

ACD 1698001

datum 4 OKT. 1983

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1) Zo nodig andere rubricering aangeven.

Distr.: BC - HC - SBP

Bijlage(n): div

Afschr.:

BO: 20117

Betreft:

Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (IKV).

Ter verspreiding op een internationaal symposium dat door 'Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (S.A.N.A.) van 20 tot 26 september 1983 in Londen wordt georganiseerd, bood het IKV desgevraagd een aantal exemplaren van een engels-talige folder aan met de grote lijnen van de campagne. Tevens werd een aantal exemplaren van een folder aangeboden die speciaal is gericht op het Amerikaanse publiek met de argumenten tegen plaatsing van Cruisè en Pershing II. Deze folders gaan vergezeld van een 'invitation' waarin de doeleinden van de 'people to people campaign', het raamwerk voor de folders uiteengezet wordt.

Bijgaand wordt van genoemde folders en de 'invitation' een exemplaar aangeboden.



Invitation for Europeans to participate in the PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE APPEAL from Europe to America against Cruise and Pershing II

In December, the US Government and NATO are scheduled to begin deploying the new generation of American nuclear missiles, Cruise and Pershing II, in Europe against the will of the majority of the people. The European disarmament movements have been working hard to prevent this in a number of ways, including pressure on governments and political parties, winning a majority of public opinion, mass demonstrations and peace camps.

In addition to these efforts, the People-To-People Appeal Project, will enable Europeans to try and stop these missiles in the US. Throughout 1983, European individuals and groups will send appeal letters to the American people and groups asking them in the name of security and democracy, to stop the American government from sending these missiles. This mass appeal will give the American movement and people a strong moral basis to oppose these weapons - the sending of these weapons violates the democratic will of the majority of people in Europe. It can also be pointed out that the deployment of these new weapons represents a marked escalation in the nuclear arms race that is also opposed by a majority of Americans, who want a nuclear Freeze. Another objective of the project is to build strong, on-going relationships between people and groups across the Atlantic, uniting them to work for world disarmament. We invite you and your group to participate.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE APPEAL PROJECT

Throughout 1983, European people and groups will be appealing directly to the American people and peace movement, saying, "We don't want Cruise and Pershing II nuclear missiles. Please, stop your government from sending them." The appeals will be sent from individual to individual and from group to group, and also to American politicians and media. Europeans will be sending appeals to their American counterparts - women to women, church to church, business people to business people, students to students, unions, disarmament groups, etc. Americans will be told of the extent of popular opposition to these weapons in Europe and asked to work against these missiles, educate themselves and their constituencies, pressure politicians, and publicise the appeals they receive.

The People-To-People Appeal Project can take on a number of forms. Some groups might "twin" with American groups. An "Appeal Week" later in the year could include national opinion polls, collecting of local appeals in European towns, to be sent to the US in big bags. Many of the 144 British nuclear-free local authorities could sign one letter and send it to 1,000 American city councils, asking them to stop these weapons. The appeals could be made known at all American and European disarmament meetings, and by tours to the US.

The London office of the People-To-People Appeal Project will be publishing lists of American groups who are participating in the project and have agreed to receive appeals from Europe and to then take relevant action.

WHY A PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PROJECT?

After three years of European effort, most Americans still have not got the message that the majority of Europeans desperately oppose American Cruise and Pershing II missiles. Many Americans support sending these missiles in the mistaken belief that Europeans want them in order to preserve their security, freedom and democracy against the "Soviet Threat": "We can't let our European friends down; we must help them."

But the reality is quite different. The majority of Europeans oppose these weapons regardless of US-Soviet decisions at Geneva, and, therefore, the NATO attempts to deploy them violates every basic tenet of democracy. The decision to deploy these weapons was made secretly by a few NATO generals and politicians, without the knowledge or consent of most European parliaments or people. The will of the majority has not been respected. The majority oppose these weapons. In Britain, for example, 144 local authorities voted against nuclear weapons and for nuclear free zones. And a recent poll (Marplan, The Guardian, 21 Jan 83) found that Britons oppose Cruise by 2 to 1 (61% disapprove, 27% approve, 12% don't know). And British women are 4 to 1 opposed (67% disapprove, 15% approve, 17% don't know).

