual (for example, impending security force operations against the group) or perceived (for example, analyzing the group's internal and external communication for the indicative themes and messages) will help provide indications of increasing defensiveness and thus increased risk for radicalization.

**Risk factor:** Conflict

**Description:** A state of conflict ranging from conventional warfare to low-intensity conflict (amidst cease-fires and brief periods of stability) can increase the likelihood of radicalization. Clearly defined in-groups and out-groups, violence, perceived oppression, and a personal connection to the victims of violence are prevalent in conflict states. These environmental conditions, coupled with an internal psychological susceptibility towards participating in the violence, increase the risk of radicalization. Whether in conventional conflict or stability-and-support operations, significant efforts must be made to understand the risk of radicalization within the populace. U.S. military doctrine (namely FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency Operations*) considers the population the center of gravity in stability-and-support operations. It is important to understand the general risk factors for radicalization, determine which are applicable, and take steps to mitigate them in order to avoid increasing the number of active combatants within an area or operation.

**Risk factor:** Humiliation

**Description:** The coincidence of the humiliation-revenge and frustration-aggression hypotheses presents a dangerous risk factor for radicalization. The degree to which the radical group is subjected to physical repression or torture, or perceives itself to be humiliated by its enemies, the greater the risk that they will take revenge through political violence (Post et al, 2002a). Intentionally or unintentionally robbing an individual of his or her inherent dignity provides not only a logical rationalization for radicalization, but also a sociocultural motivation to defend the inherent dignity of all those within the in-group.

**Risk factor:** Competition

**Description:** The degree to which a radical group is in competition with another group for a shrinking constituency increases the risk of radicalization (Post et al, 2002a). Like-minded groups compete for support, recruits, publicity, and/or prestige. Demonstration of operational credibility is an effective means of generating credibility. While a competing group can benefit from violent acts, particularly if they claim credit, the typical result is increased violence directed toward the political objective as well as toward competing groups. Though potentially beneficial in the short term, the long-term viability of a radical group is decreased by the presence of a competing radical group. As exemplified earlier using the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Egyptian Islamic Group, the competition amongst similar groups can lead to violent radicalization that may consume the government. Although more radical groups with which an entity must contend is not necessarily easier than less, it can exploited to the counter-radicalization efforts benefit. Pseudo-operations, in which government forces and defectors portray themselves as radical groups, have seen success in counterinsurgency warfare (Cline, 2005). Fomenting internecine rivalries may serve as a distraction from the political objective and may be exploited to drive a wedge between the radical groups and their potential sympathizers.

**Risk factor:** Youth

**Description:** The most important biological factors associated with radicalization tend to be age and gender; young male in their mid-teens to late 20s are the most likely to be recruited by or interested in joining a radical organization (Silke, 2008). The greater the concentration of activists between the ages of 18 and 25, the greater the risk for radicalization (Post et al, 2002a). Census operations are amongst the most important information-gathering tasks in counter-radicalization operations. From Galula to Killcullen, practitioner-theorists have advocated that accurate census taking will facilitate better administration, security operations, and ultimately pacification.

**Risk factor:** Resonant narrative

**Description:** A well-crafted message that appeals to a variety of vulnerabilities (sociocultural symbols, individual affective vulnerability, etc.) within a selected target audience will help create an environment that supports the radicalization process. This is increasing in relatively closed environments in which it is more difficult to gain access to alternative explanations through additional information resources.[24] The presence of this particular issue has been hypothesized in the myriad madrasas throughout the Islamic world where young boys are exposed to a particular interpretation of Islam and not afforded the exposure to competing ideas or interpretations. There are numerous ongoing programs (and considerable debate over their effectiveness) designed to counter this path toward radicalization. Among the prevalent arguments is that the counter-radicalization programs must address multiple levels of Maslow's hierarchy as early as possible in the individual's life and without the perception of Islamophobia or the imposition of foreign political will.


**Suggested further reading on this topic:**
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) (2008). *Personality targeting tactics, techniques and procedures.*

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[24] Although this can occur in open societies as individual selection bias, it predisposes one to seeking out information that supports their objectives and values and fails to consider opposing ideals.

