

Questions about the Transport of Intercepted IP Traffic document

- Q1. Which version is the standard according to the law (Vo.1.2 Draft or Vo.2.0 Standard)?
- Q2. May lower versions of the TIIT be implemented?
- Q3. What is the procedure according to changes of the TIIT? How are changes made? Who takes care of communications of changes? When and how are changes technically implemented?
- Q4. Piii: What means “functional unit”? When this is the S₁, S₂, T₁ or T₂ it seems that S₁ and S₂ or T₁ and T₂ may not be combined. Is this correct?
- Q5. What means LEMF? Is this only the combination T₁ + T₂ or also S₁ + S₂?
- Q6. P1: Are the S₁+S₂ combination meant by “interception function”? This means that TIIT only specifies the handover interface between S₂ and T₁. Is this correct?
- Q7. Where can I find or get the documents in the References?
- A. [Brag97] RFC2119: <ftp://ftp.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>
[CLE+00] Functional Specifications: Can be obtained via the Ministry of Justice or the Dutch ISPA (NLIP).
[DA99] RFC2246: <ftp://ftp.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt>
[Mil92] RFC1305: <ftp://ftp.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1305.txt>
[RVoo] AMvB: unknown yet
[Srig95] RFC1832: <ftp://ftp.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1832.txt>
- Q8. Are all these documents available in English?
- Q9. P4: What (kind of) personnel (on the ISP-side) are involved in Lawful Interception?
- Q10. P4: How about subcontractors having (a part of) the network in control. Are employees of the subcontractors authorized personnel?
- Q11. P4+6: Will there be any transport media other than the Internet (in the future) for LI?
- Q12. Is it necessary to record log events for LI even when in normal operation this is not done?
- Q13. Are hosting companies also ISP within this context (only having a server but no network services)?
- Q14. P7: Can a “normal” network within a building connecting S₁ and S₂ be marked as a secure channel? On page 14 is stated that a secure channel is not necessary if S₁ and S₂ are in the same building. Is this correct? Is encryption necessary when S₁ and S₂ are in the same building (Page 8)?
- Q15. P7: Is an encrypted channel over the Internet possible to connect S₁ to S₂?
- Q16. P7: What is the C₂ protocol / channel?
- Q17. P8: What margins of the time are allowed? E.g. can S₂ be synchronized with NTP from the Internet and act as a NTP server for S₁?
- Q18. P8: What are all these acronyms?
- A.
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| ISP | Internet Service Provider |
| Interception Function | ? |
| NTP | Network Time Protocol |
| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol |
| DPDU | ? |
| PDU ₂ | ? |
| SHA (hash) | ? |
| TIIT | Transport of Intercepted IP Traffic |
| SSL | Secure Socket Layer |
| TLS | ? |
| TCP/IPSec | ? |
| IKE | ? |

- Q19. P8: Why MUST S₁ generate the hash? May S₂ do this job? S₁ can be a standard machine in this case, without modifications.
- Q20. P9: How does S₁ function anyway without an IP stack? An IP stack is necessary to monitor to IP traffic! How is IP stack defined in this situation? (having an IP address?)
- Q21. P9: What is the procedure when S₂-T₁ communications times out?
E.g. who are authorized personnel? How do you know for sure (on the other side)? Receiving side contacts are not specified in the XML-example! How to reach the LEA? By phone? How to secure this communication channel?
- Q22. P9: Is TIIT meant as a RFC? If so, why is it not formatted as such?
- Q23. P9: What kind of alarm is possible to alarm authorized personnel when a crypto suite is not correct? What must the personnel do next?
- Q24. P9: Which crypto suites are allowed?
- Q25. P12: definition of “int”. Is this 32 bit?
- Q26. P13: Who or where is the Sniffer ID determined?
- Q27. P14: MUST S₁ encapsulate the PDU's or may S₂ do this job?
- Q28. P14: When T₁ cannot reach any T₂ there traffic from S₂ will not be accepted. This means that after one hour the ISP personnel has to inform the LEA personnel. Should there not be a mechanism that the LEA-personnel informs the ISP? E.g. the T₁ – S₂ should also have a time-out and procedure of contacting the ISP.
- Q29. P14: Does the S₂ has to buffer the traffic when a link (S₂-T₁ or T₁-T₂) is not available or even down?
- Q30. Is there a difference in channel status (status=“down”) between S₂ and T₁ when a time out occurs of 300 s. (retries) or 3600 s. (alternative route)? MUST the traffic that is received by S₂ from S₁ be delivered after the T₁ is up again? If so, in both cases?
- Q31. P17: What about PDU's that are at large as the MTU? May PDU₂ be larger than the MTU or must it split into two packets?
- Q32. P18: What are the criteria for negotiation on other media for delivering H₁. Will negotiation take place on individual bases or for all ISP's and LEA's together?
- Q33. P14: For T₁ – T₂ communications a physically secured and total administrative control is a secure channel. Does this also count for S₁ – S₂?
More generally: What are secure channels?
- Q34. P18: Must S₂ deliver the traffic to at most 5 T₁'s? What is the purpose of this?
Can the use of several T₁'s be explained, because it is not quite clear in the document?
One possibility is to deliver to more than one T₁. The other is to have different routes for delivering to the LEA.
- Q35. P20: Here it seems that S₁ has warrants. The warrants should be set up on S₂ and not S₁, is this correct? S₂ set up the tunnel. Why and how does S₁ have to torn it down?
- Q36. P20: Isn't it true that there is only one warrant per tunnel? So the tunnel should always be torn down after the warrant ends?
- Q37. P20: Can the use of target location be explained? Who gives the X and Y coordinates and how are the established?
- Q38. P20/21: Must DHCP renewal events given to T₁? If so, is it via SuccessfulIPv4DHCPRegistration?
- Q39. P20: Is there a fixed format for the telephone number?
- Q40. How must S₂ authenticate S₁? Is it up to the ISP?
- Q41. P23: In chapter 12.1 more functionality is given to both H₁ as H₂. Why not in the specific chapters?
- Q42. P23: How must S₂ handover a log event when there is no session established?

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- Q43. P23: In the previous chapters it seems that HII is a one way channel from LEA to ISP. Is it true that log events could go over HII? So, it would be bi-directional. What is the procedure in this case? How is the data transferred and in which format? Consider the fact that HII will be electronic in the future, without human interference.
- Q44. P24: It is stated that randomly a given tunnel should be used. Can this be clarified?
In the specifications it seems that there is only one tunnel per warrant. See also Question 34.
- Q45. P26. Who gives the X.509 certificates?
- Q46. P26. Is it true that a specific X.509 certificate can be used for more than 1 warrant?
This seems to be the fact, since it is stated that a certificate expires after one year.
- Q47. Why are the terms SSLv3 and TLS both mentioned all the ways? Can this be clarified?
- Q48. P6: Is it correct that events (authentication, log) are transmitted from S2 to T1 after they are received by the server and not during the event itself?
- Q49. Chapter 9 en 12. It is not clearly specified how HII3: Email packet in IP PDU is build. What is the payload of a Email Packet in an IP PDU? Are the IP packets of SMTP communication of E-mail addressed (TO,CC en BCC) to the target or is it the email text message as specified in RFC 822 en RFC 821?
- Q50. TIIT v0.1.2 12.2 Message formats of intercepted traffic: de specification of a IP PDU for intercepted email (conform RFC 822) is forgotten. Is this true?