Europeans oppose these weapons, in part because they believe these weapons begin a dangerous new round of escalation in the nuclear arms race, which reduces their security by increasing the likelihood of a nuclear war in Europe through choice or accident. These weapons are making Europe the nuclear battlefield of the two superpowers in a fight that is not the Europeans'.

We believe that the American people want to help preserve freedom and democracy in Europe. Consequently, when the American people get the message that the deployment of these weapons violates the democratic will of the majority of people in Europe (thereby violating the same democracy and freedom these weapons are supposed to be defending) Americans will oppose their government's attempt to send these weapons to Europe. The People-To-People Appeal Project is an attempt to get this message to the American people.

HOW YOU AND YOUR GROUP CAN PARTICIPATE

INDIVIDUALS You can participate as an individual.

- Send a personal appeal to Americans you know or who are your "counterpart" by sharing a similar religion, profession, etc.
- Maintain an on-going relationship to work together for disarmament.
- Encourage groups to which you belong to participate in the People-To-People Project.

PARTICIPANT GROUP Your group can be a "participant group" in the project.

- Send an appeal letter (or signed petition by many people) to as many American groups as you can, particularly groups similar to your own (eg peace, student, union, etc.) (Names of US groups can be got from a networking or coordinator group in your country, or the London PPAP office.)
- Send copies of your appeal also to US local media and politicians, whose names you can request from the American groups to which you send appeals.
- Your group can "twin" with one or more groups similar to your own, working together on an on-going basis not only against Cruise and Pershing II in Europe, but also against the other 3,000 planned Cruise, Trident, and for total nuclear disarmament and world peace. You can exchange views, information, newsletters, and visits.
- Participate in "Appeal Week" (date not set at this time).
- Ask other groups to participate in this project.
- Ask American groups you know to participate. You can send them the leaflet, "Invitation for Americans to Participate in the PPAP".
- Send a small contribution to your national coordinator group or the London office of PPAP.
- Let the coordinator group know about your experiences in the project.

LOCAL COORDINATOR GROUP Your group can agree to be a local coordinator group, which helps oversee and coordinate the appeal project in your area, ask other groups to participate, liaison with the national coordinator group, organize Appeal Week, etc.

REGIONAL OR NATIONAL NETWORK GROUP Encourage groups and individuals in your local or national network (students, medical people, artists, etc.) to participate in the Appeal Project and do on-going liaison and communication between this network and the Project.

WHAT YOU CAN INCLUDE IN YOUR APPEAL LETTERS Say that you and the majority of Europeans don't want Cruise and Pershing II, and why; quote public opinion polls. Ask Americans to oppose these missiles, publicise your appeal, send you names of their local politicians and media. If you want, suggest having a twinning relationship. Your appeal can be a letter signed by you or your members or can include a "petition" signed by many.

HOW THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PROJECT WORKS The basis of the project is the sending of appeals from European individuals and local groups to Americans, asking them to stop the Cruise and Pershing deployment, and establishing on-going relations across the Atlantic working for nuclear disarmament and world peace. Many Europeans can write directly to American groups they know already, but most will write to American groups who have already agreed to receive appeals from Europe and act on them. The names of these groups will be distributed. The London office and the coordinator groups in each country will act as switchboards, helping European and American groups get in touch with each other. Also, they will help run the overall communication and coordination of the project. We are trying to get "coordinator groups" in many American towns to receive European appeals and pass them on to the similar "counterpart" American groups

Our group would like to participate in the PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE APPEAL PROJECT as marked below:

<input type="checkbox"/> PARTICIPANT GROUP Kind of group _____ (peace, student, religious, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/> LOCAL COORDINATOR GROUP Location _____
<input type="checkbox"/> REGIONAL/NATIONAL NETWORK GROUP: Name/kind of network _____	

GROUP NAME _____ Phone _____

ADDRESS _____

CONTACT PERSON, ADDRESS & PHONE _____

Enclosed is a small donation to help defer costs _____
Please send self-addressed envelope.