Molnar, A. R., Lybrand, W. A., Hahn, L., Kirkman, J. L., & Riddleberger, P. B. (1964). *Undergrounds in insurgent, revolutionary, and resistance warfare.* Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office.

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# RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study consisted primarily of assessing the current state of the art of two of the major social-science fields as they pertain to radicalization. This primer contains no new research, but summarizes theories and proposed mechanisms and observables that exist in the current literature. A number of studies are currently ongoing that are worthy of assessment and inclusion in this type of reference when they are made available.

A logical next step would be a broad assessment of the collected (yet dispersed) data that have been collected on current and former radicals from the past decade. We know that a number of recent studies have collected data from insurgents, prisoners of war, gangs, internal radical groups, and a number of other populations that have possibly been assessed for local use or for specific near-term purposes. There have been broader studies that have collected data from small- to medium-size populations, either directly or through indirect methods, to test or verify some of the theories and hypotheses that we have included in this report. To our knowledge, however, little effort has been made to collect all of the raw data from the myriad of detention facilities or jails in which psychological assessments have been made of people detained under counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency efforts. Collection of the profiles, assessments, questionnaires, and other personality, intellectual, and demographic data would be a vital step toward a broader research program and would allow for a broad categorization study that could provide insights as to how applicable each of the included theories and diagnoses within this study actually are.

Another outcome of such a database would be the discovery of research questions and empirical data "holes" that could be easily filled through assessment of the collected dataset, or through new research studies. Vital areas of the theories and proposed observables and mechanisms herein have not been empirically studies or validated. The collected dataset may be able to provide those answers, or guide us toward the construction of a research program that could do so.

Once a research program to address critical unknowns on radicalization/radicalism is formed, a small pilot study using an available and controlled population would be the next step. Local jails hold radical group members (e.g., Hammerskins or the Black Guerrilla Family gang) that might provide opportunities to test methods and criteria in preparation for a larger study.

We expect that numerous potential studies exist that could provide vital clues and insights into the radicalization process and the profile of the radical that would be of interest to the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group. The studies could be specific to a particular group or type of radical, or broad across the spectrum of types and reasons for radicals. Specific case studies could be constructed, first from a historical analysis, then to a data assessment study, to finally a dedicated research study through interviews and assessment. Potential subject populations could range from local prison or urban gangs, to specific drug cartels, potential radicalization targets within the military, or specific insurgent groups worldwide.

A few specific studies have already been done with radical groups that merit verification through the assessment of another radical group with the same methodology. Verification studies like this ensure that the results of the first study translate to other populations, or find specific conclusions that do not translate across motivation, demographics, cultures, or generations.

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# APPENDIX: DSM-IV-TR CRITERIA FOR SELECTED MENTAL DISORDERS

The DSM IV-TR uses a multiaxial or multidimensional approach to diagnoses because rarely do other factors in a person's life not affect their mental health.

Axis I: Clinical Syndromes, where clinical syndromes are the focus of the diagnosis.

> Disorders are identified into 14 categories, including Anxiety Disorders, Childhood Disorders, Cognitive Disorders, Dissociative Disorders, Eating Disorders, Factitious Disorders, Impulse-Control Disorders, Mood Disorders, Psychotic Disorders, Sexual and Gender-Identity Disorders, Sleep Disorders, Somatoform Disorders, and Substance-Related Disorders.

Axis II: Developmental Disorders and Personality Disorders: long-standing chronic conditions that may affect the clinical syndromes listed in Axis I.

> Developmental disorders include autism and mental retardation, disorders that are typically first evident in childhood.

> Personality disorders are clinical syndromes that have enduring symptoms and encompass the individual's way of interacting with the world. They include Paranoid, Antisocial, and Borderline Personality Disorders.

Axis III: Medical/Physical Conditions that play a role in the development, continuance, or exacerbation of Axis I and II Disorders.

> Physical conditions such as brain injury or HIV/AIDS that can result in symptoms of mental illness.

Axis IV: Social and environmental stressors that may affect the clinical syndromes listed in Axis I.

> Events in a person's life, such as death of a loved one, starting a new job, college, unemployment, and even marriage can affect the disorders listed in Axis I and II.

> These events are both listed and rated for this axis.

Axis V: Highest Level of Functioning.