MAIL THIS FORM TO: PEACE NETWORK, St James Church, 197 Piccadilly, London W1. Phone 01-734 5244

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Suspension

Whatever the outcome of Geneva, the peace movement in Western Europe continues to reaffirm its unconditional opposition to any new missile deployments, even as part of an 'interim solution'. Instead we call for a suspension or delay of any further implementation of the NATO decision (of both of its tracks because both lead to deployment) in order to create time for establishing a new negotiation-framework in Geneva. Several leading politicians have suggested creative alternative approaches, which so far could not be discussed at government level because of 'Geneva'. Any alternative proposal is seen as 'undermining' the US negotiation position. Moreover, the weapons issue should be discussed in a wider context of East-West problems in Europe. Detente and disarmament have to be linked. The current framework in Geneva can only lead to further escalation (a separate Eurostrategic balance) and to confrontation. The deployment of the first new missiles in December 1983 may even derail the whole East-West arms control process for at least several years. Geneva is speeding up the arms race because many officials now say: the sooner we start deployment, the sooner Moscow will make concessions. In reality, these talks do not aim at controlling the arms race but at controlling public protest against the arms race. Negotiations are needed, but their framework should be such that they can produce steps towards a solution. We ask our own governments to stop being paralysed by 'Geneva', to respond to the majority in our own countries, and to finally take initiatives of their own to prevent the crisis of 1983. We ask the Soviet Union to make a start with dismantling its missiles, both old and new. And we ask the US people to urge Congress to prevent the deployment of this new generation of US missiles.

July 1983



This folder is a service of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) to the British-originated 'People to People Campaign'.

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1. The peace movement in Western Europe

In recent years the European peace movement has grown tremendously. In the fall of 1981 it organized the largest anti-nuclear weapons demonstrations ever held in Europe. It has won massive support from all layers of the population. It has succeeded in winning some important political parties to its views or to positions close to it. In several countries it is very close to the churches. And it has forced two NATO governments to postpone a decision to deploy new nuclear missiles on their territory. Nevertheless, the aim to begin a process of nuclear disarmament, by independent first steps by European countries, has not yet come closer.

Increasingly, our energy is absorbed by our efforts to stop a new generation of nuclear weapons from coming in rather than getting the existing ones out. We are still in the midst of this struggle, which is heading for a climax by the end of 1983.

A new and hopeful factor is that we now realize that we are part of a worldwide mass-movement that is operating on an international scale to halt the madness of the nuclear arms race. Two important examples are the churches in the GDR (East Germany) who have taken new initiatives and the growing movement in the Pacific to stop French nuclear tests.


In Europe we have welcomed the rapid rise of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign with particular enthusiasm. From its very beginning we have been in close contact with it. We have been impressed to see how it found massive support among the American people in a very short time, irrespective of social and political differences. Fear of nuclear war, concern about new weapon developments in both East and West which signal the trend toward nuclear warfighting, uneasiness about bellicose rhetoric and disenchantment with arms control-as-usual are common elements of our movements.

2. The freeze on European arms

We see the 'Freeze' as a time-urgent proposal. Its immediate goal is to stop the new generation of nuclear weapons which is in the making both in East and West, and which will put a hair-trigger on nuclear war. We in Europe feel the pressure of time very directly.

In December 1983 NATO wants to begin the deployment of the first US Pershing II and cruise missiles. For the first time in history, Western Europe will serve as a launching platform for extremely accurate US strategic missiles targeted at the Soviet Union.

Should these missiles be deployed the prospects of achieving a U.S.-Soviet freeze on all new nuclear weapons will be seriously undermined.



In December 1979, NATO made its so-called double track decision: to deploy 572 US missiles in five Western European countries and to offer negotiations to the Soviet Union. This led to a series of protests in many European countries, which climaxed in the unprecedented mass demonstrations in the autumn of 1981, when 3 million people marched the streets of Western European cities.

Since then, opposition has continued to grow. Some examples: peace camps were organized at many nuclear weapons storage sites. In Sicily, where the first cruise missiles are due to arrive by the end of 1983, more than a million signatures (more than half of the adult population) were collected within 2 months in 1982. In December 1982, in a symbolic action involving non-violent civil disobedience, some 30,000 women 'embraced' the cruise missile base near Greenham Common in England to protect the world from its evil.

In West Germany the Social Democratic Party has gradually shifted to a much more critical position with respect to the Euromissiles question and 'the Greens' (the ecological party), who reject deployment unconditionally, won a number of seats in Parliament in the recent elections. In Belgium also the peace movement keeps growing, and in the Netherlands government leaders have even publicly stated their doubt that a deployment decision could be implemented without lasting damage to the cohesion of society.

In those NATO-countries where no missiles are to be deployed opposition has also grown. In Canada, the plans to test US cruise missiles are strongly protested. In Denmark and Norway the public unrest about the missiles became evident in their Parliaments: Denmark voted to withhold the payment of their share of infra structure costs of the NATO program, in Norway the same proposal lost with one vote difference. Greece refuses to agree to the deployment paragraphs in NATO communiqués and promotes initiatives for a nuclear free zone in the Balkans. In Denmark, Parliament forced the government to step out of line when all NATO countries were supposed to vote no to a Freeze resolution in the United Nations. (In the Netherlands a similar resolution failed to pass in Parliament by only the smallest margin). Moreover, the Danish

Parliament recently voted not to agree with deployment as long as the Geneva-negotiations are still underway.

Permanent testimony of the public resistance in Europe appears in the various opinion polls. Opposition in the various European countries to the NATO decision was substantial from the beginning and has been growing considerably ever since.

3. The polls

In the Netherlands a poll which was taken in November 1979, before the NATO decision, showed some 37% of the population in favour and 25% against deployment of new US missiles in Europe. When the nature and implications of the decision became better known to the public, opposition against deployment increased markedly. In all the polls there now appears a hard core of 40-50% of the population which rejects deployment unconditionally. About 30% prefer to make their answer dependent on the arms control negotiations in Geneva. Faced with a direct question (yes or no to deployment), half of these reject deployment as well. This means that about two thirds of the Dutch population (more than 60%) oppose deployment.

In the other four deployment countries the opposition has also grown considerably in past two to three years. In Great Britain, according to a recent poll (Marplan, The Guardian, January 21, 1983), 61% of the population disapprove of deployment of cruise missiles and 27% are in favour. Unconditional opposition in that country doubled in the course of 1981 (from 23% to 46%). A similar process can be seen in the Federal Republic of Germany. Unconditional opposition increased from 29% in July 1981 to 47% in January 1982.

According to "Der Spiegel" magazine, the Bonn government has an unpublished study by the Sinus Institute in Munich, in which 61% of those polled favor postponement of deployment, if by the autumn of 1983

"there is still no agreement in Geneva. In June 1983 a poll ZDF-television showed that the percentage favoring postponement had increased to 72%. In Italy, in October 1981, 60% opposed the new missiles on the basis of a simple yes or no question. A poll in July 1983 again showed 60% against. In Belgium (L'Evenement, 1 October 1982) in 1981 50.2% were against deployment of new missiles on their territory, whereas in 1980 this figure was only 41.7%.

As to other NATO countries: in Norway, (December 1982) 69% oppose deployment in Europe. In Denmark, in spite of very biased and misguided phrasing of the questions in the poll (Gallup, January 17, 1983, Berlingske Tidende) 51% thought it wrong to deploy new US missiles as an answer to a Soviet threat.

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Democracy

Why is it that these figures are so little reflected in the official politics of the European governments? In only one of the 5 NATO-countries where according to the December 1979 decision new nuclear missiles were to be deployed this decision was subjected to proper parliamentary debate prior to the decision. This was the Netherlands, and there parliament vote against it. However, in NATO unanimity is traditionally considered a political imperative of the utmost importance. For instance, late in 1982 Western European governments even had to officially endorse President Reagan's newest MX missile deployment plan, because not to do so would be seen in Moscow as a sign of division within NATO and — more importantly — the Reagan administration needed European support against growing opposition within the US. Virtually no European government really liked the Reagan plan, but none dared to say so.

The NATO double track decision has gradually become the main test-case for demonstrating the unity and resolve of the alliance and thus serves a political rather than a military purpose. Many Western European politicians who were in power in 1979 and are no longer today now admit that the NATO decision was a mistake. But our governments cannot afford this luxury and will be most reluctant to drop the commitments of 1979 to deploy new missiles, in spite of the inevitable high political costs. For the people in Europe will get more and more alienated from the political process, as our leaders continue to disregard our most sincere convictions and concerns.