> On the final axis, the clinician rates the person's level of functioning at both the present time and the highest level within the previous year. This helps the clinician understand how the above four axes are affecting the person and what type of changes could be expected.

Diagnostic criteria for 301.0 Paranoid Personality Disorder

> A. A pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by four (or more) of the following:

>> (1) suspects, without sufficient basis, that others are exploiting, harming, or deceiving him or her

>> (2) is preoccupied with unjustified doubts about the loyalty or trustworthiness of friends or associates

(3) is reluctant to confide in others because of unwarranted fear that the information will be used maliciously against him or her

(4) reads hidden demeaning or threatening meanings into benign remarks or events

(5) persistently bears grudges, i.e., is unforgiving of insults, injuries, or slights

(6) perceives attacks on his or her character or reputation that are not apparent to others and is quick to react angrily or to counterattack

(7) has recurrent suspicions, without justification, regarding fidelity of spouse or sexual partner

B. Does not occur exclusively during the course of Schizophrenia, a Mood Disorder with Psychotic Features, or another Psychotic Disorder and is not due to the direct physiological effects of a general medical condition.

Note: If criteria are met prior to the onset of Schizophrenia, add "Premorbid," e.g., "Paranoid Personality Disorder (Premorbid)."

Diagnostic criteria for 301.7 Antisocial Personality Disorder

A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest

(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure

(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead

(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults

(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others

(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations

(7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another

B. The individual is at least age 18 years.

C. There is evidence of Conduct Disorder with onset before age 15 years.

D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of Schizophrenia or a Manic Episode.

Diagnostic criteria for 301.81 Narcissistic Personality Disorder

A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

(1) has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents, expects to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)

(2) is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love

(3) believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate with, other special or high-status people (or institutions)

(4) requires excessive admiration

(5) has a sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations

(6) is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends

(7) lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others

(8) is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her

(9) shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes

Diagnostic criteria for Schizophrenia

A. Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) of the following, each present for a significant portion of time during a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated):

(1) delusions

(2) hallucinations

(3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)

(4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior

(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition

Note: Only one Criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running commentary on the person's behavior or thoughts, or two or more voices conversing with each other.

B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of the time since the onset of the disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning such as work, interpersonal relations, or self-care are markedly below the level achieved prior to the onset (or when the onset is in childhood or adolescence, failure to achieve expected level of interpersonal, academic, or occupational achievement).

C. Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least 6 months. This 6-month period must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if successfully treated) that meet Criterion A (i.e., active-phase symptoms) and may include periods of prodromal or residual symptoms. During these prodromal or residual periods, the signs of the disturbance may be manifested by only negative symptoms or two or more symptoms listed in Criterion A present in an attenuated form (e.g., odd beliefs, unusual perceptual experiences).

D. Schizoaffective and Mood Disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective Disorder and Mood Disorder With Psychotic Features have been ruled out because either 1) no Major Depressive, Manic, or Mixed Episodes have occurred concurrently with the active-phase

symptoms; or 2) if mood episodes have occurred during active-phase symptoms, their total duration has been brief relative to the duration of the active and residual periods.

E. Substance/general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition.

F. Relationship to a Pervasive Developmental Disorder: If there is a history of Autistic Disorder or another Pervasive Developmental Disorder, the additional diagnosis of Schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or hallucinations are also present for at least a month (or less if successfully treated).

Classification of longitudinal course (can be applied only after at least 1 year has elapsed since the initial onset of active-phase symptoms):

Episodic with Interepisode Residual Symptoms (episodes are defined by the reemergence of prominent psychotic symptoms); also specify if: With Prominent Negative Symptoms

Episodic with No Interepisode Residual Symptoms

Continuous (prominent psychotic symptoms are present throughout the period of observation); also specify if: With Prominent Negative Symptoms

Single Episode in Partial Remission; also specify if: With Prominent Negative Symptoms

Single Episode in Full Remission

Diagnostic criteria for 295.30 (Schizophrenia) Paranoid Type

A type of Schizophrenia in which the following criteria are met:

A. Preoccupation with one or more delusions or frequent auditory hallucinations.

B. None of the following is prominent: disorganized speech, disorganized or catatonic behavior, or flat or inappropriate affect.

ASYMMETRIC
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WARFARE GROUP

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