We believe in democracy. But what else can we do than demonstrate again and again, in the polls and on the streets, that the majority of the people in our countries do not want these new missiles? The talks in Geneva cannot stop them. Our governments are paralysed by the demand of unanimity in NATO. We must now count on the help of the American people to make democracy work. The Freeze movement in the USA supports our struggle to stop the new missiles; while also calling on the Soviet Union to reduce its intermediate-range missiles aimed at Europe. We appeal to the American people to urge Congress to oppose the funding of testing, production and deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles and to halt all efforts to begin deployment of the missiles in December 1983.


5. The arguments

Originally, the reason for NATO's modernisation plan was not the growing offensive force of the Soviet Union (particularly its SS - 20 missile) but its increased defensive potential, in particular its air defense. NATO said its aging bombers could no longer penetrate. By 1979, the official arguments underlying NATO's 'double track' decision had

shifted. At that time the most prominent argument there had grown a substantial asymmetry in Europe respect to land-based systems for the intermediate range. Because of the parity between the Soviet Union and the USA in strategic systems, to be codified in Salt II, this regional imbalance was seen as undercutting the credibility of the West's nuclear deterrent and as a potential cause of political blackmail by Moscow. This argument focused on the replacement of the almost 20 year old Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles by the SS-20, a multiple warhead (MIRV) missile of greater range and accuracy. NATO claimed to have no answer to this threat, although already before the first SS-20 appeared the US sea-launched missiles so far 'countering' the SS-4 and SS-5 had been 'MIRV'ed. Later, when public resistance to deployment grew, the official argument changed again. Originally, the negotiation 'track' had been added to the deployment 'track' to make deployment acceptable by public opinion. Now this was reversed. Going on with deployment was called necessary for the success of the negotiations. (The outcome would, of course, be the same: deployment).

The peace movement in Europe has consistently expressed its opposition to the SS-20 program. It also opposes the current and equally impressive modernization plans of French and British nuclear weapons. All current nuclear weapons modernization in Europe (Soviet, American, French and British) points towards nuclear warfighting and the SS-20 is clearly one of the most threatening of today's missiles. But "response" to this new Soviet modernization round makes the situation even more dangerous, for a number of reasons.

- It is again one more step in the nuclear arms race between the superpowers that has been going on for too long already. It will not bring more security in Europe. If American cruise missiles and Pershing II's will be deployed, the Soviet Union will respond again with new weapons on its side. Such reasoning reflects a dangerous fixation on comparisons between various weapon systems and playing the 'numbers game', although there are already far more nuclear warheads than conceivable targets.
- Qualitatively this new step is even more dangerous. This new generation of nuclear weapons of extreme accuracy



changes the strategic situation of Europe and feeds Soviet anxieties about the trends towards a US first strike capability. The Pershing II, once deployed, will be the most accurate missile in the world, the first ballistic missile of the coming generation of first strike nuclear weapons. The trend toward nuclear warfighting postures, which is the guideline of the current modernization both in East and West, is a special cause of great uneasiness for us in Europe. We know that to see Europe as the theatre of a possible 'limited' nuclear war is utter nonsense.

- That the deployment of US Euromissiles is a response to European concerns is only partly true. Long before such concerns were expressed (for instance late in 1977 by Chancellor Schmidt) the US Air Force was already planning to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles at three NATO bases. Today, the issue of the Euromissiles must be seen as part of the overall strategy of the US administration to develop a position of military superiority towards the Soviet Union. The peace movement in Europe is certainly not anti-American. But we are very concerned about the ideological, moral, even religious rhetoric which the Reagan administration uses to underline its foreign policy and its relation to the Soviet Union in particular. Whatever we may think of the socio-political system of the Soviet Union and the policies of its leaders — and the peace movement in Western Europe expresses its criticism in this respect quite frankly which has led some Soviet officials to call us CIA-agents — defining the relations with the Soviet Union in terms of "a struggle between right and wrong, good and evil", talking of the Soviet Union as "an evil empire", and considering a continuation of a forced arms race and economic sanctions as appropriate means to get the Soviet Union on its knees, is endangering world peace. New efforts for detente are of vital interest for Europe. The deployment, for the first time in European history, of such extremely accurate US missiles in Europe targeted at the Soviet Union means further escalation of tension and confrontation. In strictly military terms there have always been doubts about the real need for deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing II's in Europe. Since after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the US replaced its land-based missiles in Europe by bombers and missiles on submarines, the Soviet Union has had a virtual monopoly in Europe with respect to land-based intermediate range missiles. NATO did not find reason at that time to 'match' this threat with land-based missiles of its own. Its potential in submarine and air-based systems was considered an adequate compensation; this potential has continuously been and is continuously being modernized and expanded.
- From the beginning the political arguments were the most important: NATO's desire to show resolve and cohesion after some nasty conflicts between President

Carter and Chancellor Schmidt. But in fact, the NATO decision has proved to be one of the most divisive issues in its history.

- Deployment of Euromissiles as scheduled for 1983 will also be a serious setback for the American peace movement because of the qualitative dimensions and the fact that verification will be much more difficult to achieve. Cruise missiles are difficult to count and can be used with either conventional or nuclear warheads.

6. Geneva

For a number of reasons the peace movement in Western Europe has been and still is very critical and sceptical about the possible outcomes of the Geneva talks.

- It is acknowledged in many (semi-) official reports that in 1979 the negotiation 'track' was added to the deployment 'track' to pacify public opinion and to legitimize deployment.
- Contents and timing of the various proposals that have been made (zero-option, interim-proposal) all suggest that their purpose continues to be to appease European public opinion rather than to achieve real results. The outcome will be deployment, full or partial.
- European countries do not sit at the table in Geneva, but are only consulted.
- Only lately and under heavy European pressure did the Reagan administration start the negotiations in Geneva at all.

Most important, and scarcely known by the public and many politicians alike, is that since the beginning NATO's negotiation approach has been determined by the search for a separate 'Eurostrategic balance': the NATO 1979 decision demanded 'equality' between the US and the USSR in land-based missiles, thus focusing on the only type of weapon systems of which NATO had none and the Soviet Union had great preponderance, and excluding all systems (air-based and sea-based) which so far had been regarded as countering these Soviet land-based missiles. President Reagan's 'zero-option' of November 1981 sounded appealing ('zero') but in fact represented an even tougher approach. 'Zero' (no deployment of US missiles in Europe) was only possible if the Soviet Union completely dismantled all its intermediate range missiles it had deployed since 1959, not just those targeted at Europe.

This approach was purely propagandistic: it was certain that Moscow would reject it, because it now added the Soviet missiles targeted at China to the equation and continued to exclude all French and British missiles targeted at the Soviet Union. In December 1982, Andropov responded in kind with what he called "a really honest zero-option": no new US missiles, no Soviet missiles to counter them, only (i) 162 Soviet missiles to counter the 162 British and French missiles. Although this proposal entailed the dismantling

several dozen SS-20's, its acceptance was equally unlikely because of its explicit link with the British and French nuclear forces, thereby (politically) trying clearly to uncouple Western European security from US security.

For the peace movement, both approaches are unacceptable. Both kinds of a separate 'Eurostrategic balance' would mean a new, separate Eurostrategic arms race. The one would introduce a new generation of US missiles, the other would legitimize both the SS-20 and the British and French nuclear programs. Britain and France are even planning to have more warheads on their missiles in the nineties than the total Soviet SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 force of today. Andropov clearly had this in mind when in May 1983 he offered to count not only missiles but warheads as well, thereby hardening his position, to match the French and British modernization programs, Moscow will need more than 162 3-warhead SS-20's.

Reagan's recent 'interim offer' (March 1983) does not change the basic position at all. It means: the US will deploy as many new weapons as the Soviet Union wants to keep. So, the US will go up (in land-based missiles) to the level where the Soviet Union will go down. The only thing worth noting about Reagan's newest 'offer' is that it should finally end the illusion, so cherished by governments and many political parties in Europe, that Geneva can produce 'zero' (no deployment). Already since 1979, the framework agreed upon by NATO means that any outcome of Geneva will mean the coming of a new generation of missiles. Given this framework, to negotiate means to deploy. Only the numbers are negotiable. In December 1979, many supporters of the double track decision said that deploying 572 new missiles was, of course, too much, but the negotiation-track could bring the number down to some 300. Reagan's newest offer is widely understood as meaning: let's settle for some 300. We as peace movements despair of our governments and many of our politicians who for years have been paralysed by 'Geneva'. They called for 'zero' and at the same time since 1979 they have agreed to a negotiation approach which makes certain that both *without* and *with* an agreement the deployment of new missiles will start in December 1983!

The fact that nothing has happened in Geneva so far, however, does not mean that nothing will happen in the coming months. Both parties have an interest in some kind of 'arms control' deal: NATO and the US to sell deployment to public opinion (which has been the purpose of the negotiations since 1979), and the Soviet Union to get things moving in the START talks and not to have to carry out its own threats, like suspending all negotiations (in any case START and INF) after the first deployments, and deploying missiles in closer range of the US (though not in Cuba as in 1962), also deploying more missiles in East European countries etc.

INTERNATIONAL

After this hot autumn of 1981 with a total of some 3 million people marching in Bonn, Rome, London, Brussels, Paris, Amsterdam and many other cities in Europe, the peace movement in October 1983 will be back in the streets. Since 1981 most of the main Western European peace campaigns are working closely together. Their common purpose is a nuclear weapon free Europe. Also since the summer of 1981 there has been intensive cooperation with the US Freeze Campaign which is based on mutual support. Contacts have been intensified with movements in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.

On a different level, there is communication with a variety of organisations, groups and initiatives in Eastern Europe, although on a more modest scale. In particular several statements by the churches in the GDR have been very helpful in the discussions in the Netherlands.

Contacts with the Third World are growing, especially in the Pacific.

Together with a number of church-related organisations and movements on all continents, IKV has initiated an appeal to the Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Vancouver (Summer 1983) to support the growing network of groups working for justice and peace, the two should always be linked.

IKV also organised a visit by a joint delegation of Western European and US peace movements to Nicaragua in April 1983. Peace movements should not only be movements for peace but also movements against war, oppression, deprivation and interventionism.

IKV

BO 201117

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INTERKERKELIJK VREDESBERAAD

Interchurch Peace Council (IKV)

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Paulownaplein 3, The Hague, The Netherlands

Our phone: 070 - 46 97 56

**Help rid the World of
Nuclear Weapons.
Let it begin
in the Netherlands.**

A folder about the disarmament campaign
of the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV)
in the Netherlands

July 1983

In November 1980, the General Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church took the position that all nuclear weapons should be unilaterally removed from the Netherlands, as a first step in a new effort to halt the nuclear arms race. This decision was preceded by a year-long debate at all levels of the church, involving literally thousands of local parish meetings.

The new position of the General Synod was expressed in a pastoral letter to all congregations and was a major support for IKV. So far, many churches throughout the world have expressed repeatedly their concern about the nuclear arms race in general terms, but seldom or never have they been concrete as to the political implications of their concern. Usually they have adhered to criteria for disarmament which have been generally accepted in politics. The pastoral letter of the Netherlands Reformed Church set a new pattern.

The need for the churches to choose their own path towards disarmament has also been forcefully argued in late 1980 in a report by Pax Christi Netherlands. The report advised the Roman Catholic bishops that, after the many condemnations of the use of nuclear arms, they should now end any 'tolerance' of the possession of nuclear arms as part of a strategy of deterrence, and that they should support the proposal of IKV. After Pax Christi's report was discussed at many levels in the Dutch Roman Catholic Church, the bishops responded in June 1983 with a pastoral letter, like their colleagues in the USA,

West-Germany and East-Germany. Although the letter was some aspects less concrete than the American one, the bishops stated that the use of nuclear arms should never be permitted, that they oppose the deployment of new missiles, and that they consider unilateral steps to be a possibility to break through the arms race.

Several smaller churches such as the Remonstrant Brotherhood, the Lutheran Church, The Mennonites, and the Quakers have explicitly endorsed IKV's campaign. In others decision-making has not yet been completed.

POLITICS

Political struggles are not won by pastoral letters and public opinion polls. But what has been said so far may help to explain why the nuclear arms issue is now one of the major issues in Dutch politics.


However, none of the larger political parties have adopted IKV's proposal of unilateral denuclearisation of the Netherlands (The Social Democratic party did so, but later withdrew its support because its leader had said that otherwise he would not be available to lead the party in the elections).

Public debate nowadays is dominated by the possible deployment of cruise missiles. Woensdrecht, an airfield on the Belgian border, was announced by the Christian Democrat/Liberal government in June 1983 as the designated deployment site.

The Social Democrats are in opposition; they are against deployment. The (right-wing) Liberals are in favour. The Christian Democrats are divided and want to wait for 'Geneva'.


The outcome of all this will most likely again be postponement of the final decision, this time until after the deployment of the first Pershing II's in West Germany and the first cruise missiles in England and Sicily.

In 1979 the Dutch government supported NATO's decision but — due to the strength of the peace movement — was unable to say yes to deployment of its own share of NATO's new missiles in Holland. It promised NATO that it would make a decision in 1981. It then postponed its decision to 1983 and will now postpone to 1984. This 'clean hands policy' (a government agreeing with NATO but making an exception for itself instead of taking independent initiatives to stop the whole NATO programme) was the reason why IKV together with the West-German church-related peace organisation 'Action Reconciliation' initiated the plan for a huge demonstration in Bonn, October 10, 1981. This was to be the first in a series of the largest demonstrations against nuclear weapons Europe had ever seen which culminated in Amsterdam with 400,000 people on November 21, 1981.



Often the new peace movement in Western Europe is labelled as 'neutralist', 'pacifist', 'anti-American' and 'Moscow-inspired'. Such labels are not very helpful in explaining what moves hundreds of thousands demonstrators to join rallies in West-European capitals.

For most of the new peace movement in Europe, none of these labels apply. They certainly do not apply to the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, IKV) which has developed one of West-Europe's more prominent disarmament campaigns.



...to disarm...
...gatherings, and...
...peace and human...
...churches, but the church...
...positions IKV takes...
...since its founding the...
...Annual Peace Week...
...cities, towns and...
...September 1977, IKV...
...against nuclear weapons...
...world of nuclear weapons...
...its aim was to contribute to...
...disarmament by getting...
...Dutch soil as a...
...core' groups have...
...church-related, which...

CHARACTERISTICS

The IKV is not 'neutralist'...
...withdrawal from NATO...
...clearly defined steps...
...two superpowers...
...of the nuclear arms...
...disaster. Such inde...
...country. Their ob...
...self-obligation: rath...
...solve the problem...
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...governments must...
...tical expression...
...ants and an...
...new active peace...
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1. *A pastoral motive.* For many years, people had been called upon, by churches and politicians alike, to be concerned about the nuclear arms race. But nobody told them what they could do. IKV considered it to be pastorally irresponsible to continue on this line and judged that the time had passed for such general calls for concern. There was now a need to develop an new concrete proposal and to organize power behind this proposal.

2. *The developments in the arms race itself.* This second motive relates to the fact that the arms race is entering a new phase, which will make the immediate future very much unlike the past 35 years. The major new factors are: — the end of 'pure' deterrence and the trend towards postures and strategies of ('limited') nuclear warfighting; — the end of arms control as a potential force in stopping destabilizing weapon development and its new role in 'controlling' public protest against the arms race rather than the arms race itself; — the end of non-proliferation and therefore of nuclear deterrence as a bipolar system.

PUBLIC OPINION

The concrete proposal of the IKV campaign in 1977 was to remove all existing nuclear weapons from Dutch soil and from the Dutch armed forces. In fact since then most energy has had to be invested in preventing new ones from coming in, the most prominent ones being the neutron

bomb and the cruise missiles. The latter are part of NATO's well-known decision of December 1979 to deploy a new generation of 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. The concreteness of these struggles has helped to make the issues more clear to public opinion.

Opinion polls show a rather constant pattern of more than half of the Dutch population favouring IKV's proposal of unilateral denuclearisation of the Netherlands, as a first step; a large majority of 65 to 75% oppose the deployment of cruise missiles. NATO's newest policy of virtually replacing the military rationale of its programme ('countering the SS-20') by its presumed arms control potential ('abolishing or reducing the SS-20') has been recognized by many as the age-old argument that one has to arm in order to disarm — and that is a policy with a 35-year old record of failure.

Nevertheless the constant hammering by politicians and media of the Geneva talks as the only way to 'solve' the problem has had a paralysing effect both on politics and on public opinion, despite IKV's persistent message that 'Geneva' can only bring deployment and will legitimate a new arms race in Europe. In the negotiation framework as agreed by NATO, only the numbers are negotiable, not the deployment as such.

The methods used by IKV to influence public opinion include canvassing door-to-door, making local political issues out of nuclear war preparations such as public

nuclear shelter programs, inviting doctors to take a stand, writing thousands of letters to politicians, and organising mass demonstrations. Of course the network of 400 committed local groups is of crucial importance for this work.

